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Zusammenfassung 
Der Schwerpunkt dieser Dissertation liegt auf Fragen der Messung in der Erforschung 
von Wahrscheinlichkeits- und Risikourteilen. Ausgangspunkt hierfür waren eine Reihe von 
Studien zum sogenannten Einzelfalleffekt—einer systematischen Verzerrung von Urteilen 
über statistisch vermittelte Risiken durch persönliche Erfahrungsberichte—, an denen ich 
beteiligt war (Betsch, Renkewitz & Haase, 2013; Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz & Betsch, 
2011). Der erste Artikel (Haase, Betsch & Renkewitz, 2015) ist ein Beispiel für diese 
Forschung: In dem experimentellen Paradigma erhalten die Teilnehmer sowohl eine 
statistische Information über die Auftretenswahrscheinlichkeit eines unerwünschten 
Ereignisses, als auch eine Reihe von kurzen Einzelfallerzählungen. Variiert wird die relative 
Häufigkeit der Berichte, die das Auftreten des unerwünschten Ereignisses schildern. Der 
Einzelfalleffekt bezeichnet den Befund, dass eine höhere Frequenz solcher Einzelfallberichte 
die wahrgenommene Auftretenswahrscheinlichkeit und das wahrgenommene Risiko des 
unerwünschten Ereignisses signifikant steigert. Normativ betrachtet sollten die Einzelfälle 
aufgrund der geringen Stichprobengröße im Vergleich zur Statistik jedoch keinen Einfluss auf 
das Urteilsverhalten haben. 
In allen Studien zu diesem Effekt sind die subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit und das 
wahrgenommene Risiko die zentralen abhängigen Variablen. In der Forschung herrscht 
jedoch nur wenig Einigkeit darüber, wie beide Konstrukte am besten zu messen sind. Daher 
beschäftigt sich der zweite Artikel (Betsch, Haase, Renkewitz & Schmid, 2015) unter 
anderem mit der Frage, ob der Einzelfalleffekt aufgabenabhängig ist, das heißt, ob er sich in 
Abhängigkeit vom verwendeten Messinstrument ändert. Artikel 3 und 4 (Haase & Betsch, 
2016; Haase, Renkewitz & Betsch, 2013) sind methodisch ausgerichtet. In insgesamt vier 
Experimenten habe ich verschiedene Messformate zur Erfassung subjektiver 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteile unter streng kontrollierten Bedingungen evaluiert. Beide Artikel 
befassen sich mit psychometrischen Eigenschaften der untersuchten Messinstrumente, wie 
Sensitivität und Kontextabhängigkeit. 
Artikel 1: Quellenglaubwürdigkeit und der verzerrende Einfluss von Einzelfall-
informationen auf die Wahrnehmung von Impfrisiken 
Während sich viele Bereiche für die Erforschung von Risikowahrnehmung eignen, 
sind Fragen des Gesundheitsverhaltens in jüngerer Zeit stärker in den Fokus psychologischer 
Forschung gerückt. Ein Grund hierfür liegt im Aufkommen der sogenannten partizipativen 
Entscheidungsfindung in der Medizin (Makoul & Clayman, 2006). Dies bedeutet, dass 
Patienten in zunehmendem Maße in medizinische und gesundheitsrelevante Entscheidungen 
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einbezogen werden. Dafür ist die adäquate Verarbeitung und Gewichtung probabilistischer 
Informationen eine wichtige Voraussetzung. Ein prominentes Beispiel hierfür ist die 
Impfentscheidung und die in den letzten Jahren wieder verstärkte Diskussion über das Risiko 
von Nebenwirkungen bei Impfungen (Dubé, Vivion & MacDonald, 2015). Darüber hinaus 
bezieht eine zunehmende Anzahl von Menschen gesundheitsrelevante Informationen aus dem 
Internet (Fox & Duggan, 2013), wo sich vermehrt impfkritische Internetseiten finden lassen, 
die von sogenannten Impfgegnern als Plattform genutzt werden. Ein häufiges Merkmal dieser 
Seiten sind individuelle Erfahrungsberichte von oder über Personen, die angeblich durch 
Impfstoffe geschädigt wurden (Guidry, Carlyle, Messner & Jin, 2015; Kata, 2010). Solche 
narrativen Informationen können in der Gesundheitskommunikation sehr effektiv sein 
(Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007; Winterbottom, Bekker, Conner & Mooney, 2008). Um 
Gesundheitsentscheidungen unter diesen Bedingungen experimentell zu erforschen, 
entwickelten Betsch et al. (2011) das oben beschriebene Forschungsparadigma. 
In der vorliegenden Studie wurde getestet, ob die Glaubwürdigkeit der 
Informationsquellen den Effekt von Einzelfällen auf die Wahrnehmung von Impfrisiken 
moderiert. Die Teilnehmer sahen zunächst eine Statistik über die Auftretens-
wahrscheinlichkeit von Nebenwirkungen (20%) nach einer Impfung gegen eine fiktive 
Krankheit. Im Anschluss lasen sie 20 personalisierte Erfahrungsberichte aus einem Online-
Forum zu dieser Impfung. In einem between-subjects Versuchsplan wurden die relative 
Häufigkeit der Einzelfälle, die von Impfnebenwirkungen berichten (35% vs. 85%), die 
Glaubwürdigkeit der Quelle von Einzelfällen (impfkritische Internetseite vs. neutrales 
Gesundheitsforum) und die Glaubwürdigkeit der Statistik (verlässliche Daten vs. nicht 
verlässliche Daten vs. Kontrolle) variiert. Im Anschluss beurteilten die Teilnehmer das Risiko 
der Impfung, ihre Impfintention sowie die wahrgenommene Wahrscheinlichkeit und den 
wahrgenommenen Schweregrad der Nebenwirkungen. Die Ergebnisse zeigten einen stabilen 
Einzelfalleffekt auf allen abhängigen Variablen, der nicht von den Glaubwürdigkeits-
manipulationen moderiert wurde. Allerdings führten Einzelfälle aus einem impfkritischen 
Forum zu einer generell niedrigeren Wahrnehmung von Impfrisiken. Zusätzliche Analysen 
zeigten, dass die beiden Risikokomponenten, Wahrscheinlichkeit und Schweregrad, nicht 
unabhängig voneinander wahrgenommen wurden. 
Artikel 2: Was treibt den verzerrenden Einfluss von Einzelfällen auf die 
Risikowahrnehmung? 
In zwei Experimenten wurden verschiedene methodische und prozedurale Faktoren 
untersucht, welche den Einzelfalleffekt beeinflussen oder erklären könnten. Dazu wurden 
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unterschiedliche Messformate zur Erfassung des Effekts verglichen und getestet, ob die 
relative oder aber die absolute Anzahl von Einzelfällen, die das relevante Ereignis berichten, 
zu der Verzerrung der Urteile führt. Darüber hinaus wurde untersucht, ob die Einzelfälle 
Urteile in gleichem Maße erhöhen und reduzieren, und demzufolge eine symmetrische 
Verzerrung auftritt. Außerdem wurde die Bedeutung von Konversationsnormen für das 
Auftreten des Effekts erforscht. 
Der Effekt der Einzelfälle war auf einem nichtnumerischen Risikomaß am stärksten, 
während zwei Skalen für subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit hauptsächlich, jedoch in unterschied-
lichem Maße, Manipulationen der statistischen Information abbildeten. Darüber hinaus erwies 
sich das Risikomaß als bester Prädiktor für Verhaltensintentionen. Carry-Over-Effekte 
zwischen den Instrumenten zeigten, dass Risiko- und Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteile ad hoc 
konstruiert werden und daher anfällig für Formulierungs- und Framing-Effekte sind. 
Risikowahrnehmung wurde durch die Einzelfälle in stärkerem Maße erhöht als vermindert, 
während der Einfluss auf Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteile symmetrisch war. Es fand sich keine 
Evidenz dafür, dass der Effekt durch Konversationsnormen zustande kommt. Die 
Manipulation der absoluten Anzahl von relevanten Einzelfällen bei gleichzeitiger 
Konstanthaltung ihrer relativen Häufigkeit hatte keinen Einfluss auf den Einzelfalleffekt. 
Insgesamt unterstreichen die Ergebnisse die wichtige konzeptuelle Unterscheidung 
zwischen wahrgenommenem Risiko und wahrgenommener Wahrscheinlichkeit. Ferner ist es 
besonders bemerkenswert, dass der Einzelfalleffekt auf einer Repräsentation von relativer 
Häufigkeit, d.h. Wahrscheinlichkeit, beruht, jedoch eine stärkere Ausprägung auf einem 
breiten Risikomaß findet als auf einem Instrument für Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteile. 
Artikel 3: Die Messung von subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteilen: Evaluation der 
Sensitivität und Genauigkeit verschiedener Skalenformate 
Subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeit ist eine zentrale Variable in vielen Studien zu Risiko-
wahrnehmung—einschließlich unserer eigenen. Es existiert jedoch kein allgemein aner-
kanntes Maß für subjektive Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteile. Unter anderem wird über die optimale 
Anzahl von Antwortkategorien, d. h. die Auflösung der Skala, und darüber, ob man wahr-
genommene Wahrscheinlichkeiten besser verbal oder numerisch messen sollte, diskutiert 
(z. B. Diefenbach, Weinstein & O’Reilly, 1993; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). Ferner 
bestimmen Evaluierungsstudien die Skalenleistung in der Regel in Bezug auf reale Daten 
(z. B. Eibner, Barth, Helmes & Bengel, 2006). Dieser Ansatz ermöglicht es jedoch nicht, 
zwischen tatsächlichen Verzerrungen in der Wahrnehmung von Wahrscheinlichkeit und vom 
Messinstrument produzierten Verzerrungen, zu unterscheiden. 
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In dieser Studie kontrollierten wir daher die objektiven, zu beurteilenden 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten und evaluierten fünf übliche Abfrageformate—eine verbale 7-stufige 
Ratingskala, eine verbal-numerische 11-stufige Rating Skale, eine visuelle Analogskala sowie 
Schätzungen relativer Häufigkeit und Prozenturteile—hinsichtlich ihrer Sensitivität und 
Genauigkeit. Variiert wurden dabei das Wahrscheinlichkeitsspektrum (niedrige vs. mittlere 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten), der Schweregrad der unsicheren Ereignisse (niedrig vs. hoch; beides 
between-subjects) sowie die Art der Enkodierung der objektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten 
(sequentiell vs. aggregiert, within-subjects). 
Der Schweregrad hatte keinen Einfluss auf die Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteile. 
Grundsätzlich waren die numerischen Maße den restlichen Formaten in allen Kriterien 
überlegen. Die Unterschiede zwischen den Instrumenten hingen jedoch von der Art der 
Darbietung objektiver Wahrscheinlichkeiten ab. Das aggregierte Format erlaubte eine 
fehlerfreie Enkodierung. Hier waren die Sensitivitätsunterschiede über beide Wahrscheinlich-
keitsbereiche stabil. Die sequentielle Darbietung hingegen führte zu einer gewissen 
Ungenauigkeit, welche im mittleren Spektrum höher ausgeprägt war als bei niedrigen 
Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Während bei geringem Fehler die Unterschiede zwischen den Skalen 
mit den Unterschieden in der fehlerfreien Enkodierungsbedingung vergleichbar waren, glich 
sich die Skalensensitivität unter höherer Fehlerlast auf allgemein niedrigerem Niveau an.  
Darüber hinaus fanden sich deutliche Kontexteffekte, d. h., unterschiedliche 
Antwortfunktionen bei den beiden Wahrscheinlichkeitsbereichen, auf den Ratingskalen und 
der Analogskala, wenn die enkodierten Wahrscheinlichkeiten ungenau waren. Bei fehlerfreier 
Enkodierung waren diese stark reduziert. Die Befunde zeigen, dass Unterschiede der 
Skalenleistung nicht nur von inhärenten Eigenschaften der Instrumente abhängen, sondern 
auch von der Genauigkeit der den Urteilen zugrundeliegenden Repräsentationen. 
Artikel 4: Die Messung von subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteilen: Fehler- und 
Ankereffekte 
Dieser Artikel beschreibt eine Folgestudie zu Artikel 3. In drei Experimenten wurde 
das leistungsstärkste Format, die Prozentschätzungen, dem leistungsschwächsten Format, der 
verbalen 7-stufigen Ratingskale gegenübergestellt. Das Experimentaldesign unterschied sich 
in folgenden Punkten von dem vorhergegangenen: Objektive Wahrscheinlichkeiten wurden 
nur sequentiell enkodiert und die Darbietung wurde angepasst, um den Enkodierfehler zu 
erhöhen. Ferner wurde das Spektrum der objektiven Wahrscheinlichkeiten erweitert       
(10%–90%), bei der Enkodierung jedoch wieder in zwei Bereiche getrennt (niedrig vs. hoch). 
Die entscheidende Neuerung war, dass beide Bereiche einen gemeinsamen Stimulus (50%) 
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enthielten und within-subjects manipuliert wurden. Der Grund hierfür war die Annahme, dass 
die in Artikel 3 beschriebenen Kontexteffekte nicht auf die Stimulusverteilung, sondern auf 
die Interaktion von Enkodierfehler und Skalenformat zurückzuführen seien. 
Experiment 1 zeigte, dass die hohe Auflösung des Prozentformats unter extremer 
Fehlerlast keinerlei Vorteile hinsichtlich der Urteilssensitivität bietet und im Aggregat sogar 
nachteilig sein kann. Weiterhin zeigte sich, dass fehlerbehaftete Repräsentationen zu 
scheinbaren Kontexteffekten auf der Ratingskala führen können. In Experiment 2 zeigte sich, 
dass ein Anker in den Stimuli die Urteile auf der Ratingskala in Relation zum Skalen-
mittelpunkt fixieren kann, dafür jedoch zu inkonsistenten Antwortfunktionen bei Prozent-
schätzungen führt, die durch eine starke Regression zur Mitte erklärt werden können. 
Experiment 3 demonstrierte schließlich, dass ungenaue Wahrscheinlichkeitsrepräsentationen 
zu einer Veränderung des Konstrukts führen, das auf der Ratingskala abbildet wird, während 
Prozenturteile konsistent bleiben. Die Befunde zeigen, dass eine verbale Ratingskala weder 
eine sinnvolle Quantifizierung noch einen sinnvollen Vergleich von Wahrscheinlichkeits-
urteilen zulässt und daher für diesen Zweck nicht verwendet werden sollte. Prozent-
schätzungen lassen sich hingegen eindeutig interpretieren, sie erfassen jedoch auch die 
Ungenauigkeiten in den zugrundeliegenden Repräsentationen und können daher zu 
klassischen Regressionsfehlschlüssen führen. 
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Overview 
The dissertation presents four separate articles on biases in probabilistic reasoning and 
on methodological issues in assessing such biases. Articles 1–3 have already been published 
in peer-reviewed academic journals. References and links to the definitive versions are 
provided on the respective chapter title pages. 
 
Research Highlights 
 
Article 1 
 A small sample of single-case narratives biases risk perceptions even when statistical 
information is provided. 
 Manipulating the credibility of the narrative or statistical information has no 
moderating effect on the bias. 
Article 2 
 Single-case narratives have different effects on perceived risk and perceptions of 
probability. 
 The effect varies as a function of concomitantly assessed related constructs. 
 The effect is driven by representations of likelihood. 
Article 3 
 Numeric scale formats for subjective probability show higher sensitivity and less 
context dependency than rating scales of a visual analog scale. 
 The performance differences between scale formats differ themselves as a function of 
the noise in the underlying representations. 
Article 4 
 Noisy representations of subjective probability can create apparent context effects in 
within-subjects designs. 
 The responsible mechanism differs between different scale formats. 
 Noise changes the level of measurement for a low-resolution verbal scale. 
 On a high-resolution numeric scale, noise can lead to classic regression fallacies. 
  
xiv 
Scope 
 
Article Experiment Research Question/Subject Matter Data Collection Analyzed N 
1 1 Does the biasing effect of single-case narratives on risk perception vary as a function of the credibility of statistical and narrative information? 
Lab/ online 84 181 
2 2 Is the biasing effect of single-case narratives on risk perception dependent on the measure used to assess it? 
Lab 277 
 3 Is the biasing effect of single-case narratives on risk perception a function of the relative or absolute frequency of narratives reporting the focal event? 
online 464 
3 4 Sensitivity and accuracy of five scale formats for subjective probability as a function of stimulus range, stimulus severity, and presentation mode of objective probabilities.  
Lab 373 
4 5 Domain specificity, sensitivity, and context dependency of two different scale formats for subjective probability when representations are highly imprecise. 
Lab 87 
 6 Anchor effects on two different scale formats for subjective probability when representations are highly imprecise. 
Lab 105 
 7 Anchor effects on two different scale formats for subjective probability as a function of error in representations. 
Lab 92 
   Total: 1663 
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General Introduction 
  
2 General Introduction 
Risk is a fundamental part of life. From the oft-cited and somewhat trivial risk of 
getting caught in the rain without an umbrella to the more serious risk of losing money in an 
investment or even the existential risk of a terrorist attack, individuals are constantly faced 
with situations that demand an appraisal of a given risk and a choice based on this appraisal. 
Consequently, risk perception and decision making under uncertainty have been studied 
extensively by many different scientific disciplines. Especially the fields of psychology and 
economics have generated two research traditions that have been at odds with as well as 
influenced each other to varying degrees over the last 150 years (Bruni & Sugden, 2007; 
Loewenstein, 1992). The research presented in this dissertation addresses biases in risk 
perception and methodological issues in assessing such biases. However, the many different 
approaches to this topic have varied markedly in their interpretation and operationalization of 
the relevant constructs. Therefore, it is necessary that I briefly clarify my understanding 
before I describe the studies in more detail. 
Interpretations of Risk 
 What is risk? The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines risk as “the possibility that 
something bad or unpleasant (such as an injury or a loss) will happen” (Risk, 2015). Though 
somewhat broad, this definition includes two distinct aspects of an event. First, a risk is a 
possibility of an event, that is, it is uncertain whether the event will occur or not. Second, the 
event itself is unpleasant, that is, a risk entails an evaluative notion. Thus, following this 
common understanding, it is then crucial to keep in mind that when individuals judge a risk 
they actually make at least two distinct, though not necessarily independent judgments: one 
regarding the probability of an outcome, another regarding its severity. This duality is 
analogous to the concept of expected value, or rather expected utility, which still forms the 
basis of decision theory. The different scientific disciplines, however, do not necessarily 
follow this interpretation of risk. 
For instance, in the economic literature risk signifies a certain interpretation of 
probability. Knight (1921) proposed that the term risk should indicate that the probabilities 
attached to the possible outcomes of a choice are measurable, that is, they can either be 
derived a priori as in the throw of a die or they can be obtained statistically through the 
empirical analysis of the frequency of occurrence. In contrast, the term uncertainty should 
refer to situations where the likelihood of outcomes cannot be measured but must be 
estimated. This classification does not include the notion of an unwanted outcome but applies 
to any uncertain prospect. It does, however, mirror three different interpretations of 
probability—the classical, the frequentist, and the subjective—which I address shortly. 
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The psychological literature, on the other hand, is highly inconsistent in its 
understanding of what constitutes risk. While some argue that there is an implicit agreement 
that risk includes likelihood and severity (Yates & Stone, 1992), numerous publications refer 
to risk perception when in fact only judgments of probability were studied (e.g., Eibner, 
Barth, Helmes, & Bengel, 2006; Lapinski, Rimal, Klein, & Shulman, 2009; Schapira, Davids, 
McAuliffe, & Nattinger, 2004). Other approaches make it a point to expand the construct. 
Accordingly, risk judgments may include affective reactions (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & 
Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004), a moral appraisal of the source 
of a risk (Gardoni & Murphy, 2013), a sense of personal susceptibility to an outcome (Brewer 
et al., 2007), the voluntariness of, knowledge about, and control over a risk (Slovic, Fischhoff, 
& Lichtenstein, 1979; see Brun, 1994 and Yates & Stone, 1992 for discussions of this topic). 
Nonetheless, common and central to all definitions of risk is the concept of probability and 
much of the pertinent research discusses risk perceptions in relation to probability theory. The 
work in this dissertation is no exception. The biases in risk perception addressed in Articles 1 
and 2 are essentially biases in probabilistic reasoning. However, determining whether this 
type of reasoning is biased depends on one’s interpretation of probability. 
Interpretations of Probability 
The important distinction here is between the objectivist and the subjectivist view. 
Very broadly, the former holds that probabilities are intrinsic properties of events, that is, it 
assumes that there is a true probability of an event independent of the observer. In some cases, 
such as games of chance, the probability is simply defined as the ratio of the cases where the 
focal event can occur to the total number of possible outcomes. This is known as the classical 
interpretation of probability and closely associated with Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat 
(Edwards, 1982; Ore, 1960). It is based on physical symmetry, that is, the equal chance of 
occurrence for all possible outcomes. In cases where the symmetry of outcomes is unknown, 
the probabilities can be derived from the relative frequency of occurrence in a number of 
repeated trials. The basis for this frequentist interpretation of probability is Jacob Bernoulli’s 
law of large numbers (Hacking, 1971) which states that as the number of trials increases the 
relative frequency will converge to the true probability.  
In contrast, according to the subjectivist view, probability does not exist independently 
of the human mind. Probability is understood as the degree of belief in the occurrence of an 
event. While classical or frequentist reasoning may be informative, what matters are a 
person’s belief about the case in question. It follows that the only way to assess probability is 
to measure a person’s behavior based on this belief, usually in the form of betting rates (de 
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Finetti, 1970). Note that Knight’s (1921) definition of uncertainty differs from the subjectivist 
interpretation of probability insofar as it is based on ignorance not on the refusal of true 
probabilities. 
Interpretations of Bias 
Judgments and decisions are assumed to be biased, that is, normatively wrong, when 
they violate the tenets of probability theory. However, different interpretations of probability 
entail different normative standards and thus disparate ideas of what constitutes a bias (see 
Beach & Braun, 1994 for a discussion). An objective interpretation of probability allows for 
the assessment of accuracy, that is, the difference between objective and subjective 
probabilities. The research on overconfidence is a classic example of this approach (e.g., 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). In contrast, the subjective view’s rejection of 
objective probabilities renders the question of accuracy meaningless. It does, however, 
recognize that different probability judgments must be coherent. Judgments are assumed to be 
biased if they are not internally consistent. The conjunction fallacy (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983) is a prominent example of this. 
Understanding of Constructs in the Present Research 
The research in this dissertation is grounded in the frequentist interpretation of 
probability. In the methodological studies (Articles 3 and 4) we evaluated the performance of 
different self-report measures for subjective probability and controlled the information that 
subjects based their judgments on. Objective probabilities were operationalized as relative 
frequencies in sequences of option-outcome pairs. The studies in Articles 1 and 2 provide a 
frame of content to the methodological research. The experiments in those sections addressed 
the biasing effect of concrete exemplars on risk perception. Subjects were provided with a 
statistical base-rate as well a small sample of single cases pertaining to a risky prospect. 
Variations in the relative frequency of single cases reporting the focal event had an effect on 
judgments of perceived probability and perceived risk. This kind of reasoning is considered to 
be biased because it fails to weight different information according to the sample size on 
which it is based (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). Thus, this bias hinges on the assumption 
of the law of large numbers. But note that we did not measure this bias as variations in the 
accuracy of judgments but rather as the presence of any influence of the exemplars, which is 
more akin to an assessment of coherence. Furthermore, we had a broad understanding of the 
risk construct, that is, judgments of the perceived risk of an outcome (Articles 1 and 2) were 
assumed to include an assessment of its likelihood as well as of its severity and possibly any 
other number of aspects. The experiment in Article 1 touches upon the varying influence of 
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different features of risk information on different aspects of the risk judgment. The 
experiments in Article 2 directly address the distinction between perceived probability and 
perceived risk. 
Summary of the Research 
The principal focus of this dissertation is on questions of measurement in research of 
risk perception. These questions were inspired by some studies of the above mentioned bias 
that I was involved in (Betsch, Renkewitz, & Haase, 2013; Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz, & 
Betsch, 2011). Article 1 (Haase, Betsch, & Renkewitz, 2015) is an example of this research 
and serves as a jumping-off point for the remainder of the dissertation. The main manipulation 
in this paradigm—next to the exploration of a number of possible moderating variables—is 
the relative frequency of single case narratives and thus probabilistic in nature. Consequently, 
subjective probability and perceived risk are central dependent variables in all studies. 
However, there is no agreement on how to assess either one. Therefore, in Article 2 (Betsch, 
Haase, Renkewitz, & Schmid, 2015) we studied, among other things, whether the bias is task-
dependent, that is, whether it changes as a function of the instrument that is used to measure 
it. In Articles 3 and 4 (Haase & Betsch, 2016; Haase, Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2013) we took a 
more methodological approach to the question of measurement and evaluated the performance 
of different self-report formats for judgments of subjective probability under highly controlled 
conditions. Both articles mainly addressed psychometric properties such as the sensitivity and 
context dependency of the instruments. 
Article 1: Source Credibility and the Biasing Effect of Narrative Information on the 
Perception of Vaccination Risks 
While many areas offer themselves for the study of risk perception, the medical 
domain has become a recent focus of research because the advent of the shared decision 
making approach (Makoul & Clayman, 2006) means that patients are increasingly included in 
treatment and preventative decisions that involve collecting, processing, and weighting 
probabilistic information. Especially the debate about vaccinations and the risk of adverse 
events has flared up again over recent years (Dubé, Vivion, & MacDonald, 2015). 
Additionally, an increasing number of people seek health information on the Internet (Fox & 
Duggan, 2013) and a common strategy of anti-vaccination proponents is the online 
dissemination of testimonials from or about individuals who have allegedly been harmed by 
vaccines (Guidry, Carlyle, Messner, & Jin, 2015; Kata, 2010). Such narrative information can 
be very persuasive in health communication (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007; Winterbottom, 
Bekker, Conner, & Mooney, 2008). Thus, Betsch et al. (2011) created the above described 
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research paradigm with a focus on vaccine adverse events (VAE). In this study we 
additionally tested whether the credibility of the information sources moderates the biasing 
effect of narrative information regarding the perception of vaccination risks. 265 participants 
were provided with statistical information (20%) regarding the occurrence of VAE after 
vaccination against a fictitious disease. This was followed by 20 personalized narratives from 
an online forum on vaccination experiences. We varied the relative frequency of narratives 
reporting vaccine adverse events (35% vs. 85%), narrative source credibility (anti-vaccination 
website vs. neutral health forum), and the credibility of the statistical information (reliable 
data vs. unreliable data vs. control) in a between-subjects design. We assessed risk 
perceptions and vaccination intentions as well as the perceived probability and the perceived 
severity of VAE. Results showed a stable narrative bias on all dependent variables that was 
not affected by credibility cues. However, narratives from an anti-vaccination website led to 
generally lower perceptions of vaccination risks. Additional analyses revealed that the two 
assumed constituents of risk (i.e., probability and severity) were not perceived independently. 
Article 2: The Narrative Bias Revisited – What Drives the Biasing Influence of 
Narrative Information on Risk Perceptions? 
In this work we investigated various methodological and procedural factors that may 
influence the biasing effect of single-case narratives. We compared different measures to 
assess the bias. We further investigated whether the absolute or the relative number of 
narratives reporting the focal event drives the bias. Additionally, we examined whether 
narratives increase and decrease judgments to the same degree, that is, whether the bias is 
symmetric. Finally, we explored the impact of conversational norms on the occurrence of the 
bias. We found that narratives had the strongest effect on a non-numerical risk measure, 
whereas two scales for subjective probability reflected primarily statistical variations, though 
to different degrees. Further, the risk measure was the best predictor of behavioral intentions. 
Moreover, two-way carry-over effects between the measures indicated that judgments of 
perceived risk and subjective probability are ad hoc constructions and thus susceptible to 
wording and framing effects. We observed a negativity bias on the risk measure, that is, the 
narratives rather increased than decreased risk perceptions while the effect on probability 
judgments was symmetric. Additionally, we found no evidence that the narrative bias is solely 
produced by adherence to conversational norms. Finally, changing the absolute number of 
narratives reporting the focal event, while keeping their relative frequency constant, had no 
effect. Thus, individuals extracted a representation of likelihood from a sample of single-case 
narratives, which drove the bias. The results not only underline the important conceptual 
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distinction between subjective probability and perceived risk as people use the same 
information differently when asked for a judgment of one or the other. They also show that 
the relation between representations of subjective probability and perceived risk is not yet 
fully understood. 
Article 3: The Measurement of Subjective Probability – Evaluating the Sensitivity and 
Accuracy of Various Scales 
Subjective probability is a central variable in many studies of risk perception 
(including our own). However, there is no standard measure for subjective probability 
estimates. Two disputed points are the optimal number of response categories, i.e., the scale’s 
resolution (e.g., Diefenbach, Weinstein, & O’Reilly, 1993) and whether one should assess 
perceptions of probability verbally or numerically (e.g., Windschitl & Wells, 1996). 
Additionally, many evaluation studies compare scale performance in relation to real-life data 
(e.g., Eibner et al., 2006). However, this approach does not allow differentiating measurement 
bias, i.e., the actual functioning of the scale, from biases in representations. Thus, in this 
study, we compared five commonly used measurement formats—a verbally labeled 7-point 
rating scale, a verbally anchored and numerically labeled 11-point rating scale, a visual analog 
scale, estimates of relative frequency, and of percent—in terms of their ability to assess 
subjective probability when objective probabilities have been provided. We varied two 
context variables: the range of objective probabilities (low vs. moderate) and the severity (low 
vs. high) of the events to be judged (both between-subjects), as well as the presentation mode 
of objective probabilities (sequential presentation of singular events vs. graphical presentation 
of aggregated information, within-subjects). We assessed scale sensitivity, scale accuracy, and 
consistent scale use across different contexts. The severity of events had no effect. The 
numeric formats generally outperformed all other measures. However, differences depended 
on how the objective probabilities were encoded. Pictographs ensured perfect information and 
the differences between scales were stable across contexts. In contrast, sequential encoding 
introduced sampling error into the probability representations to varying degrees. For low 
range probabilities the error was lower than for moderate probabilities because spotting a few 
highly salient events in a sequence is easier than tracking many. When the error was low, the 
differences between scale formats were similar to the graphical condition. When error was 
higher, on the other hand, the differences in performance were markedly decreased. 
Moreover, when representations were error-free, all scale formats remained reasonably 
consistent across probability ranges while sampling error resulted in very different judgment 
functions on the rating scales and the analog measure but not on the numeric formats. We 
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concluded that differences in performance between scales are caused only in part by 
characteristics of the scales themselves—they also depend on the error in the underlying 
representations. 
Article 4: Self-Report Measures of Subjective Probability – Error and Anchor Effects 
In this study we directly followed up and expanded on the findings reported in the 
second article. In three experiments we compared the worst and the best performing scale 
formats—the verbally labeled 7-point rating scale and the percent format. Subjects encoded 
two ranges of objective probabilities with one common stimulus as sequences of option-
outcome pairs. We increased the sampling error and broadened the range of objective 
probabilities to cover almost the entire continuum. Crucially, we presented the two judgment 
ranges within-subjects as we reasoned that the previously observed context effects were a 
function of the encoding error and the scale format rather than of the distribution of stimuli. In 
Experiment 1 we observed that under highly error-prone conditions the high resolution of the 
percent format offers no advantage in terms of sensitivity. Additionally, imprecise 
representations, rather than the stimulus distribution, can result in apparent context effects on 
the rating scale. In Experiment 2 we found that an anchor in the stimuli can tether judgments 
on the rating scale to the scale’s midpoint but in turn result in inconsistent judgment functions 
on the percent format that could be misinterpreted as context effects, though they are an 
expression of regression toward the mean. In Experiment 3 we discovered that imprecise 
representations change the way the rating scale is used while percent estimates remain 
consistent. We concluded that a verbal rating scale does not allow for a meaningful 
quantification or meaningful comparisons between experimental conditions and should not be 
used in research on subjective probability. The percent format captures the underlying 
representations reliably and consistently but is very sensitive to noise and can lead to classic 
regression fallacies. 
Overview 
The articles in this dissertation are presented in a conceptual rather than a 
chronological order—from an applied context to a purely methodological approach. Although 
the research is closely connected, each article is self-contained and includes a discussion of 
the respective findings. Therefore, I close my dissertation with a brief overarching discussion 
of the conclusions drawn from the individual manuscripts and the theoretical implications 
they entail. 
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Abstract 
Immunization rates are below the Global Immunization Vision and Strategy established by 
the World Health Organization. One reason for this are anti-vaccination activists, who use the 
Internet to disseminate their agenda, frequently by publishing narrative reports about alleged 
vaccine adverse events. In health communication, the use of narrative information has been 
shown to be effectively persuasive. Furthermore, persuasion research indicates that the 
credibility of an information source may serve as a cue to discount or augment the 
communicated message. Thus, the present study investigated the effect of source credibility 
on the biasing effect of narrative information regarding the perception of vaccination risks. 
265 participants were provided with statistical information (20%) regarding the occurrence of 
vaccine adverse events after vaccination against a fictitious disease. This was followed by 20 
personalized narratives from an online forum on vaccination experiences. The authors varied 
the relative frequency of narratives reporting vaccine adverse events (35% vs. 85%), narrative 
source credibility (anti-vaccination website vs. neutral health forum), and the credibility of the 
statistical information (reliable data vs. unreliable data vs. control) in a between-subjects 
design. Results showed a stable narrative bias on risk perception that was not affected by 
credibility cues. However, narratives from an anti-vaccination website generally led to lower 
perceptions of vaccination risks. 
Keywords: Persuasion, testimonials, immunization, discounting 
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Source Credibility and the Biasing Effect of Narrative Information on the Perception of 
Vaccination Risks 
Immunization has been one of the most successful endeavors of modern medicine, 
eradicating smallpox and averting an estimated 2.5 million deaths per year (World Health 
Organization, 2013). Still, global vaccination uptake remains below the goals set forth in the 
Global Immunization Vision and Strategy launched by the World Health Organization in 
2006 (Brown et al., 2011). While this shortcoming is due to many reasons including a lack of 
resources in less developed countries, suboptimal immunization rates also occur in parts of 
the world where the availability and cost of vaccines are no hindrance. This is exemplified by 
recent and recurring outbreaks of measles in various member-states of the European Union 
(Burki, 2013). In these countries, vaccinations have, in a way, become a victim of their own 
success. Because many vaccine-preventable diseases occur only rarely, the risks associated 
with these diseases remain invisible to most individuals (Omer, Orenstein, & Koplan, 2013). 
As perceived risk has been shown to be a reliable predictor of vaccination behavior (Brewer et 
al., 2007), this lacking awareness of risky diseases may contribute to the low vaccination 
rates. In addition, many individuals focus on the risk of vaccine adverse events—first, 
because the absolute frequency of vaccine adverse events (VAE) increases with the number of 
individuals receiving vaccines (Chen, 1999) and, second, because anti-vaccination activists 
propagate severe alleged VAE, for example, the refuted myth that the MMR-vaccination may 
lead to autism (The Lancet, 2010; Wakefield et al., 1998). A typical strategy of anti-
vaccination activists is to promote emotional narratives from and about individuals, preferably 
children, who have allegedly been harmed by vaccinations (Kata, 2010, 2012). Recent web 
2.0 technology (O'Reily, 2005) offers the ideal platform for this approach (Betsch et al., 
2012). 
In health communication, the use of narrative information has also been shown to be 
effective in persuasion (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007). With regard to likelihood information, in 
particular, the fact that concrete examples have a greater effect on decisions than abstract 
base-rate information has long been observed (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977; Brosius & Bathelt, 
1994; de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008). This so-called narrative bias has also been demonstrated 
within the specific context of perceived vaccination risks: even when participants are 
provided with base-rate information regarding the occurrence of VAE, normatively irrelevant 
narrative evidence increases participants’ perceptions regarding the probability and risk of 
VAE (Betsch, Renkewitz, & Haase, 2013; Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2011). 
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Theoretical accounts of the narrative bias focus on different aspects of narrative 
communication. Some argue that the mere frequency with which one encounters narrative 
information determines its effect, irrespective of the sample size to which the information 
pertains (Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2009). This approach relates to the probability 
dimension of risk. In general, risk is understood as a combination of an event's probability of 
occurrence and its severity (Yates & Stone, 1992). Other accounts focus on the quality of 
narratives such as the sense of transportation, that is, immersion in the story, that a narrative 
evokes in the reader (Green & Brock, 2000, 2002). This aspect may also affect the perceived 
severity of the event. 
While the narrative bias has been demonstrated frequently, little is known regarding 
the importance of the sources that communicate the narrative and statistical information. 
Persuasion research has shown that the credibility of an information source may serve as a cue 
to discount or augment the communicated message (Hovland & Weiss, 1951; Pornpitakpan, 
2004). That is, irrespective of the amount of information learned from a source, the persuasive 
impact of the provided information may be significantly smaller if the source is perceived to 
be low in credibility (discounting); at the same time, the persuasive impact may be 
significantly greater if the source is perceived to be highly credible (augmenting). Thus, we 
assessed the potential moderating effect of statistic and narrative source credibility on the 
narrative bias. 
Overview 
In the following experiment, we presented participants with statistical information 
regarding the occurrence of VAE. The statistical information was combined with either a 
discounting or an augmenting cue in the experimental conditions. No extra information was 
provided in the control condition. Participants then read 20 personalized narrative reports, 
framed as contributions in an online forum, either on an anti-vaccination website (discounting 
cue) or an online health forum (control). The relative frequency of positive narratives (i.e., 
narratives reporting VAE) was varied between subjects to test for the narrative bias. 
Hypotheses 
On the basis of previous research regarding the biasing influence of narrative 
information, we hypothesize the following: 
H1: A higher relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE will increase the 
perceived risk of vaccination (H1a) and perceived probability of VAE (H1b, narrative bias). 
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As the credibility of the source of information can lead to augmenting or discounting 
the communicated information, we expect that the narrative bias will depend on the credibility 
of the sources of the statistical and narrative information: 
H2: The narrative bias on risk and probability perception will be moderated by the 
credibility of the statistical information. The narrative bias will be strongest when the 
statistical information is discredited and weakest when it is praised. 
H3: The narrative bias on risk and probability perception will be moderated by the 
credibility of the narrative information. The narrative bias will be stronger when the narratives 
are provided by a neutral source as opposed to an interest group. 
Perceived risk is an important predictor of preventive health behavior. Based on 
previous research (Betsch et al., 2013), we therefore posit the following: 
H4: A higher relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE will decrease the 
intention to get vaccinated (H4a). This effect will be mediated by the perceived risk of VAE 
(H4b). 
In addition to probability, we also explored the manipulations’ effects on the perceived 
severity of VAE, as perceived risk is constituted by both variables (Yates & Stone, 1992). 
Method 
Participants and Design 
The study was conducted both in the laboratory and as an online survey. Participants 
in the laboratory were students at a German university between the ages of 19 and 36 years 
who took part in exchange for either a payment of 3 € (ca. US$4) or course credit. Online 
participants (18–47 years) were recruited through a number of websites (Facebook, websites 
related to online research, health, and childhood topics). As an incentive, we raffled off ten 
20 € (ca. US$27) vouchers for a large Internet store. Participants were randomly distributed to 
one of the 12 cells in the 3 (low credibility vs. high credibility of statistical information vs. no 
credibility information) × 2 (low credibility vs. high credibility of narrative information) × 2 
(35% vs. 85% relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE) between-subjects design. 
Procedure 
Participants were presented with information regarding a fictitious disease called 
dysomeria, a serious and highly contagious disease with symptoms including vomiting and 
fever as well as meningitis and, in some cases, permanent paralysis. Participants were 
informed that a vaccination against dysomeria exists that effectively protects against infection 
and is highly recommended by the STIKO (National Immunization Technical Advisory 
Group, German equivalent to the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices). 
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Participants were also told that a study had observed VAE such as fever, rash, restlessness, 
and dizziness in 20% of all vaccination cases. Depending on the condition, participants 
received a discounting or augmenting cue or no information regarding the credibility of the 
statistics. Subsequently, participants read 20 short narratives from an online forum, which 
described personal experiences with the dysomeria vaccination. The forum's source varied in 
credibility between subjects. Participants then proceeded to the dependent and control 
variables and the manipulation checks. 
Statistical Base-Rate Information 
The base-rate information (20% VAE) was also provided in the form of an icon array, 
that is, a 10 × 10 matrix of 100 rectangles colored either blue (VAE) or gray (no VAE, 
generated using http://www.iconarray.com). This type of display has been shown to reduce 
the effect of anecdotal information (Fagerlin, Wang, & Ubel, 2005) and therefore yields a 
strong test for the effect of narratives on risk judgments. The VAE (fever, rash, restlessness, 
dizziness) were selected from 66 medical conditions that were pretested for severity on a 
7-point rating scale. Their mean severity scores ranged between 1.97 (SD = 1.20) and 2.77 
(SD = 1.31) and did not differ significantly from values of either 2 or 3 (ts ≤ 1.60). 
Credibility of Statistical Information 
Below the icon array, a short evaluation of the research methods employed in the 
study was presented. The text stated that two national scientific bodies had described the 
scientific methods and data analysis used in the study to be either poor (discounting) or 
exemplary (augmenting), resulting in unreliable or reliable data, respectively (see the 
Appendix for the full texts). In the control condition, no additional information pertaining to 
the statistics was provided. 
Credibility of Narrative Information 
We manipulated narrative credibility by stating that they had been posted on either a 
neutral online health forum called gesundheit-net.de (health-net.de) or an anti-vaccination 
website called impfen-schadet.de (vaccination-harms.de). First, participants were presented 
with an introductory text explaining that, in the age of web 2.0, it had become common for 
individuals to share their experiences with others in online forums (e.g., regarding 
vaccinations). To increase the salience of the narratives’ source all participants then read short 
texts describing both websites in counterbalanced order. The description of the anti-
vaccination website stated that, to further their agenda, the website's goal was to collect as 
many cases of harm through vaccination as possible (see the Appendix for the full texts). 
Subsequently, participants proceeded to the actual narratives, which were the same in both 
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conditions. A mock online banner with the name of the forum was constantly visible at the 
top of the page displaying the narrative. 
Relative Frequency of VAE 
The online forum presented a sequence of 20 narratives in a randomized order, one on 
each page, describing personal experiences with the dysomeria vaccine. The narratives 
reported either the occurrence or nonoccurrence of VAE. To test for the narrative bias, the 
relative frequency of positive VAE implied in the forum was higher than in the statistical 
information (20%). In the 35% condition, 7 out of 20 narratives reported VAE compared to 17 
such cases in the 85% condition (see the Appendix for sample narratives). All narratives had a 
length of 53 words and were balanced for author gender. The VAE mentioned in the 
narratives corresponded to the ones provided in the statistical information. 
Measures 
Dependent variables. Participants judged the riskiness of the vaccination on a scroll 
bar ranging from not risky at all (score = 0) to very risky (= 100). Numeric scale anchors were 
not provided. Probability of VAE was assessed through a percentage statement. Participants 
then rated on 7-point rating scales the severity of VAE (1 = not severe, 7 = very severe) and 
their intention to get vaccinated against dysomeria if they had the chance to do so in the 
following week (1 = definitely not vaccinate, 7 = definitely vaccinate). 
Control variables. Because attitude is a strong predictor for vaccination behavior 
(Glasman & Albarracín, 2006), participants were asked to rate their general attitude toward 
vaccination on a 7-point rating scale (1 = fully against vaccination, 7 = fully in favor of 
vaccination). 
In addition, participants rated the extent to which they weighted narrative vs. statistical 
information in their judgments on a scroll-bar ranging from judgment based fully on statistics 
(= 0) to based fully on narratives (= 100). The scale was anchored at the midpoint (= 50) in 
the beginning to indicate equal weighting of both sources. Again, no numeric anchors were 
provided. 
To assess whether numeracy affects risk judgments (Reyna, Nelson, Han, & 
Dieckmann, 2009) participants completed the Berlin Numeracy Test for the general 
population (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Schwartz, Woloshin, 
Black, & Welch, 1997)—a 7-item instrument consisting of tests of probabilistic inference 
abilities, for example, “Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of 
these 50 throws how many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)?” 
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Because of its length, the numeracy test was administered at the very end of the study, that is, 
after manipulation checks were completed. 
Manipulation checks. Participants rated four items pertaining to the credibility of 
either information source on 7-point rating scales. They judged the credibility (1 = not 
credible at all, 7 = absolutely credible) and representativeness of the statistics and narratives 
when considering all vaccinations that are administered in Germany within a year (1 = not 
representative at all, 7 = very representative) as well as the expertise (1 = very bad, 7 = very 
good) and trustworthiness (1 = not at all trustworthy, 7 = absolutely trustworthy) of the study 
and the narratives’ authors. 
To ensure that all information was properly encoded, participants were also asked to 
recall the statistically conveyed base-rate of VAE, the absolute number of narratives reporting 
VAE, and the name of the online forum in which the narratives were published. 
Results 
Participants 
102 individuals took part in the web-administered lab experiment. 18 stated that they 
had participated in a similar study previously and were thus excluded, resulting in a sample of 
84 individuals, 67 (79.8%) of which were female. Because of the high number of participants 
reporting previous participation, we decided to make the study available for participants on 
the Internet. 
After being published online, 390 individuals clicked the link to the study and 244 
ﬁnished the survey, 45 of which stated that they had previously participated in a similar study 
and were therefore excluded. 18 participants who completed the survey in less than the mean 
time minus one standard deviation (4 minutes 42 seconds) were also excluded, resulting in a 
sample of 181 participants, 163 (90.1%) of which were female.1 
The laboratory and online samples were combined for analyses, resulting in a ﬁnal 
sample of 265 participants, 230 (86.8%) of which were female. The mean (SD) age was 28.42 
(6.11) years. 33 participants (12.6%) did not complete the German university entrance exam 
(Abitur), 127 (47.9%) completed the Abitur, 92 (34.7%) completed some higher education, 
                                                          
1 The time required to complete the study was calculated as the time between having read the initial instructions and having answered the last of the manipulation checks (recall of forum name). The numeracy test was excluded from this calculation, as the seven items took approximately half as long to complete as the entire rest of the survey, with a very large standard deviation, that is, 6 min 9 s (4 min 20 s). 
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and 10 (3.8%) completed a PhD. Mean time (SD) to complete the survey for the combined 
sample was 9 min 41 s (3 minutes 34 seconds).2 
Manipulation Checks 
Encoding variables. The majority of participants (n = 232; 87.6%) correctly recalled 
the probability of VAE (20%) as presented in the icon array (mode = 20; M = 20.70, 
SD = 9.45). Likewise, the majority of the participants correctly or approximately remembered 
the number of narratives reporting VAE. In the 35% condition, 72.5% of participants reported 
remembering 5, 6, 7, or 8 positive narratives (correct answer = 7) with a mode of 6 (M = 7.11, 
SD = 3.71). In the 85% condition, 84.3% recalled 15–18 narratives (correct answer = 17) with 
a mode of 15 (M = 15.70, SD = 2.22). 
Participants were also asked to recall the name of the online forum. Recalled names 
were coded as correct if they included the term health in the health forum condition and if 
they clearly indicated an anti-vaccination stance in the anti-vaccination website condition. In 
the anti-vaccination condition 117 participants (86.7%) correctly remembered the name of the 
online forum, 111 (85.4%) individuals correctly remembered the online health forum. 
Source credibility. The respective four items pertaining to source credibility were all 
moderately to strongly positively correlated (statistics: rs = .35–.61, ps < .001; narratives: 
rs = .36–.73, ps < .001). Therefore, we averaged the items to form a single credibility score 
for each information source (statistics: Cronbach’s α = .76; narratives: Cronbach’s α = .76). 
Compared with the control condition without additional information (M = 4.99, 
SD = 1.00), participants perceived the statistical information to be less credible when it was 
described as unreliable (M = 4.40, SD = 1.14). Praising its reliability (M = 5.15, SD = 0.98) 
did not increase credibility, F(2, 262) = 12.22, p < .001, η² = .09, Bonferroni’s test ps ≤ .001. 
These results indicate that the discounting cue lowered source credibility for the statistical 
information, whereas the augmenting cue had no effect. 
In contrast, the source of the narrative information had neither an effect on the 
credibility index (health forum: M = 3.52, SD = 1.12; anti-vaccination: M = 3.47, SD = 1.17; 
                                                          
2 In the laboratory sample, the mean (SD) age was 22.69 (3.77) years. 81 participants (96.4%) reported an Abitur grade with a sample mean (SD) of 2.15 (0.44). Grades on this exam range between 1.0 and 4.0, with 1.0 being the best possible grade. The mean time (SD) to complete the study was 10 min 24 s (2 min 16 s). In the online sample, the mean (SD) age was 31.07 (5.09) years. Thirty-three participants (18.2%) did not complete the Abitur, 46 (25.4%) completed the Abitur, 92 (50.8%) received a higher education degree, and 10 (5.5%) received a PhD. The mean time (SD) to complete the study was 8 min 51 s (4 min 9 s). 
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F < 1) nor on any of the four single items, questioning if this manipulation worked as 
anticipated. 
To explore whether the different sources affected the use of the information 
differently, we compared the self-reported weighting of the sources between the conditions. 
We found no signiﬁcant differences in self-reported source weighting between the three 
sources of statistical information, F(2, 259) = 1.09, p = .338, and a small effect of narrative 
source (health forum: M = 48.33, SD = 29.29; anti-vaccination: M = 40.73, SD = 28.50), 
F(1, 259) = 3.84, p = .051, η
P
2  = .02. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Regression analyses were used for all analyses. We created two dummy variables to 
assess the effect of the statistical information credibility; the condition without any additional 
information served as the reference or control group. Thus, we compare praising the statistical 
information to providing no information. Correspondingly, we compare criticizing its 
credibility to providing no information. The resulting variables are “Credible statistical 
information” (coded as 1 with the remaining two conditions coded as 0) and correspondingly 
“Not credible statistical information” (= 1, rest = 0). Likewise, narrative source was coded as 
0 = anti-vaccination website and 1 = online health forum. All predictors were standardized 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Interaction terms are mathematical products of the 
respective predictors. In a ﬁrst step, we predicted perceived vaccination risk, perceived 
probability of VAE, and vaccination intention with the three manipulated factors (relative 
frequency of narratives, source of narrative and statistical information) and assessed whether 
the narrative bias was moderated by either source. In a second step, we explored whether 
numeracy, general attitude toward vaccination, and source used for the judgment moderated 
the narrative bias 
Perceived risk of vaccination. Results of the ﬁrst regression analysis are summarized 
in Table 1. Figure 1 displays mean ratings across conditions. A higher relative frequency led 
to higher perceptions of vaccination risk (H1a). Furthermore, we observed a main effect of 
narrative source, that is, participants generally reported greater perceived risk of vaccination 
when narratives originated from a neutral health forum as compared to an anti-vaccination 
website. However, in contrast with our expectations, we found no interaction between relative 
frequency and narrative source (contradicting H3). Furthermore, source credibility of the 
statistical information also did not moderate the narrative bias (contradicting H2).  
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Table 1 Regression analysis 1 predicts perceived risk of vaccination with the independent variables 
  Perceived risk of vaccination 
R² = .17 
Predictors  B SE β 
Constant  34.097 1.375  
Relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE (35%, 85%)   9.071 1.378 .374*** 
Credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  −0.704 1.563 −.029 
Not credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  1.470 1.558 .061 
Narrative source (0 = anti-vaccination website, 1 = online health forum)  3.600 1.386 .148* 
Relative frequency  credible statistical information  −1.598 1.567 −.066 
Relative frequency  not credible statistical information  −0.701 1.561 −.029 
Relative frequency  narrative source  0.244 1.389 .010 
*p < .05. ***p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Perceived risk of vaccination as a function of the relative frequency of narratives 
reporting VAE, the credibility of the narratives’ source and the credibility of the statistical 
information. Error bars represent 95% conﬁdence intervals.  
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Table 2 Regression analysis 1 predicts perceived probability of VAE with the independent variables 
  Perceived probability of VAE 
R² = .17 
Predictors  B SE β 
Constant  28.407 1.172  
Relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE (35%, 85%)   7.970 1.175 .387*** 
Credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  −0.417 1.332 −.020 
Not credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  0.234 1.328 .011 
Narrative source (0 = anti-vaccination website, 1 = online health forum)  2.484 1.181 .120* 
Relative frequency  credible statistical information  0.267 1.336 .013 
Relative frequency  not credible statistical information  0.616 1.330 .030 
Relative frequency  narrative source  0.160 1.184 .008 
Note: VAE = vaccine adverse events. *p < .05. ***p < .001.  
 
Perceived probability of VAE. As displayed in Table 2, the results for the perceived 
probability of VAE mirrored the results for perceived risk: more positive narratives resulted in 
higher probability judgments (H1b). The mean (SD) perceived probability of VAE was 20.75 
(9.94) in the 35% conditions and 36.74 (25.48) in the 85% conditions, demonstrating the 
biasing effect of narratives. Again, the two source manipulations did not lead to the expected 
interactions (contradicting H2 and H3). We again observed the aforementioned main effect of 
narrative source, indicating that narratives from the neutral source led to higher perceived 
probability of VAE. 
Intention to get vaccinated. Hypothesis 4a predicts that the narrative bias also 
manifests itself in intentions to get vaccinated. To control for the other manipulated variables, 
we included intention in the same regression as the risk variables (Table 3). The results 
support Hypothesis 4a: A higher number of narratives reporting VAE decreased intentions to 
get vaccinated. In addition, when the narratives originated from a neutral online health forum, 
as compared to an anti-vaccination website, intention decreased. 
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Table 3 Regression analysis 1 predicts intention to get vaccinated with the independent variables 
  Intention to get vaccinated 
R² = .09 
Predictors  B SE β 
Constant  4.614 0.103  
Relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE (35%, 85%)   −0.336 0.104 −.193** 
Credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  0.048 0.117 .028 
Not credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  −0.208 0.117 −.119 
Narrative source (0 = anti-vaccination website, 1 = online health forum)  −0.297 0.104 −.171** 
Relative frequency  credible statistical information  −0.082 0.118 −.047 
Relative frequency  not credible statistical information  −0.029 0.117 −.017 
Relative frequency  narrative source  0.081 0.104 .046 
Note: VAE = vaccine adverse events. **p < .01.  
 
Mediation analysis. We predicted that the biasing effect of the narrative information 
on vaccination intention would be mediated by risk perception (H4b). To test this assumption, 
we estimated the indirect effect employing the method described by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004) using bootstrapped estimates of conﬁdence intervals (5,000 samples).3 As predicted, 
the indirect effect of the relative frequency of positive narratives on vaccination intention 
through perceived vaccination risk was signiﬁcant (indirect effect = −.22, standard error = .04, 
95% CI [−.30, −.15]), indicating mediation. Figure 2 represents a path model of the 
mediation, illustrating that there was no direct effect of relative frequency on vaccination 
intention. 
Exploratory Analysis 
We calculated a hierarchical regression entering the control variables in the ﬁrst block 
and the simple model variables in the second. Table 4 displays the explorative model’s 
coefﬁcients. Inclusion of the control variables signiﬁcantly increased the amount of variance 
that could be explained by the model, change in R² = 0.24, F(7, 257) = 11.42, p < .001. The 
predictors’ variance inﬂation factors ranged from 1.00 to 1.32 with an average variance 
                                                          
3 We used the SPSS macro PROCESS provided by Andrew Hayes at http://afhayes.com. 
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Figure 2. Path model of the indirect effect of the relative frequency of positive narratives on vaccination intention through perceived risk of vaccination. The numbers are standardized 
regression coefﬁcients. ***p ≤ .001.  
 
inﬂation factor of 1.14, indicating a lack of multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003). Neither the 
narrative bias nor the main effect of narrative source could be explained by any of the control 
variables. 
Considering the control variables’ independent contributions, the results indicate that 
participants with a greater ability to understand and use numeric information judged the risk 
of vaccination to be lower. This effect was qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction between the 
relative frequency of positive narratives and numeracy, that is, only when most narratives 
reported VAE did higher numeracy scores reduce risk perception (85%: r = −.32, p < .001, 
35%: r = .00, p = .959). 
Participants who were generally in favor of vaccination judged the risk of vaccination 
to be signiﬁcantly lower than participants who were more opposed to vaccination. This effect 
held when only a few narratives reported VAE (35%: r = −.53, p < .001). When almost all 
narratives reported VAE, the general attitude was no longer related to risk perception 
(85%: r = −.14, p = .115). 
The self-report measure regarding the information sources used to make judgments 
conﬁrmed the observed effects: Participants indicating that they attributed more weight to the 
narrative information in their judgments reported higher perceived vaccination risk. As 
indicated by two signiﬁcant interactions, weighting narratives more strongly than statistical 
information only led to higher risk perceptions when most narratives reported VAE (r = .48, 
p < .001; 35%: r = .09, p = .311) and when narratives originated from a neutral online health 
forum, (r = .35, p < .001; anti-vaccination: r = .12, p = .180).  
.03 ns
Perceived risk of vaccination
Relative frequency of positive narratives Vaccination intention
.38*** -.59***
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Table 4 Regression analysis 2 predicts perceived risk with the extended model including numeracy, general attitude toward vaccination, and self-reported weighting of information sources 
  Perceived risk of VAE 
R² = .41 
Predictors  B SE β 
Constant  33.980 1.189  
Relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE (35%, 85%)   9.520 1.182 .392*** 
Credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  −1.516 1.348 −.062 
Not credible statistical information (=1, rest = 0)  −0.364 1.353 −.015 
Narrative source (0 = anti-vaccination website, 1 = online health forum)  2.686 1.204 .111* 
Relative frequency  credible statistical information  −1.351 1.360 −.056 
Relative frequency  not credible statistical information  −1.300 1.354 −.053 
Relative frequency  narrative source  0.653 1.207 .027 
Numeracy  −2.477 1.233 −.102† 
Relative frequency  numeracy  −2.804 1.238 −.115* 
General attitude  −6.272 1.201 −.258*** 
Relative frequency  general attitude  4.165 1.213 .171** 
Source weighting (lower values indicate more weight given to the statistical information)  5.026 1.253 .207*** 
Relative frequency  source weighting  4.228 1.253 .174** 
Narrative source  source weighting  2.646 1.217 .108* 
† p = .05. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.  
 
Perceived Severity of VAE 
We calculated the same simple regression model with perceived severity as the 
dependent variable and found the same pattern of signiﬁcant predictors (R² = .08) as for 
probability and risk perception. The effect of the relative frequency of positive narratives on 
perceived severity resulted in a standardized regression coefﬁcient of β = .168, p = .006, as 
compared to the frequency’s effect on perceived probability of β = .387, p < .001. Narrative 
source, on the other hand, predicted perceived severity with β = .206, p = .001, whereas the 
effect on perceived probability was substantially smaller, β = .120, p = .036. Estimating the 
indirect effect of narrative source on perceived risk of vaccination through perceived 
probability of VAE and perceived severity of VAE indicated a signiﬁcant mediation (total 
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indirect effect = .13, standard error = .04, 95% CI [.06, .21]), in which the indirect effect 
through severity (indirect effect = .09, standard error = .03, [.04, .15]) was roughly twice as 
large as the indirect effect through probability (indirect effect = .04, standard error = .02, 
[.00, .10]). A pair-wise contrast, however, revealed that the two indirect effects did not differ 
signiﬁcantly (contrast = −.04, standard error = .04, [−.12, .03]). There was no signiﬁcant 
direct effect of narrative source on vaccination risk perception (direct effect = .02, standard 
error = .05, [−.08, .12]; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Discussion 
In this study we tested whether the biasing effect of narrative information on risk 
perceptions is moderated by source credibility—that is, the credibility of the narrative as well 
as that of the statistical information delivering the base-rate. In all conditions, we observed a 
stable narrative bias: even though participants had statistical base-rate information about the 
occurrence of vaccine adverse events (VAE), normatively irrelevant information conveyed by 
narratives from online discussion boards systematically increased perceptions of vaccination 
risks. Contrary to our expectations, informing participants that the statistical base-rate was 
based on unreliable or very reliable data did not moderate the narrative bias. Furthermore, the 
narrative bias occurred irrespective of whether the narratives originated from an anti-
vaccination website or a neutral health forum. This lack of both expected moderator effects is 
mirrored in the self-reported weighting of information sources, as there were no signiﬁcant 
differences in reported source weighting between the three statistic conditions as well as a 
negligible effect of narrative source. Thus, it appears that informing individuals about the 
credibility of different types of risk information does not affect the integration thereof. This is 
in line with previous research, which showed that the type of information (i.e., statistic and 
narrative) appears to determine their relative weighting (Betsch et al., 2013). 
It is important to note that we found no effect of narrative source manipulation on the 
manipulation check variables. However, the manipulation check items regrettably pertained to 
the narratives rather than the whole forum. Even though the narratives were presented on a 
website with an agenda, there was no indication that the individual narratives had also been 
authored for this purpose. Thus, it appears that reports of vaccination experiences by “people 
like me” are trusted irrespective of the source that delivers them (Haase & Betsch, 2012). 
Future research should manipulate the credibility of the narratives and the forum 
independently to assess whether the expected moderator effect occurs when the credibility of 
the narratives is low. 
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While the narrative source manipulation did not eliminate the narrative bias, we found 
that presenting the narratives in the context of an anti-vaccination forum led to a general 
decrease in vaccination risk perceptions. Thus, even when the narratives originated from a 
non-credible source, their biasing effect remained stable—although on a generally lower level 
of perceived risk. Considering the two constituents of risk separately—probability and 
severity—might help to partially explain this ﬁnding. The additional analyses reported above 
revealed that the main effect of relative frequency on perceived probability was 
approximately twice as large as that on perceived severity. In contrast, narrative source 
affected severity perceptions almost twice as strongly as it affected perceived probability. 
Furthermore, the main effect of narrative source on perceived risk primarily occurred through 
its effect on severity. There is no compelling theoretical reason to assume an interaction effect 
of narrative source and the relative frequency of positive cases on perceived severity. Given 
that narrative source affected perceived vaccination risk primarily through perceived severity 
of VAE, the observed main effect of narrative source on perceived risk (rather than an 
interaction) would be expected. However, this explanation requires that both risk constituents 
are perceived independently—both the current study and previous research (Betsch et al., 
2013; Harris, Corner, & Hahn, 2009) have demonstrated that this is not the case, for example, 
we observed an effect of relative frequency (a pure likelihood manipulation) on perceived 
severity as well as an effect of narrative source on perceived probability. 
Nonetheless, the observed main effect indicates that the source of the narratives offers 
an interpretative frame for the narratives’ content, rather than for their frequency. Anti-
vaccination websites often indicate their agenda in the title (e.g., www.vaccineinjury.info). 
The names of the forums in the current study closely followed this pattern and were 
constantly visible at the top of the screen while participants read the narratives. This 
consistent display of an agenda together with the persuasive information might have induced 
psychological reactance and resulted in reduced persuasion, that is, lower risk perception 
(Pavey & Sparks, 2009). Future research should investigate whether comparable effects are 
observed when a neutral source is compared with providers with an explicit pro-vaccination 
title (such as @vaccineswork on Twitter). 
In line with previous research (Reyna et al., 2009), participants lower in numeracy 
overestimated the vaccination risk more so than those with greater numerical skills. However, 
this effect was limited to the 85% condition, that is, when almost all narratives implied 
vaccination risks. Fuzzy-trace theory might offer an explanation for this apparent discrepancy. 
According to this theory, individuals extract two kinds of representations from information: 
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Verbatim representations are precise, whereas gist representations capture the bottom line 
meaning. Judgments and decisions are informed by gist rather than verbatim representations 
(Reyna, 2008). The manipulation check indicated that most participants were able to recall 
absolute numbers of positive narratives that were in a range of ±2 to the correct answer. 
Considering this somewhat imprecise verbatim recall of positive narratives, we assume that, 
in the 35% condition, the gist of the vaccination risk was simply low and, therefore, more or 
less congruent with the statistical information that also proposed low riskiness (20%). 
Consequently, participants may have felt no need to adjust their risk representations that they 
had already constructed based on the statistical information. Evidence for this notion can be 
found in the probability ratings. In the 35% condition, the perceived probability ratings did 
not differ signiﬁcantly from 20%, the percentage conveyed in the statistic, t(137) = 0.89, 
p = .374. In the 85% condition, the gist of the risk of vaccination may have been high. Hence, 
the original idea of how risky vaccination is differed from the gist derived from the online 
discussion board. Only in this case did participants need to adjust their risk perceptions. This 
adjustment was affected by individual numeracy: Participants low in numeracy were more 
prone to the biasing effect of the narratives, which is in line with previous ﬁndings 
(Dieckmann, Slovic, & Peters, 2009). Accordingly, we interpret the ﬁnding that participants’ 
general attitude toward vaccination only affected risk judgments in the 35% condition: When 
statistical and narrative evidence were more or less congruent, vaccination risk perceptions 
were primarily a function of general attitudes. The overwhelming narrative evidence for VAE 
in the 85% condition, however, made an adjustment necessary and appeared to convince even 
participants with a pro-vaccination attitude that this vaccination is risky. 
Limitations 
First, we used self-report measures pertaining to a hypothetical scenario. While ethical 
considerations prescribe this approach, the potential lack of external validity should be kept in 
mind when interpreting results. Future research could try to improve upon this issue by 
paying participants dependent on performance (making the bias costly) and thereby rendering 
the scenario more akin to a real-life health decision (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). 
Secondly, while ﬁnding the same results in two different samples would usually be 
supportive of external validity, the precise effects of combining the two samples—laboratory 
and online—in the current study cannot be meaningfully assessed due to small cell sizes. 
There were, however, no main effects of the sample on any of the three dependent variables 
(all ts < 1). 
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Conclusions 
We found an extremely stable bias of normatively irrelevant narrative information on 
perceptions of a statistically conveyed vaccination risk. This bias affects perceptions of 
vaccination risks through both the perceived probability and severity of VAE and indirectly 
affects individuals’ intentions to get vaccinated. Informing people about the credibility of a 
statistic had no correcting effect on the bias. This implies that health communicators cannot 
counter the narrative bias by underlining the excellent reliability of their data (see Nyhan, 
Reifler, Richey, & Freed, 2014, for comparable results). Rather, it appears that techniques 
pertaining to the narratives themselves are needed. In a previous study, we were able to show 
that bias awareness disclaimers emphasizing the biased sampling of narratives can decrease 
the effect of narratives—although the disclaimer’s effect was very small; and the narrative 
bias still occurred (Betsch et al., 2013). The present study adds to evidence that informing 
individuals about the ulterior motive behind presenting narratives does not impede their 
biasing effect. 
Narrative evidence is a common feature of anti-vaccination websites and, unlike in the 
current study, contains almost exclusively reports of very severe VAE (Kata, 2010, 2012). 
Apparently, these reports affect individuals’ risk perceptions and vaccination intentions, 
irrespective of whether they were collected with a speciﬁc agenda in mind. Fortunately, it 
appears that some anti-vaccination websites may inadvertently reduce this effect by stressing 
their agenda, which potentially creates reactance within the reader. Overall, the present 
research demonstrates once more how difﬁcult it is to counter the biasing effect of narrative 
information. 
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Appendix: Texts Used for Manipulated Factors 
Note that the original materials were in German. 
Discounting Cue for Statistical Information 
Some time after its publication, the German Research Foundation and the Robert-
Koch-Institute described this study as being poor with regard to the scientific methods 
employed and the data analysis. Accordingly, this study does not provide reliable or generally 
valid data about the occurrence of VAE following the vaccination against dysomeria. 
Augmenting Cue for Statistical Information 
Some time after its publication, the German Research Foundation and the Robert-
Koch-Institute described this study as being exemplary with regard to the scientific methods 
employed and the data analysis. Accordingly, this study provides highly reliable and generally 
valid data about the occurrence of VAE following the vaccination against dysomeria. 
Description of Both Websites, Neutral Health Forum Mentioned First 
On Health-net.de people can share their experiences with medications and adverse 
events. The explicit goal of Health-net.de is not only to support people with their health 
decisions but also to provide real-life data to manufacturers and regulatory authorities and 
thereby increase others’ safety. Vaccination-harms.de is a forum, run by so called anti-
vaccination activists. Anti-vaccination activists reject any kind of vaccination, mostly on 
ideological grounds. One key argument is that, due to the high risk of severe adverse events 
and subsequent damages, vaccinations are very dangerous—a claim that cannot be 
substantiated scientiﬁcally. The explicit goal of Vaccination-harms.de is to collect as many 
cases of harm through vaccination as possible in order to provide support to this claim.  
Example for a Narrative Reporting the Occurrence of VAE (Positive) 
Hey! I am Anna and I got vaccinated against dysomeria a month ago. Apart from the 
pricking I didn’t notice anything bad during the ﬁrst few days following the vaccination. After 
a week however I started feeling dizzy constantly. It got so bad that my boss sent me home. 
Example for a Narrative Reporting the Nonoccurrence of VAE (Negative) 
Hi! I got vaccinated against dysomeria about a month ago. I hadn’t gotten any shots in 
years and had forgotten what a quick procedure this is. Everything went really well. I just 
didn’t like the shot so much but I guess that’s normal. Jens  
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Abstract 
When people judge risk or the probability of a risky prospect, single case narratives can bias 
judgments when a statistical base-rate is also provided. In this work we investigate various 
methodological and procedural factors that may influence this narrative bias. We found that 
narratives had the strongest effect on a non-numerical risk measure, which was also the best 
predictor of behavioral intentions. In contrast, two scales for subjective probability reflected 
primarily statistical variations. We observed a negativity bias on the risk measure, such that 
the narratives increased rather than decreased risk perceptions, whereas the effect on 
probability judgments was symmetric. Additionally, we found no evidence that the narrative 
bias is solely produced by adherence to conversational norms. Finally, changing the absolute 
number of narratives reporting the focal event, while keeping their relative frequency 
constant, had no effect. Thus, individuals extract a representation of likelihood from a sample 
of single-case narratives, which drives the bias. These results show that the narrative bias is in 
part dependent on the measure used to assess it and underline the conceptual distinction 
between subjective probability and perceived risk. 
 
Keywords: Risk perception, subjective probability, narratives, cognitive bias, 
negativity bias 
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The narrative bias revisited: What drives the biasing influence of narrative information on risk 
perceptions? 
Every day we encounter and act upon probabilistic information. From the weather 
forecast to consumer reports, individuals are regularly confronted with likelihood information 
about risks (e.g., the chance of rain) to inform their behavior in one way or another (e.g., 
whether to leave the house with or without an umbrella). In the medical domain, the advent of 
the modern shared decision making approach means that patients are increasingly involved in 
treatment and preventative decisions such as choosing between bypass surgery and 
angioplasty or deciding for or against vaccinations. All such decisions involve collecting, 
processing, and weighing probabilistic information. As a result, individual risk perception 
about medical matters has have been a recent focus of research. 
At least 40 years of psychological research have produced an extensive catalog of 
situations in which likelihood estimates deviate from the prescriptions of probability theory 
(see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002 for an overview). One such bias is the excessive 
influence of narrative information, exemplars, and testimonies, which we refer to as narrative 
bias. In a classic example, Borgida and Nisbett (1977) found that a few brief personal 
accounts had a far stronger impact on students' course choices than mean course evaluations. 
Such reasoning is considered to be biased, that is, formally incorrect, because it fails to weigh 
different samples of data according to the respective sample size. 
Assessing the Narrative Bias 
One difﬁculty in understanding the mechanisms behind the narrative bias and in 
coherently summarizing ﬁndings lies in the different measures used to assess the inﬂuence of 
narrative information. Dependent variables vary from subjective probability to perceived risk 
or actual decisions (Betsch, Renkewitz, & Haase, 2013; Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz, & 
Betsch, 2011; Fagerlin, Wang, & Ubel, 2005; Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2009). 
Researchers on biases in risk perception commonly collect some sort of magnitude 
judgment regarding the likelihood of a speciﬁed event (e.g., de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008; 
Knapp, Gardner, Raynor, Woolf, & McMillan, 2010; Lee, Schwarz, Taubman, & Hou, 2010). 
However, even the most parsimonious, and also most common, deﬁnition of perceived risk 
(following expected value theory) additionally includes a value dimension, that is, the 
signiﬁcance or severity of a loss. Other concepts include the affective reaction to an outcome, 
the perceived source of a risk, the susceptibility to a risk, and degree of belief. Further, the 
voluntariness of risk, the knowledge about, and control over risk can also play a role in risk 
judgments (Brewer et al., 2007; Eiser, 1994; Gardoni & Murphy, 2013; Loewenstein, Weber, 
 How Narratives Bias Risk Perceptions 43 
Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Slovic, Fischhoff, & 
Lichtenstein, 1979; see Brun, 1994 for a comprehensive discussion of this topic). Thus, it 
seems prudent to distinguish between subjective probability and perceived risk. 
In addition, although subjective probability and perceived risk are central variables in 
many studies, there is no consensus regarding their measurement. Methods include inferences 
from bets (Beach & Phillips, 1967), balls and bins tasks (Goldstein & Rothschild, 2014), risk 
matrices (Ball & Watt, 2013), and various self-report formats. The latter typically elicit a type 
of magnitude judgment and include numeric estimates, rating scales, and visual analog scales. 
One goal of this paper is to compare narrative biases across different measures used in 
previous research (Betsch et al., 2013, 2011; Obrecht et al., 2009). 
Theoretical Accounts 
Theoretical accounts of the highly persuasive effect of narrative evidence vary in 
focus and scope. Some explanations focus on the content of the narrative itself, which elicits 
affective reactions and immersion (see Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007 for an overview). Indeed, 
ﬁndings from previous research have shown that highly emotional narratives reporting 
vaccine adverse events increase the perceived risk of vaccination compared to less emotional 
narratives (Betsch et al., 2011). However, other ﬁndings show that the narrative bias occurs 
even when the content of the narrative is free of emotion and contains only the statement that 
the critical event occurred (Betsch et al., 2013; Obrecht et al., 2009). In this paper, we focus 
on a more formal approach that explains the narrative bias based solely on the structure of 
statistical and narrative information regardless of the narratives’ qualitative content. 
Previous research that presented both statistical and narrative evidence to subjects has 
led to comparable results but differed regarding the causal explanation put forward by the 
authors. Ubel, Jepson, and Baron (2001) examined the importance of the match between 
statistical and narrative information and found that narratives were especially inﬂuential when 
the ratio of narratives indicating success vs. failure of a treatment was incongruent with 
previously presented statistical evidence. The effect, however, disappeared when controlling 
for the absolute number of narratives. Nevertheless, this ﬁnding indicates that individuals may 
perceive a set of narratives as a single unit of information—comparable to statistical 
information—that conveys the relative frequency of events. 
Contrary to this idea, Obrecht et al. (2009) developed the encounter frequency theory, 
which assumes that each piece of information, be it a statistic or a single narrative case, is 
attributed equal weight when forming a judgment. Accordingly, individuals simply count 
each piece of information indicating the (non)occurrence of an event. Encounter frequency 
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theory does not specify the process of how positive and negative counts are integrated. 
However, this account suggests that changing the absolute number of narratives reporting the 
occurrence of a focal event while keeping their relative proportion constant will affect 
judgments or decisions. A similar notion can be found in research on the ratio-bias or 
denominator neglect—that is, the phenomenon that individuals tend to prefer a gamble with a 
9
100
 likelihood of winning over a gamble with a 1
10
 likelihood, because they tend to ignore the 
denominator (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). 
Thus, the second goal of this paper is to clarify whether the narrative bias relies on the 
relative or absolute number of narratives reporting the critical event. 
Negativity Bias 
There is some evidence that individuals tend to weigh information regarding the 
presence of a risk more strongly than information concerning its absence (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 
2001). This negativity bias means that narratives may have an asymmetric effect. Narratives 
implying a higher risk than the provided statistical information would have a stronger 
inﬂuence on risk perceptions than narratives implying a lower risk than the statistical 
information. Therefore, a third goal is to test whether narratives can both increase and 
decrease risk perceptions, relative to the perception resulting from the statistical information 
alone. 
Experimental Artifact 
We also strive to test the narrative bias against two potential and related alternative 
explanations that are inherent in the experimental procedure. First, it is possible that the 
narrative bias occurs simply because subjects follow conversational norms. That is, as 
experimenters we assume that the statistical information is the most or even only relevant 
information for the judgment. We expect individuals to attribute less weight to or even ignore 
the less reliable narrative information. However, Grice (1975) argues that conversation 
follows certain norms of cooperation, one of which states that communicated information is to 
be relevant. Thus, from the subjects’ point of view, all information provided by the 
experimenter may appear relevant for judgment due to the simple fact that it has been 
provided. 
Second, in most studies comparing the inﬂuence of statistical and individuating 
information, statistical information is presented ﬁrst followed by individuating information. 
Thus, it is possible that the narrative bias is at least partially caused by a recency effect. 
Expanding on the idea of conversational norms, Krosnick, Li, and Lehman (1990) argue that 
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more informative and thus more important information is typically provided last, especially 
when two contradictory pieces of information are presented. Accordingly, subjects may 
assume that the experimenter considers the second piece of information, that is, the narrative 
information, to be more important and that they should, in turn, do the same when making a 
judgment. 
Finally, and related to this, we will investigate whether subjects would seek the 
narrative information at all if it were not provided. The act of seeking more information when 
sound statistical evidence is already available results in added costs to the individual—at least 
in terms of time. From a homo oeconomicus point of view, statistics provide the necessary 
likelihood information to quickly make a decision and should, therefore, be preferred over the 
time consuming evaluation of narrative reports. 
Summary of Research Questions and Overview 
Perceived risk and subjective probability are conceptually different; and there is no 
consensus on how to measure either one. Previous research has studied the narrative bias 
effect on both subjective probability, assessed either as percent estimates or by rating scales, 
and perceived risk measured using a visual analog scale. Experiment 1 asks whether the 
narrative bias is dependent on the task. Specifically: 
RQ1: Do narratives and statistical information have different relative effects on a 
numeric and a verbal measure of subjective probability and a visual analog scale measure of 
perceived risk? 
In previous studies, the relative frequency of the critical event as implied by the 
narratives typically exceeded that given by the statistical information, which led to an increase 
in perceived risk (Betsch et al., 2013, 2011). Research on the negativity bias (Siegrist & 
Cvetkovich, 2001) suggests that narratives may have an asymmetrical inﬂuence on risk 
perceptions such that they will have a greater impact when they exceed rather than fall below 
statistical risk information. Experiment 1 will therefore address the following research 
question: 
RQ2: Is the narrative bias symmetric or asymmetric? 
The same number of narratives indicating the occurrence of an event will lead to 
different risk perceptions if we assume that the relative rather than absolute frequency 
inﬂuences risk perceptions. Therefore, in Experiment 2, we strive to answer the question: 
RQ3: Is the narrative bias caused by the relative or absolute number of narratives 
reporting the focal event? 
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Experiment 2 also explores questions related to the experimental procedure aimed to 
rule out the possibility that the narrative bias is an experimental artifact: 
RQ4: Is the narrative bias partially an artifact produced by conversational norms in 
that the narratives have to be encoded and therefore appear to be relevant for judgments? 
RQ5: Is the narrative bias partially caused by a recency effect when narratives appear 
after the statistical information? 
RQ6: Is narrative information an attractive source of information when statistical 
information about a risk is already provided? 
For the experiment content domain, we use vaccination risks. The example of 
vaccination risks seems particularly relevant in this context for two reasons: a growing 
number of individuals facing health related decision consult the Internet for information (Fox 
& Duggan, 2013); and narrative evidence is a common feature on anti-vaccination activist 
websites that propagate alleged adverse events and high risks of vaccination (Betsch et al., 
2012; Haase & Betsch, 2012; Kata, 2010, 2012). In both experiments, subjects receive 
statistical and narrative information about the occurrence of vaccine-adverse events (VAE). 
They then judge the riskiness of the vaccination as well as the subjective probability of VAE. 
Experiment 1 
In this experiment, we compared the effect of the narrative bias on three related 
measures. We asked for a percent estimate of the likelihood of VAE. Only numeric measures 
allow for a meaningful quantiﬁcation of the narrative bias; and this format has been shown to 
be the least context dependent and less error-prone than judgments of relative frequency 
(Haase, Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2013; Weinstein & Diefenbach, 1997). As a second measure of 
subjective probability, we included a verbally labeled 7-point rating scale in order to retain 
comparability with previous studies (Betsch et al., 2011). Further, this 7-point rating scale has 
been shown to be superior in behavior prediction as compared to a percent measure 
(Weinstein et al., 2007). We will therefore explore whether we ﬁnd comparable results 
regarding vaccination intentions. Finally, we assessed perceived risk by means of a visual 
analog scale. Since subjective probability and perceived risk are distinct constructs, we 
assessed all dependent variables for every subject and varied the order of assessment between 
subjects. In our analyses of the narrative bias, we examined only the ﬁrst measure completed 
by each subject in order to exclude carry-over effects. 
Because we differentiate between subjective probability and perceived risk, and 
deﬁnitions of risk typically include a value dimension, we additionally assessed the perceived 
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severity of VAE. We also assessed the intention to get vaccinated in order to compare the 
different measures in terms of behavior prediction. 
Method 
Subjects and design. A total of 290 students at the University of Erfurt participated in 
this lab-experiment in exchange for a small gift and the chance to win one of ten €50 notes 
(approx. US$67.50). Thirteen subjects were excluded because they had either taken part in a 
similar experiment before or reported in a post-experimental interview that they were unsure 
about the handling of the scales. Thus, the ﬁnal sample includes N = 277 subjects, with ns for 
individual analyses ranging from 22 to 27. Sixty-eight subjects (24.5%) were male and the 
mean age (SD) was 22.13 (3.16) years. 
Each subject was randomly assigned to one of 12 conditions, resulting from a 
2  2  3 between-subjects design with the relative number of narratives reporting VAE as the 
independent variable (1 or 8 narratives of 20, equaling 5% and 40%), the statistical 
probability of VAE (5% or 40%) as a second factor, and the ﬁrst dependent variable as a third 
factor (7-point rating scale, percent estimate or visual analog scale). In addition, we assessed 
subjects’ numeracy, as previous work suggests that individuals with low numeracy may be 
especially prone to biases due to narrative information (Dieckmann, Slovic, & Peters, 2009; 
Peters, 2008). 
Procedure. All materials were presented on a computer screen. Subjects were 
provided with information about a ﬁctitious severe disease (dysomeria) and the recommended 
vaccination. This was accompanied by a statistic reporting the likelihood of VAE occurring. 
Subsequently, subjects were asked to imagine that they found additional information about 
experiences with the vaccination on an Internet bulletin board. The narratives there reported 
either the occurrence (positive) or non-occurrence (negative) of VAE. Afterwards, subjects 
completed the dependent variable measures. 
Manipulation of the statistical probability of adverse events. The statistical 
probability of VAE was explicitly expressed in percent together with a pictograph, that is, a 
matrix of 100 elements colored in one of two ways which indicated the presence or absence of 
VAE (created with http://www.iconarray.com, last accessed on October 24, 2014). 
Pictographs have been shown to reduce the effect of narrative information (Fagerlin et al., 
2005). We manipulated the statistical probability of VAE (5% vs. 40%) between conditions. 
Manipulation of relative frequency of narratives reporting adverse events. The 
narratives reported either the occurrence or non-occurrence of adverse events, with the 
number of narratives reporting VAE depending on condition (1 vs. 8 of 20 reports, resulting 
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in 5% and 40%, respectively). The narratives were approximately equal in length (mean 
number of words = 57.5 and 52.2 for positive and negative narratives, respectively). In 
addition, positive narratives were pretested on 9-point rating scales concerning the severity of 
reported VAE, emotionality of content, and credibility. We selected narratives with moderate 
severity and emotionality, that is, ratings did not differ from a midpoint rating of 5 (severity: 
all ts ≤ 1.66, emotionality: all ts ≤ 1.98). The narratives were rated as equally credible (mean 
ratings did not differ from a rating of 6, all ts ≤ 1.48). The ﬁctional authors’ ﬁrst names for all 
narratives were balanced for gender. The narratives were displayed as single cases, with one 
narrative per page. The pages were displayed in random order. In order to minimize any 
systematic inﬂuence due to additional information in the text, for example, concerning the 
vaccination procedure, narratives were elected at random when the whole sample was not 
needed. For example, in the 5% condition, one positive narrative out of a total of eight 
positive narratives (that were used in the 40% condition) was drawn for each subject. 
Appendix A presents four example narratives. 
Dependent variables. Table 1 provides an overview of all dependent variables. 
Subjects completed all measures; however, the order of the following measures was varied 
between subjects: the subjective probability of the occurrence of adverse events (measured via 
two measures: numeric estimate in percent and probability rating on a 7-point rating scale) 
and the perceived risk of the vaccination (visual analog scale). For perceived risk, we used a 
non-numeric format so as to avoid making the probability dimension especially salient. 
However, to allow for comparisons with the subjective probability judgments and a 
quantiﬁcation of the narrative bias, the visual analog scale provided scores between 0 and 
100. No numeric feedback was provided to subjects. 
In the subjective probability conditions, subjects provided their ratings on the speciﬁc 
subjective probability measure followed by the respective other measure and the visual analog 
scale to assess perceived risk. In the perceived risk condition, risk was assessed on the visual 
analog scale followed by the subjective probability measures in counterbalanced order. After 
all three measures were completed we assessed the severity of the possible adverse events as 
well as subjects’ intentions to get vaccinated. 
Manipulation check. After completing the dependent measures, subjects were asked 
to reproduce the stated statistical probability (5% or 40% depending on condition) and report 
the number of cases that reported VAE on the bulletin board (1 or 8).  
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Table 1 Overview of dependent variables 
Construct Scale type Wording 
Subjective 
probability Percent estimate What is the probability of experiencing vaccine-adverse events if you get vaccinated? 
 (You will experience adverse events with a probability of__ %) 
Subjective 
probability 7-point rating scale What is the probability of experiencing vaccine-adverse events if you get vaccinated? 
(1 = almost zero, 2 = very small, 3 = small, 4 = moderate, 5 = large, 6 = very large, 7 = almost certain). 
Risk  Visual analog 
scale  How risky do you judge the vaccination to be?  (0 = not risky at all, 100 = very risky) 
Severity 7-point rating scale How severe do you judge the possible adverse events of the vaccination to be? 
(1 = not severe, 7 = very severe). 
Intention 7-point rating scale If you had the possibility to get vaccinated in the next week, what would you do?  
(1 = I would definitely not get vaccinated, 7 = I would definitely get vaccinated) 
Note: No numeric anchors were provided to the subjects. In Experiment 1 the materials were in German.  
 
Subjective numeracy. Subjective numeracy was assessed with a German translation 
of the Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007; German translation by Keller, 
Siegrist, & Visschers, 2009). The eight items were answered on a 6-point scale, where higher 
ratings indicate greater subjective numeracy (e.g., How good are you at working with 
fractions?). 
Results 
Manipulation check. In both conditions, roughly 96% of subjects were able to 
reproduce the given statistical probability (5% or 40%). We assumed a correct recall of the 
number of narratives if the recalled number was plus/minus one. For the condition in which 1 
narrative reported VAE, 94.9% correctly recalled the absolute number (M1 = 1.40, 
SD1 = 1.75). In the 8 cases condition, 51% (M8 = 8.33, SD8 = 2.29) correctly recalled the 
absolute frequency of narratives reporting VAE. As the results did not change after 
eliminating subjects who did not correctly recall the encoded information, we used the full 
sample in our analyses. 
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Subjective numeracy. The obtained internal consistency of all items was sufﬁcient, 
Cronbach’s α = .77. The mean score of answers constitutes the subjective numeracy score 
(potential range 1–6). The mean subjective numeracy score (4.21, SD = 0.76) did not differ 
across conditions (all η
P
2s in a 2  2  3 ANOVA were ≤ .01, all ps ≥ .09). 
Subjective probability and risk perception. The ﬁrst goal of this experiment was to 
compare the effects of statistical and narrative information on different measures of perceived 
risk and subjective probability. Therefore, we calculated regression analyses for the measures 
using only the subsamples that responded to the respective construct ﬁrst in the order of 
dependent variables. We excluded the samples in which other measures were completed prior 
to the dependent variable of interest to exclude carry-over effects (e.g., the inﬂuence of the 
numerically recalled probability on the general judgment of risk). Thus, we calculated three 
linear regressions predicting subjective probability (percent estimate and rating scale) and risk 
(visual analog scale), respectively. For all analyses we used standardized, continuous 
predictors. Interactions were calculated as the mathematical products of the factors (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). 
In a ﬁrst regression, we entered the manipulated factors and their interaction. In a 
second regression, we added subjective numeracy and the interactions of the factors with 
subjective numeracy.1 The main results of the separate regressions are displayed in Table 2. 
The narrative biases are displayed in Figure 1. Both the statistical base-rate (β = .81) and the 
narratives (β = .15) signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the subjective probability of experiencing adverse 
events assessed as percent estimate. The statistical information had a stronger inﬂuence than 
the narrative information. A similar pattern of effects occurred when subjective probability 
was assessed by means of a 7-point rating scale (statistical base-rate: β = .56, narratives: 
β = .16), although the narratives’ inﬂuence was not signiﬁcant. For perceived risk assessed 
with the visual analog scale, however, the inﬂuence of the statistical base-rate information 
was lower than that of the narratives (statistical base-rate: β = .29, narratives: β = .43), 
indicating a stronger narrative bias. 
In order to assess the different effects of narratives and statistics on the three 
dependent measures we also correlated each of the three dependent measures with the 
difference between the statistical and narrative information. This was done only for those 
subjects for whom narrative information differed from the statistical base-rate. Differences   
                                                          
1 As multiple regression can obscure relationships between variables Appendix B presents a full correlation matrix of the independent and dependent variables as well as numeracy. 
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Table 2 
Subjective probability (percent estimate, 7-point rating scale) and perceived risk as a function 
of the statistical base-rate, relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE, and subjective 
numeracy (Experiment 1) 
Subjective probability (percent estimate) 
n = 89 β p β p 
Statistical base-rate (5% vs. 40%) .81 < .001 .83 < .001 
Narratives: frequency of VAE (5% vs. 40%) .15 .02 .14 .03 
Statistical base-rate  narratives .00 .97 −.02 .79 
Subj. numeracy   −.01 .84 
Subj. numeracy  statistical base-rate   .10 .12 
Subj. numeracy  narratives   −.14 .02 
Subj. numeracy  statistical base-rate  narratives   −.03 .58 
R2 .68  .71  
Subjective probability (7-point rating scale) 
n = 94 β p β p 
Statistical base-rate (5% vs. 40%) .56 < .001 .55 < .001 
Narratives: frequency of VAE (5% vs. 40%) .16 .07 .17 .06 
Statistical base-rate  narratives .07 .43 .03 .71 
Subj. numeracy   .03 .75 
Subj. numeracy  statistical base-rate   .22 .02 
Subj. numeracy  narratives   .09 .30 
Subj. numeracy  statistical base-rate  narratives   .07 .42 
R2 .35  .39  
Perceived risk (visual analog scale) 
n = 94 β p β p 
Statistical base-rate (5% vs. 40%) .29 .002 .29 .002 
Narratives: frequency of VAE (5% vs. 40%) .43 < .001 .42 < .001 
Statistical base-rate  narratives −.13 .14 −.14 .14 
Subj. numeracy   .01 .93 
Subj. numeracy  statistical base-rate   .02 .87 
Subj. numeracy  narratives   −.03 .74 
Subj. numeracy  statistical base-rate  narratives   −.06 .51 
R2 .29  .30  
Note. Standardized betas (β) and respective p-values of signiﬁcant effects are shown in boldface.  
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Figure 1. Subjective probability (A: n = 89, B: n = 94) and perceived risk (C: n = 94) as a function of statistical and narrative information. All factors were manipulated between subjects. Error bars = 95% CI.  
 
were calculated by subtracting the frequency of VAE from the statistical base-rate, so a 
difference of −35% represents a low base-rate and a higher probability in the narratives, a 
difference of 35% represents the opposite. This way, a negative correlation indicates a 
stronger effect of narratives, a positive one a stronger effect of the statistical information. The 
correlations were r = .67, p < .001 for the percent estimate (n = 44), r = .41, p = .005 for the 
7-point rating scale (n = 46), and r = −.15, p = .343 for the visual analog scale (n = 45). The 
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last of these differed signiﬁcantly from the other two (Percent estimate: Fisher’s z = 4.38, 
p < .001, 7-point rating scale: Fisher’s z = 2.71, p = .007). 
When we entered subjective numeracy into the regression model, the percent estimate 
was a function of the number of narratives only when subjects had low subjective numeracy 
scores. Subjects high in subjective numeracy were unaffected by the number of narratives 
when judging the probability of VAE. This is evident in a signiﬁcant interaction between 
subjective numeracy and the relative number of narratives (β = −.14). 
When subjects judged the probability of VAE on the 7-point rating scale, the resulting 
judgments differed more strongly between the 5% and 40% statistical conditions for subjects 
high in subjective numeracy. Judgments by subjects low in subjective numeracy were more 
similar across statistical conditions. This was indicated by a signiﬁcant interaction of 
subjective numeracy and statistical probability of VAE (β = .22). 
Subjective numeracy did not affect ratings on the risk measure (all βs n.s.). 
Carry-over effects. The results above suggest that risk judgments and subjective 
probability judgments are indeed very different—the probability judgments were less biased 
by narrative information than the risk judgment and depended more on the statistical base-
rate. Judging probabilities before judging risk, therefore, may increase the saliency of the 
probability dimension of risk, resulting in a larger effect of the statistical base-rate on risk 
judgments. Conversely, judging risk before probability might increase the inﬂuence of 
narrative information. Both kinds of inﬂuence should manifest themselves in carry-over 
effects. To test this, we calculated three additional regression analyses with the respective  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Perceived risk (n = 183) as a function of the statistical and narrative information. Subjective probability was assessed before the risk judgment. All factors were manipulated between subjects. Error bars = 95% CI.  
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other subsample, for example, we predicted ratings on the probability scales using only 
subjects that had ﬁrst judged perceived risk and, vice versa, predicted risk judgments of 
subjects who had ﬁrst estimated subjective probability of VAE. 
Percent estimates were not affected by a prior risk judgment (statistical base-rate: 
β = .81, p < .001, narratives: β = .19, p = .002). Subjective numeracy had no inﬂuence, all 
other ts ≤ 1.45; R² = .72, F(7, 86) = 31.62, p < .001. 
For the 7-point rating scale, on the other hand, we found a similar signiﬁcant inﬂuence 
of statistical variation (β = .56, p < .001) but also a signiﬁcant effect of the narratives (β = .25, 
p = .003). Again, there was no effect of subjective numeracy, all other ts ≤ 1.48; R² = .41, 
F(7, 86) = 8.36, p < .001. This indicates that considering the whole risk construct ﬁrst renders 
a probability judgment more susceptible to the inﬂuence of irrelevant information. 
For the risk measure, we found that judging probability ﬁrst reversed the relative 
inﬂuence of both information types, thus resulting in a stronger inﬂuence of statistical 
information (β = .51, p < .001) than of the narratives (β = .16, p = .012) on subsequent risk 
judgments, all other ts ≤ 1.21; R² = .32, F(7, 175) = 11.86, p < .001. Note that increasing the 
salience of the probability dimension not only increased the effect of statistical information 
but also decreased the narratives’ inﬂuence (see Figure 2 compared to Figure 1C). 
Symmetry of the narrative bias. In order to assess whether the narrative bias is 
symmetric, we compared the effect sizes of the conditions when narratives were expected to 
increase vs. decrease the resulting judgments. The bars on the left in Figure 1 represent the 
case in which narratives should increase ratings of subjective probability and risk, because the 
relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE is equal to or greater than the statistical base-
rate of 5%. The bars on the right represent the case in which narratives report an equal to or 
lower probability of VAE than the statistical information. If the narrative bias is symmetric, 
effect sizes displayed in Figure 1 should not differ between an expected increase vs. decrease 
(left vs. right). 
In the case of the percent estimates, we observed a symmetric narrative bias in both 
directions. For the 7-point rating scale, the decreasing effect was slightly larger than the 
increasing effect, although both effects were rather small. For the risk measure, we observed a 
strong negativity bias, indicating that narratives increased rather than decreased risk 
perceptions. 
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Table 3 
Correlations between subjective probability (percent estimate, 7-point rating scale), perceived 
risk, and intention to get vaccinated for the full sample in Experiment 1 (N = 277). 
 Percent 7-point Risk Intention 
Percent —    
7-point .70*** —   
Risk .61*** .74*** —  
Intention −.22*** −.34*** −.43*** — 
***p < .001.  
 
Intention to get vaccinated. For each subsample, separate correlation analyses 
between the intention to get vaccinated and the respective dependent variable revealed 
virtually identical coefﬁcients (rPERC = −.31, r7-POINT = −.33, rRISK = −.31, all ps < .01). 
However, in an additional step-wise regression analysis across all subjects (N = 277) only 
perceived risk predicted the intention, whereas both other variables were excluded from the 
analysis (βRISK = −.43, p < .001; R² = .19). 
These results might indicate multicollinearity, that is, even though each measure 
predicts the intention on its own, they actually account for the same variance because they are 
correlated. In line with this, the correlation coefﬁcients in Table 3 indicate that the percent 
estimate and the 7-point rating scale have some predictive power but that perceived risk 
accounts for the same as well as for additional and unique variance in vaccination intentions. 
Appendix C presents the same correlation matrices as Table 3 for each subsample. The 
absolute predictive power of all measures varies but the relation between measures remains 
stable, with perceived risk as the best predictor of behavioral intentions. 
Summary. Narratives biased the perception of subjective probability and risk to 
different extents, depending on the measure with which the dependent variables were 
assessed. The relative effect of narratives was largest (and even a little larger than the effect of 
the statistical information) on perceived risk assessed with a visual analog scale. The 
narratives had a similar but smaller to negligible effect on both measures of subjective 
probability (RQ1). Variations in statistical information, on the other hand, had the greatest 
effect on subjective probability assessed as a percent estimate and the smallest effect on 
perceived risk assessed with a visual analog scale. These results underline the important 
conceptual distinction between subjective probability and perceived risk. Risk perception is 
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often operationalized as a likelihood judgment. However, the manipulation of probabilistic 
information (all other variables were held constant) affected judgments of subjective 
probability and perceived risk differently. This is especially apparent when considering RQ2. 
The narrative bias was symmetric only when subjective probability was assessed in percent—
that is, when narratives suggested a lower likelihood than the statistical base-rate, subjective 
probability decreased; it increased to the same extent when narratives suggested a higher 
likelihood compared to the statistical base-rate. Contrary to this ﬁnding, we observed a strong 
negativity bias on the risk measure—that is, a greater increase than decrease in risk 
perceptions due to narratives. 
Previous research indicates that the 7-point rating scale is less sensitive to variations in 
objective probabilities (Betsch et al., 2011; Haase et al., 2013), which is supported by the 
present results: The 7-point rating scale was less able to map differences in the statistical 
base-rates than the percent estimates. In addition, the effect of narratives was smallest on this 
scale. If quantifying the effect of narratives on subjective probability is a goal, subjective 
probability should be assessed as percent estimates. Experiment 2 will therefore omit the 
7-point rating scale. 
In additional analyses, we found that individual differences in subjective numeracy 
play a differential role concerning the judgment of subjective probability both as a percent 
estimate and on a rating scale. Low subjective numeracy increased the inﬂuence of narratives 
when providing percent estimates, which matches previous ﬁndings (Dieckmann et al., 2009). 
For the 7-point rating scale, low subjective numeracy was related to less differentiation 
between statistical base-rates. Highly numerate subjects used the 7-point rating scale more 
broadly to differentiate between the 5% and 40% base-rate. In line with this, Peters and 
Bjalkebring (2014) found higher subjective numeracy to be related to better performance in a 
symbolic-number mapping task. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 implicitly assumes that the relative frequency of narratives reporting the 
critical event inﬂuences risk perceptions. However, as stated in the introduction, encounter 
frequency theory and research on the ratio-bias suggest that the absolute number of narratives 
may drive this effect. In the current experimental paradigm, individuals would then perceive 
different risks when 8 of 20 narratives report VAE than when 4 of 10 do so. Thus, in this 
experiment we vary the absolute number of narratives while keeping the relative number of 
positive cases constant (RQ3). 
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In order to investigate whether the narrative bias is in part an experimental artifact, 
additional experimental conditions offer subjects the option to decide whether they want to 
view the narrative information in addition to the statistical information. This should 
communicate to subjects that the statistical information is sufﬁcient to make a judgment 
(RQ4) and will also allow us to address the question whether narratives are an attractive 
source of information that are sought out even when statistical information is already 
available (RQ6). Further, in certain conditions we vary the sequence of statistical and 
narrative information to exclude recency as an alternative explanation (RQ5). 
Method 
The experimental set-up strongly resembled the ﬁrst experiment. 
Subjects and design. Subjects were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk and were 
paid US$1 (hourly wage: approx. US$4.14) through the Mechanical Turk payment system. Of 
the 515 individuals who clicked on the link to the survey, 479 completed the study. We 
excluded one individual who copied text from the page into a textbox, indicating that he or 
she did not read the instructions. In addition, we excluded three subjects who completed the 
survey in less than 5 minutes (M = 13 min 56 s, SD = 6 min), which falls below the minimum 
completion-time. Finally, 11 subjects indicated that they had previously participated in a 
similar study and were therefore excluded from the sample. Thus, analyses were calculated 
with a sample of N = 464 subjects, with ns for individual conditions ranging from 24 to 31. 
Nearly half of the sample identified as female (n = 230, 49.6%) and the mean age (SD) was 
32.65 (10.85) years. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to 16 conditions, resulting from a 2  2  3 between-
subjects design plus four additional conditions described below (Figure 3). The main design is 
constituted by the following factors: 2 (sequence of dependent variables: risk perception 
followed by subjective probability and vice versa)  2 (sample size: 10 vs. 20 cases)  3 
(relative frequency of narratives reporting adverse events: 10% vs. 20% vs. 40%). The 
statistical base-rate information was equal in all conditions (20%). Additionally, we assessed 
subjects’ numeracy. 
In order to test whether the narrative bias occurs due to a conversational norm 
indicating that all information provided must be relevant, we added two cells in which reading 
the narratives was optional, in contrast to all the above mentioned conditions in which reading 
the narratives was required. We did so in a 2  2 between-subjects subdesign, using two cells 
from the design reported above: 2 (relative frequency of adverse events: 10% vs. 40%)  2  
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Figure 3. Design of Experiment 2. Top of the ﬁgure shows the main 2  2  3 design, the bottom shows both subdesigns. Dashed borders indicate cells from the main design used for comparison with the subdesigns.  
 
(encoding of narrative information: required vs. optional). If an interaction suggests that the 
narrative bias disappears when encoding of the narratives is optional rather than required, we 
can assume that at least part of the narrative bias occurs due to the subjects’ tendency to view 
all materials presented by the experimenter as relevant. For economic reasons, we decided to 
use only the risk measure as a dependent variable. 
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In order to test whether the narrative bias occurs due to a recency effect, we added two 
additional conditions in which we varied the order of the statistical and narrative information. 
Thus, the resulting 2  2 between-subjects subdesign was constituted by the following factors: 
2 (relative frequency of adverse events: 10% vs. 40%)  2 (sequence of information: statistic–
narratives and vice versa). If an interaction suggests that the narrative bias disappears when 
the statistical information is presented after the narratives and before the dependent variables, 
we can assume that at least part of the narrative bias occurs due to a recency effect. Again, we 
used only the risk measure. 
Procedure. As in Experiment 1, subjects read about the disease, the vaccine 
recommendation, and the statistical likelihood of VAE in written and graphic form. They 
were then presented with the narrative information within a simulated bulletin board. Finally, 
we collected dependent variables, manipulation checks, and control variables. 
Statistical probability of adverse events. As in the ﬁrst experiment, the statistical 
probability of VAE was stated explicitly in percent and displayed by means of a pictograph 
and was ﬁxed at 20% in all conditions. The narratives either matched, exceeded, or fell below 
the statistical information. 
Manipulation of relative frequency of narratives reporting adverse events. In all 
conditions, either 1, 2 or 4 of 10 or 2, 4 or 8 of 20 narratives reported VAE (resulting in 
relative frequencies of 10%, 20% and 40%, respectively). All reported adverse events were 
categorized as mild (e.g., insomnia, fever, rash; as identiﬁed in a pretest, see Experiment 1). 
The remaining cases reported unproblematic vaccination experiences. As in Experiment 1, the 
narratives were of equal length, randomized in their sequence, and displayed one at a time. 
Required vs. optional reading of narratives. Two conditions offered subjects the 
choice to either view the narrative information or skip the simulated bulletin board. Subjects 
were asked: “Next, you have the opportunity to read a number of posts from an online 
message-board where people share their personal experiences with the vaccine. Would you 
like to read the posts?” (yes or no). In all other conditions, subjects were informed that on the 
subsequent pages they will see “a number of posts from an online message-board where 
people share their personal experiences with the vaccine”. The instructions asked them to read 
all messages carefully. 
Sequence of statistical and narrative information. All subjects learned that their 
doctor provided them with the statistical information. In two conditions, the statistical 
information appeared after the narrative information. In all other conditions, the statistical 
base-rate information was provided ﬁrst. 
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Dependent variables. As dependent variables, we assessed perceived risk and 
subjective probability in the same manner as in Experiment 1 (Table 1). As a measure for 
subjective probability, we asked for percent estimates. Half of the subjects judged the 
subjective probability of VAE ﬁrst and then rated their perceived risk and vice versa for the 
other half. 
Manipulation checks. We asked subjects to recall the initially stated base-rate of 
VAE (20%) as well as the number of narratives that reported adverse events (1, 2, or 4 of 10 
or 2, 4, or 8 of 20). We asked for the number of narratives only if the subjects had either seen 
them by default or if they had decided to read them. 
Numeracy. In this experiment, we employed a more objective measure of 
numeracy—a combination of the 3-item scale by Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, and Welch 
(1997) and the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 
2012). The seven items involve short mathematical quizzes (e.g., “Imagine we are throwing a 
ﬁve-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws, how many times would this ﬁve-
sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)?”, correct answer = 30). 
Results 
Manipulation check. Ninety-two percent of subjects correctly recalled that the 
statistical base-rate was 20% (M20 = 21.16, SD20 = 9.12); 4% reported that it was below 20%, 
whereas 4% reported a base-rate greater than 20%. 
We assumed a correct recall of the number of narratives if the recalled number was 
plus/minus one. For the condition in which 1 narrative reported VAE, 95.3% correctly 
recalled the absolute number (M1 = 1.30, SD1 = 1.32). In the 2 cases condition, 93.2% 
(M2 = 2.45, SD2 = 1.77), in the 4 cases condition 85.1% (M4 = 4.71, SD4 = 4.12), and in the 8 
cases condition 41.4% (M8 = 8.97, SD8 = 11.78) correctly recalled the absolute frequency of 
narratives reporting VAE. 
Numeracy. The sum score of all correctly solved numeracy items constitutes the 
numeracy score (potential range 0–7). The mean numeracy score (3.50, SD = 1.79) did not 
differ across conditions (all η
P
2s in a 3  2  2 ANOVA were ≤ .003, all ps ≥ .32). 
Subjective probability and risk perception. The goal of this experiment was to 
assess whether the narrative bias occurs due to the relative or absolute frequency of narratives 
reporting VAE (RQ3). A main effect showing an increase with sample size (number of 
messages on the bulletin board) would indicate that the absolute number of narratives 
reporting VAE (possibly as well as the relative number) inﬂuences the dependent variables, 
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because the absolute number of narratives is higher in the 20 cases condition (2, 4, 8) than in 
the 10 cases condition (1, 2, 4). 
For all analyses, we calculated regression analyses with standardized, continuous 
predictors. Two separate linear regressions were calculated, predicting subjective probability 
(percent estimates) and perceived risk (visual analog scale). We again used only the 
subsamples in which the respective dependent variable was assessed ﬁrst to exclude carry-
over effects. Interactions were calculated as the mathematical products of the standardized 
predictors (Cohen et al., 2003). In a ﬁrst regression, we entered the manipulated factors and 
their interaction. In a second regression, we added numeracy and the interactions of the 
factors with numeracy.2 
Table 4 displays the results of the regression analyses. Subjective probability tended to 
be inﬂuenced by the relative frequency of positive narratives when the sample was small (10 
cases) and was not inﬂuenced when it was large (20 cases), as indicated by an almost 
signiﬁcant interaction of narratives and sample size (β = −.14). The effect was somewhat 
weaker when numeracy and the respective interactions were also entered into the regression. 
No other effects were signiﬁcant. 
Perceived risk was a function of the relative frequency of narratives reporting VAE 
(β = .38), with subjects in conditions with a higher relative frequency perceiving higher 
vaccination risks. The sample size did not affect perceived risk (Figure 4).3  
 
Figure 4. Unstandardized simple slopes of frequency of VAE predicting perceived risk for the small and the large sample.  
                                                          
2 See Appendix B for a full correlation matrix. 
3 Simple slope ﬁgures were created with an Excel plotting sheet by Winnifred Louis, available at: http://www2.psy.uq.edu.au/ uqwloui1/, last accessed on March 3, 2015. 
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Table 4 
Subjective probability and perceived risk as a function of sample size, frequency of VAE, and 
numeracy (Experiment 2). 
Subjective probability (percent estimate) 
n = 181 β p β p 
Sample size (10 vs. 20%) −.04 .61 −.03 .70 
Narratives: frequency of VAE (10% vs. 20% vs. 40%) .10 .16 .09 .26 
Sample size  narratives −.14 .06 −.13 .09 
Numeracy   −.02 .80 
Numeracy  sample size   .05 .50 
Numeracy  narratives   −.10 .19 
Numeracy  sample size  narratives   .11 .15 
R2 .03  .06  
Perceived risk (visual analog scale) 
n = 168 β p β p 
Sample size (10 vs. 20%) −.07 .36 −.07 .35 
Narratives: frequency of VAE (10% vs. 20% vs. 40%) .38 < .001 .37 < .001 
Sample size  narratives .04 .60 .04 .62 
Numeracy   −.14 .05 
Numeracy  sample size   .02 .76 
Numeracy  narratives   −.14 .05 
Numeracy  sample size  narratives   .13 .06 
R2 .29  0.30  
Note. Standardized betas (β) and respective p-values of signiﬁcant effects are shown in boldface.  
 
Subjects with high numeracy generally perceived lower risk (β = −.14). Two 
interaction effects qualiﬁed this main effect. For highly numerate subjects, there was a weaker 
narrative bias, whereas the bias was stronger for subjects with low numeracy (Figure 5). The 
almost signiﬁcant three-way interaction is displayed in Figures 6A and 6B, which show that 
there was no narrative bias for highly numerate subjects when the sample size was small. 
In order to rule out the possibility that the lack of an effect of sample size was due to 
subjects not encoding the larger number of narratives as carefully as the small number, we 
analyzed reading times. We conducted two separate 3  2  2 ANOVAs with the total amount 
of time spent reading the narratives and the average amount of time per narrative as respective  
 How Narratives Bias Risk Perceptions 63 
 
Figure 5. Unstandardized simple slopes of frequency of VAE predicting perceived risk for 1 SD below and 1 SD above the mean of numeracy.  
 
dependent variables. Subjects took almost exactly twice as long to encode 20 narratives, 
M20 = 3 min 31 s, SD20 = 2 min 5 s, as compared to 10 narratives, M10 = 1 min 46 s, 
SD10 = 57 s; F(1, 337) = 60.96, p < .001, η
P
2  = .15). There were no other signiﬁcant effects 
(Fs ≤ 1.11). Correspondingly, average reading times per narrative were virtually identical in 
the small and large sample conditions (M10 = 11 s, SD = 6 s; M20 = 11 s, SD = 8 s) and did not 
differ across any conditions (Fs < 1). Additionally, adding either time variable had no effect 
on the regression models. 
Thus, the results show that subjects encoded small and large samples equally well. As 
there was no main effect of sample size on either dependent variable, this indicates that 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Unstandardized simple slopes of frequency of VAE predicting perceived risk for 1 SD below and 1 SD above the mean of numeracy, separate for the small and the large sample, illustrating the three-way interaction. 
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subjects extracted a relative frequency representation from the narratives. This relative 
frequency, rather than the absolute number of cases, drives the narrative bias (RQ3). 
Carry-over effects. Again, to test for carry-over effects, we calculated the same two 
regression models for the respective other subsample. Considering the whole risk construct 
ﬁrst led to a signiﬁcant narrative bias on subjective probability estimates (β = .26, p = .001). 
An almost signiﬁcant interaction with numeracy indicated that this bias was more pronounced 
for low numerate individuals (β = −.14, p = .060; all other ts < 1; R² = .10, F(7, 160) = 2.48, 
p = .019). 
A prior probability estimate, on the other hand, decreased the inﬂuence of narrative 
variation on the risk judgment (β = .20, p = .009) and rendered all further effects non-
signiﬁcant (all other ts ≤ 1.81; R² = .09, F(7, 173) = 2.34, p = .026). 
Required vs. optional encoding of narratives. Of the subjects who had a choice to 
read the narratives, 78.2% (n = 43) decided to do so. We conducted a 2 (frequency of VAE: 
10% vs. 40%)  2 (encoding of narrative information: required vs. optional) ANOVA with 
perceived risk as dependent variable. The analysis revealed only a strong narrative bias, 
F(1, 92) = 19.11, p < .001, η
P
2  = .17, all other Fs < 1. Consequently, we assume that narrative 
information affects risk perceptions irrespective of whether it had to be read or was freely 
chosen (RQ4). 
Sequence of statistical and narrative information. In order to test for recency 
effects, we conducted a 2 (frequency of VAE: 10% vs. 40%)  2 (sequence of statistical and 
narrative information) ANOVA with perceived risk as the dependent variable. We found a 
strong main effect for the relative frequency of VAE, F(1, 109) = 16.07, p < .001, η
P
2  = .13. 
All other effects were nonsigniﬁcant, Fs ≤ 1.7. Thus, the narrative bias occurred regardless of 
whether statistical base-rate information was provided before or after the narratives were 
encoded. This indicates that the narrative bias is not caused by a recency effect (RQ5). 
Intention to get vaccinated. For all subjects (N = 464) the correlation between 
perceived risk and intention to get vaccinated is r = −.41 (p < .001). Subjective probability 
and intention are not correlated (r = .01, n.s.). Because we observed muticollinearity in 
Experiment 1, Appendix C presents correlations between both measures and intention. When 
perceived risk was assessed ﬁrst, it correlates with subjective probability. However, in both 
subsamples only perceived risk predicts behavioral intentions. 
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Discussion 
In two experiments we found that the biasing inﬂuence of narrative information on 
risk perception is in part a function of the dependent measure used to assess it. Narratives had 
the largest effect on a non-numerical risk measure, whereas two scales for subjective 
probability reﬂected mostly statistical variations. This stresses the importance of 
differentiating between the constructs risk and probability. Further, two-way carry-over 
effects between the respective measures indicated that the use of all scales was context 
dependent, for example, considering the risk construct ﬁrst increased the inﬂuence of 
narrative information on subsequent probability judgments. Additionally, the risk measure 
was the best predictor of behavioral intentions, and only for the risk measure did we observe a 
negativity bias. Moreover, results indicate that subjects extracted a representation of relative 
frequency from the narratives, as changing the absolute number of single events while 
keeping their relative number constant did not change the narrative bias. Subjective and 
objective numeracy had opposing and somewhat weak effects on judgments. Finally, the 
option to freely choose whether to read the narrative information did not affect the narrative 
bias in any way. In addition, we found no indication of a recency effect as an explanation for 
the narratives’ inﬂuence. 
Issues of measurement. Regarding the task dependence of the narrative bias, three 
aspects of measuring risk perception must be considered: the representation on which a 
judgment is based, the scale used for assessment, and the context in which the scale is used. 
Various theoretical approaches propose that risk judgments rely on two distinct 
representations or processes. These theories make diverse yet conceptually related 
differentiations between cognitive vs. affective risk evaluations, a belief in objective 
probabilities vs. an intuitive perception of risk, and verbatim vs. gist representations. The two 
respective components are understood to be distinct but may interact in the reasoning process, 
which moves along a continuum between them (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Reyna, 2008, 2012; 
Slovic et al., 2004; van Gelder, de Vries, & van der Pligt, 2009; Windschitl, Martin, & 
Flugstad, 2002). 
The scales we used differ along at least two dimensions. First, whereas the rating scale 
offers only seven discrete categories for judgment, the percent format and the visual analog 
risk scale allow for quasi-continuous estimates, that is, 101 discrete categories, as responses 
were restricted to integers. This difference in resolution provides the latter scales with a 
natural advantage in terms of sensitivity to changes in subjective probability (Haase et al., 
2013). Second, while the percent format is purely numeric, the rating scale and risk measure 
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provide verbal labels. It has been argued that numeric probability measures induce rule-based 
reasoning in individuals and elicit beliefs in objective probability, whereas verbal scales lead 
to a more associative reasoning style and elicit rather intuitive thoughts about an uncertain 
prospect. These intuitive beliefs entail more than just a maximally accurate representation of 
likelihood. Rather, they also include notions of the value of a prospect, affective reactions to 
it, and its meaning in a given situation—all of which may make them more comparable to 
real-life situations. Accordingly, verbal probability scales have been shown to be more 
sensitive to context and framing effects as well as to be better predictors of preferences, 
behavioral intentions, and behavior than numeric scales. The risk measure extends this idea on 
an explicit conceptual level, as risk by deﬁnition encompasses more than mere probability. In 
addition, risk measures have been found to perform even better in predicting behavior 
(Baghal, 2011; Weinstein et al., 2007; Windschitl, 2002; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). 
Finally, the interpretation of a question and the use of a response format have been 
shown to be affected by the context such as a preceding question (Schwarz, 1999, 2007). 
Building on these premises, we suggest that judgments in research on biased risk perception 
are in part task-dependent (RQ1). Subjects base their estimates on beliefs in objective 
likelihood and intuitive risk representations and engage in rule-based and associative 
reasoning styles. The degree to which these two representations inform the judgment and the 
manner in which they are weighed and processed are in part a function of the response scale 
provided, as well as prior elicitations of related constructs. 
In line with this notion, narrative and statistical information affected the three 
dependent variables differently. Judgments on the 7-point rating scale were not inﬂuenced by 
variations in the narrative information (Experiment 1), which can partly be explained by the 
scale’s low sensitivity, as even the explicitly stated statistical probabilities of 5% and 40% 
were mapped very close to each other on the rating scale. However, the verbal qualiﬁers of 
this scale make judgments prone to reﬂecting not only a likelihood representation but also 
other aspects of the uncertain prospect, for example, the severity of VAE (Weber & Hilton, 
1990), which may have masked the effect of the narrative manipulation. Indeed, controlling 
for perceived severity (β = .19, p = .024) in the regression model not only significantly 
increased the amount of explained variance, from R² = .39 to R² = .43, F(1, 85) = 5.31, 
p = .024, but also rendered the variation in narratives a signiﬁcant predictor of subjective 
probability (β = .17, p = .046; all other effects unchanged). We assume that these subjects 
attempted to provide judgments which, for the most part, reﬂect their beliefs in objective 
probability, as this was the ﬁrst question asked. In contrast to this, estimates by subjects who 
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had ﬁrst considered the whole risk construct showed a clear narrative bias, indicating that 
subjects’ interpretation of the 7-point rating scale—as a pure probability measure vs. a general 
risk measure—varies as a function of contextual factors. 
The percent format, in comparison, elicits responses that are almost exclusively 
expressions of rule-based reasoning processes concerning numeric probabilities. The effect of 
variations in narrative information was smaller (Experiment 1) or negligible (Experiment 2) 
and symmetric as compared to the effect on risk judgments. Further, adding severity to the 
regression model had no effect in either of the experiments. Subjects encoded the likelihood 
of VAE in percent and were later asked for an estimate in percent. Thus, the format might 
have cued the retrieval of this speciﬁc information rather than a subjective representation of 
probability. However, even the percent format is not fully resistant to context effects—in 
Experiment 2, asking for a general risk judgment beforehand led to a narrative bias. 
Finally, we observed the strongest narrative bias on the visual analog risk scale. In 
Experiment 1, narratives had a stronger effect on risk perceptions than the statistic. In 
Experiment 2, only risk perceptions were affected by narrative information. Further, 
perceived severity proved a strong predictor of perceived risk and improved the model to a 
large degree in both experiments (Experiment 1: β = .31, p = .001; from R² = .30 to R² = .39, 
F(1, 85) = 12.17, p = .001; Experiment 2: β = .48, p < .001; from R² = .20 to R² = .42, 
F(1, 159) = 61.36, p < .001; all other effects unchanged). As individuals expressed more than 
just a likelihood representation in their risk judgments, these estimates might be especially 
susceptible to contextual factors. Accordingly, asking for a probability estimate ﬁrst increased 
the inﬂuence of statistical information on perceived risk (Experiment 1) and decreased the 
effect of narrative variation (both experiments). Still, risk estimates did not represent merely 
an analytic integration of likelihood and value. Additionally controlling for subjective 
probability estimates in the regression models eliminated the effect of statistical variation 
(Experiment 1) but not the effect of narratives on risk judgments (both experiments). 
In line with previous research and our reasoning thus far, we found that the risk 
measure predicted behavioral intentions best. Decisions and behavior under risk, of course, 
have more antecedents than just the likelihood of a given outcome. Thus, a measure that 
elicits more than this likelihood representation will consequently lead to superior predictions. 
Our ﬁndings regarding the symmetry of the narrative bias (RQ2) lend further support to this 
explanation. When asked to provide percent estimates, subjects engaged in rule-based 
integration akin to a calculation, which, since the presented frequencies were symmetric, 
resulted in a symmetric bias. A more intuitive risk measure, on the other hand, led to a clear 
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negativity bias. One explanation for the stronger impact of negative information is that it 
possesses greater diagnostic value. Consider the potential cost of ignoring a danger versus 
mistakenly missing out on a beneﬁt. If judgments of perceived risk are more relevant for 
actual behavior, it would make sense to assign negative information more weight. However, 
when the judgment process follows a normative understanding of mathematics, equal 
numbers will receive equal weights (Baumeister et al., 2001; Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2001; 
Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). 
Narratives as a source of probabilistic information. The narrative information 
provided subjects with exemplars of the occurrence and non-occurrence of an uncertain 
outcome, that is, VAE. The encoding of such event frequencies is a predominantly automatic 
and accurate process (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Zacks & Hasher, 2002). Accordingly, the 
manipulation checks showed that subjects were able to track the number of narratives 
reporting VAE, although there was some decline in accuracy when this number was larger. 
Nonetheless, results indicate that individuals perceived the absolute frequency of an uncertain 
event, yet extracted a relative frequency representation for subsequent risk judgments, as a 
change in total sample size did not affect the biasing inﬂuence of narrative information (RQ3). 
This ﬁnding stands in contrast to some existing literature. Research on the ratio bias, 
for instance, would have predicted that subjects perceive a higher likelihood or risk when 8 of 
20 narratives report VAE rather than 4 of 10, as they concentrate on the absolute frequency of 
the focal event and fail to take into account the total number of events (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 
1994; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). However, the occurrence of the ratio-bias appears to depend 
on within-subjects comparisons (Lefebvre, Vieider, & Villeval, 2010), whereas the present 
study used a between-subjects design. 
Similarly, Obrecht et al. (2009) employed a within-subjects design in their encounter 
frequency account. However, while 4 of 10 and 8 of 20 narratives would result in equal ratios 
of positive and negative encounters, their theory hinges on the idea that the statistic enters the 
judgment process as simply one more instance indicating either the occurrence or non-
occurrence of an event. This extra piece of information leads to differing ratios and, 
subsequently, differing predictions of perceived probability. There may be some merit to this 
theory if the statistic offers clear-cut evidence, that is, the likelihood is extremely high or low. 
However, a probability of 20% clearly indicates a certain amount of risk; one would be hard-
pressed to simply interpret it as a non-occurrence of an event because it is numerically below 
50%. 
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Taken together, our ﬁndings indicate that subjects interpreted the narratives as 
representing one sample of events conveying a probability and the statistic as another such 
sample. We did observe two almost signiﬁcant interaction effects of sample size: First, 
probability estimates were biased by the narrative information only when the sample was 
small. This might be due to a more accurate tracking of event frequencies when only ten 
exemplars were presented. Second, individuals high in numeracy showed no narrative bias on 
the risk measure in a small sample as compared to a large one. This might indicate that these 
subjects did in fact consider sample size in their judgments, as a larger sample of 20 events 
does have a higher diagnostic value than a smaller sample of 10 cases. As both effects were 
barely signiﬁcant and rather small, we do not believe that they impede our previous reasoning. 
Numeracy. We observed opposing effects of numeracy on the respective dependent 
measures in the two experiments. It is important to note, however, that we employed two 
different instruments to assess numeracy. The Subjective Numeracy Scale in Experiment 1 
measures self-assessed ability and preferences to understand and apply numbers, whereas the 
combined test in Experiment 2 objectively assesses the ability to perform mathematical 
operations with percentages and proportions. Even though the former measure was developed 
to serve as a proxy for objective performance tests, inconsistent results have been observed 
previously. In addition, it has been shown recently that subjective and objective numeracy 
scales share only a limited amount of variance and differ in their predictions of various biases 
(Hess, Visschers & Siegrist, 2011; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Peters & 
Bjalkebring, 2014). 
In Experiment 1, only the measures of subjective probability were affected by 
subjective numeracy, although in different ways. The statistical variation led to more extreme 
values on the 7-point rating scale for individuals higher in subjective numeracy, which 
implies a relation to the way individuals use a given scale for mapping likelihood. In contrast, 
higher subjective numeracy resulted in percent estimates that were less biased by narrative 
information, indicating signiﬁcance for the process of integrating probabilities. In Experiment 
2, we observed that objective numeracy decreased risk perceptions in general and moderated 
the narrative bias. Percent estimates of subjective probability were moderated only by 
objective numeracy when risk was assessed ﬁrst, leading to a narrative bias in the ﬁrst place. 
The question of whether a unitary construct underlies the various observed effects or 
lack thereof has been an ongoing debate (e.g., Nelson, Moser, & Han, 2013; Reyna, Nelson, 
Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). Subjective numeracy appears to reﬂect motivation and conﬁdence 
regarding the use of numerical information, that is, it relates to how people approach a task. 
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Thus, the lack of an effect on the risk measure in Experiment 1 is in line with our thinking 
that the risk judgments were approached in a more intuitive rather than rule-based manner. Of 
course, the processing of proportions is still relevant in the actual formation of a risk 
judgment, as the results regarding the sample size in Experiment 2 clearly demonstrate. Thus, 
the effect of objective numeracy, which appears to drive actual number operations, does not 
contradict the ﬁndings from Experiment 1. These ﬁndings support the notion of two related 
but not identical numeracy constructs (Peters & Bjalkebring, 2014). 
Experimental artifact and the motivation to understand risky outcomes. We 
addressed two potential experimental artifacts as alternative explanations for the narrative bias 
that both relate to conversational norms. First, encoding of the individuating information is 
typically mandatory in experiments like this. Thus, subjects might assume that it is relevant to 
the task at hand and thus only use it for this reason (Grice, 1975). We offered subjects a 
choice and found that, when reading the narratives was optional, the narrative bias occurred 
just as strongly (r = .39, p = .009) as when it was required (r = .44, p = .001; Fisher’s 
z = −0.27, p = .787; RQ4). 
Second, it has been argued that, when two conﬂicting pieces of information are 
presented, conversational norms indicate that the more informative and thus more important 
information is typically placed last (Krosnick at al., 1990). As the individuating information is 
generally presented after a base-rate in most related research, we varied the sequence of 
narrative and statistical information to exclude the possibility that the narrative bias is driven 
by recency. The results show that the narrative bias occurred independently of the narratives’ 
position in the sequence of information (RQ5). 
Thus, we found no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the narrative bias is based 
on adherence to conversational norms. On the other hand, we also cannot rule out their 
signiﬁcance. Even in the optional encoding conditions, the narratives were still provided by 
the experimenter. Therefore, it is still possible that the subjects assumed that they are relevant 
for their judgments. The fact that nearly 80% of subjects chose to read the narratives in 
addition to the statistical information might support this interpretation. 
Ultimately, the importance of conversational norms in research on cognitive biases 
due to irrelevant information cannot be ascertained conclusively in an experiment, as all 
information is always provided by the experimenter. However, the motivation of the majority 
of subjects to read the narratives in this experiment might be explained differently. Huber, 
Wider, and Huber (1997) found that individuals are often more interested in the outcomes of 
risky situations rather than the likelihood of negative outcomes. This behavior appears to have 
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biological roots, as ﬁsh and birds behave in a similar manner. The costly information 
hypothesis states that when information (e.g., concerning vaccine safety) is too costly to be 
acquired personally (because it might harm the organism), animals will take advantage of the 
relatively low-cost information provided by others (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Webster & 
Laland, 2008). 
Taken together, narratives appear to represent an attractive source of information, as 
they deliver details on speciﬁc outcomes of risky situations (RQ6). Whether people deem 
them to be relevant for their risk assessments due to their speciﬁcity (see for example Bar-
Hillel, 1980) or simply because they have been presented cannot be answered decisively. 
However, the fact that in the present research both procedural manipulations had no effect at 
all on risk perceptions renders experimental artifacts as sole drivers of the narrative bias less 
likely. 
Limitations. One goal of this study was to investigate the biasing effect of narrative 
information as a function of different self-report measures. However, a general concern in this 
line of research is a potential lack of external validity due to the use of hypothetical scenarios, 
meaning that presenting a bias incurs no cost to the subjects. Indeed, some biases have been 
found to decrease or disappear when payment is dependent on performance (Lefebvre et al., 
2010). Future research should strive to substantiate the present ﬁndings by incentivizing non-
biased judgments (Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). 
The data in Experiment 2 were collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk. The data 
quality may be affected by increased error variance if a greater number of subjects did not 
take their participation seriously. For this reason, we eliminated subjects whose time to 
complete the study suggested non-serious participation. Further, previous research has shown 
an advantage of Mechanical Turk samples in heterogeneity compared to the standard student 
sample as well as sufﬁcient quality according to the psychometric publication standards 
(Buhrmester, Kwang & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 
2010). 
Conclusion. The biasing effect of a small sample of single-case narratives is in part 
dependent on the measure used to assess it. Scales that gauge the likelihood dimension of an 
uncertain prospect are least affected. Narratives have the strongest effect on measures of a 
more extensive risk representation, which may entail a value dimension as well as other 
aspects, for example, an affective appraisal of the uncertain event. This more comprehensive 
idea of a risk appears to be of greater importance in guiding decisions and behavior than a 
strict likelihood representation. On the other hand, judgments of subjective probability as well 
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as of perceived risk appear to be ad hoc constructions and are therefore susceptible to wording 
and framing effects. Attempts to predict preferences and behavior should therefore be viewed 
cautiously, as risk perception might change from the time of assessment to the time of action 
due to a change of context. Further, systematic review or overview articles need to not only 
specify the exact wording and scale format of the instruments that were used in the original 
research but also take concomitant assessments of related constructs into account. Individuals 
do extract a representation of likelihood from single-case exemplars. This representation 
drives the narrative bias. However, the effect is much smaller on scales that assess only the 
perceived likelihood as compared to a measure of a broader and more intuitive concept of 
risk. 
Taken together, these results underline the important conceptual distinction between 
judgments of subjective probability and perceived risk. When individuals judge a risk, they 
take many other aspects of the risky prospect into account than merely its probability of 
occurrence. Next to its severity, characteristics such as the voluntariness of, knowledge about, 
and control over risk play a role in risk perception. Affective reactions, personal 
susceptibility, and the source of a risk are additional potentially relevant factors. The 
measures we investigated reﬂect these different concepts to differing degrees. For instance, 
the perceived severity of VAE had no effect on percent estimates of probability, a small effect 
on a verbal probability measure, and a strong effect on a measure of risk. 
However, the narrative bias we observed cannot be attributed to any of these 
additional aspects of risk, as they were either held constant across subjects, for example, the 
emotionality of narratives, or controlled for through randomization. Further, Experiment 2 
clearly indicates that the bias was driven by a representation of relative frequency, that is, 
probability. This representation had small effects on measures of probability, that is, 
instruments that are designed to solely assess this very representation. On the other hand, it 
had large effects on an inherently multidimensional measure of risk. Thus, we conclude that 
the relationship between representations of subjective probability and perceived risk is not yet 
fully understood. Future research should strive to understand what role likelihood 
representations play in the formation of risk perceptions.  
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Appendix A: Sample narratives used in both experiments 
Note that in Experiment 1 the materials were in German. 
Negative Narratives 
Hi everyone! Well I just got my dysomeria shot at my family doctor’s ofﬁce in town. I 
got an appointment right away and had no adverse effects whatsoever. Everything went just 
ﬁne and was easy. So, all in all, no reason to complain or worry. John 
My doctor had told me that I should get vaccinated against dysomeria. Well I’m not 
really a fan of needles, but last week I just went and got it over with. Afterwards: no problems 
at all and I actually went to the gym to do my regular work out right afterwards. No biggie. 
Sarah 
Positive Narratives 
Well, I went to the doctor a week ago to get my dysomeria immunization. Usually I’m 
not very fragile but after this shot I felt dizzy for days and could hardly ride my bike. Let me 
tell you, not very appealing to constantly stagger trying not to fall over all the time! Julie 
I had about a week of fever after my dysomeria vaccination. I do not know if that was 
a side effect but I was conﬁned to the bed for quite a while and could hardly move a muscle. 
I’m just glad it’s over now and I can get back to normal life. Bill  
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Appendix B: Full correlations matrices of the independent and dependent variables as well as 
numeracy in both experiments 
 
Table B1 
Correlations between independent variables and numeracy and the respective dependent 
variable for each subsample in Experiment 1. For example: When perceived risk was the ﬁrst 
dependent measure, the correlation between judgments of perceived risk and the frequency of 
positive narratives was r = .66, p < .001 in the 5% base-rate condition and r = .29, p < .05 in 
the 40% base-rate condition. 
Subjective probability (percent estimate) 
 n Statistical base-rate (5% vs. 40%) Narratives: frequency of VAE (5% vs. 40%) Subjective numeracy 
Statistical base-rate: 5% 44 — .27† −.21 
Statistical base-rate: 40% 45 — .25 .11 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 5% 44 .84*** — −.06 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 40% 45 .80*** — −.12 
Overall 89 .81*** .16 −.07 
Subjective probability (7-point rating scale) 
 n Statistical base-rate (5% vs. 40%) Narratives: frequency of VAE (5% vs. 40%) Subjective numeracy 
Statistical base-rate: 5% 47 — .12 −.26† 
Statistical base-rate: 40% 47 — .24† .23 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 5% 47 .50*** — −.12 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 40% 47 .64*** — −.10 
Overall 94 .56*** −.17 −.07 
Perceived risk (visual analog scale) 
 n Statistical base-rate (5% vs. 40%) Narratives: frequency of VAE (5% vs. 40%) Subjective numeracy 
Statistical base-rate: 5% 44 — .66*** −.08 
Statistical base-rate: 40% 50 — .29* .09 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 5% 45 .47** — .03 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 40% 49 .18 — −.02 
Overall 94 .30** .44*** −.001 
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. ***p < .001, two-tailed. †p < .05, one-tailed.   
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Table B2 
Correlations between independent variables and numeracy and the respective dependent 
variable for each subsample in Experiment 2. 
Subjective probability (percent estimate) 
 n Sample size (10 vs. 20) Narratives: frequency of VAE (10% vs. 20% vs. 40%) Numeracy 
Sample size: 10 88 — .23* −.09 
Sample size: 20 93 — −.04 .03 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 10% 61 .12 — .09 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 20% 61 −.10 — −.06 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 40% 59 −.19 — −.17 
Overall 181 −.04 .10 −.04 
Perceived risk (visual analog scale) 
 n Sample size (10 vs. 20) Narratives: frequency of VAE (10% vs. 20% vs. 40%) Numeracy 
Sample size: 10 83 — .31** −.11 
Sample size: 20 85 — .46*** −.17 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 10% 55 .07 — −.08 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 20% 60 −.31* — −.02 
Narratives: frequency of VAE: 40% 53 .05 — −.27* 
Overall 168 −.07 .38*** −.14† 
*p < .05, two-tailed. **p < .01, two-tailed. ***p < .001, two-tailed. †p < .05, one-tailed.   
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Appendix C: Correlations between dependent measures and intention to get 
vaccinated 
 
Table C1 
Correlations between subjective probability (percent estimate, 7-point rating scale), perceived 
risk, and intention to get vaccinated for the full sample and the respective subsamples in 
Experiment 1. 
Full Sample 
N = 277 Percent 7-point Risk Intention 
Percent —    
7-point .70*** —   
Risk .61*** .74*** —  
Intention −.22*** −.34*** −.43*** — 
Subjective probability (percent estimate) 
n = 89 Percent 7-point Risk Intention 
Percent —    
7-point .75*** —   
Risk .69*** .83*** —  
Intention −.31*** −.42*** −.47*** — 
Subjective probability (7-point rating scale) 
n = 94 Percent 7-point Risk Intention 
Percent —    
7-point .66*** —   
Risk .64*** .74*** —  
Intention −.24* −.33*** −.53*** — 
Perceived risk (visual analog scale) 
n = 94 Percent 7-point Risk Intention 
Percent —    
7-point .69*** —   
Risk .49*** .64*** —  
Intention −.11*** −.28** −.31*** — 
Note. The correlation matrix for the full sample is included again (see Table 3) to facilitate comparison. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.   
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Table C2 
Correlations between subjective probability, perceived risk, and intention to get vaccinated 
for the full sample and the respective subsamples in Experiment 2. 
Full Sample 
N = 464 Percent Risk Intention 
Percent —   
Risk .22*** —  
Intention .01*** −.41*** — 
Subjective probability (percent estimate) 
n = 181 Percent Risk Intention 
Percent —   
Risk .05 —  
Intention −.02 −.48*** — 
Perceived risk (visual analog scale) 
n = 283 Percent Risk Intention 
Percent —   
Risk .31*** —  
Intention −.004 −.37*** — 
Note. The subsample that judged perceived risk ﬁrst includes the subjects from the two subdesigns. ***p < .001.  
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Abstract 
The risk of an event generally relates to its expected severity and the perceived probability of 
its occurrence. In risk research, however, there is no standard measure for subjective 
probability estimates. In this study we compared five commonly used measurement formats—
two rating scales, a visual analog scale, and two numeric measures—in terms of their ability 
to assess subjective probability judgments when objective probabilities are available. We 
varied the probabilities (low vs. moderate) and severity (low vs. high) of the events to be 
judged as well as the presentation mode of objective probabilities (sequential presentation of 
singular events vs. graphical presentation of aggregated information). We employed two 
complementary goodness-of-fit criteria: the correlation between objective and subjective 
probabilities (sensitivity), and the root-mean-square deviations of subjective probabilities 
from objective values (accuracy). The numeric formats generally outperformed all other 
measures. The severity of events had no effect on performance. Generally, a rise in 
probability led to decreases in performance. This effect, however, depended on how the 
objective probabilities were encoded: Pictographs ensured perfect information, which 
improved goodness-of-fit for all formats and diminished this negative effect on performance. 
Differences in performance between scales are thus caused only in part by characteristics of 
the scales themselves—they also depend on the process of encoding. Consequently, 
researchers should take the source of probability information into account before selecting a 
measure. 
 
Keywords: Context dependency, goodness-of-ﬁt, measurement, subjective probability 
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The Measurement of Subjective Probability: Evaluating the Sensitivity and Accuracy of 
Various Scales 
Risk is commonly construed as a combination of the likelihood and significance of a 
loss (Yates & Stone, 1992). In most models of health-related behavior, this basic construct is 
mirrored in two dimensions of perceived risk: the probability and severity of a given health 
risk (van der Pligt, 1996; Weinstein, 1993). While a large number of studies assess risk as a 
central variable, there is little agreement regarding the measurement of perceived risk, which 
impedes comparison across studies. Measurement formats in risk research typically aim to 
elicit some form of magnitude judgment, that is, they focus on the probability dimension of 
risk. Common scale formats include verbal rating (e.g., seven categories ranging from very 
unlikely to very likely), visual analog (e.g., a scroll bar or a slider), and numeric scales (e.g., 
percentage). 
Studies comparing different scale formats, however, fail to deliver consistent results. 
Scales differ with regard to usability (Diefenbach, Weinstein, & O’Reilly, 1993; Woloshin, 
Schwartz, Byram, Fischhoff, & Welch, 2000), subjective confidence in judgment (Eibner, 
Barth, Helmes, & Bengel, 2006), and test-retest reliability (Diefenbach et al., 1993). There is 
no format that consistently outperforms the others. 
The distinction between verbal and numeric scales, that is, scales that assess subjective 
probabilities with a range from 0–100, has been the subject of much debate in terms of risk 
assessment (Windschitl & Wells, 1996). Verbal probability quantifiers are easy to understand 
but are by definition somewhat vague. This makes them prone to any number of context 
effects: For example, the expression rather likely might indicate two very different 
expressions of subjective risk depending on whether it is referring to the chance of rain or the 
likelihood of developing cancer (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 
1988; Druzdzel, 1989; Fischer & Jungermann, 2003; Wallsten, Budescu, & Erev, 1988; 
Wänke, 2002). On the other hand, verbal scales have been shown to be superior in predicting 
preferences, intentions (Windschitl & Wells, 1996), decisions (Teigen & Brun, 1999), and 
behavior: Weinstein et al. (2007) compared one numeric categorical (percentage in 13 
increments) and three verbal rating (2-, 6-, and 7-point) scales for risk magnitude and found 
the 7-point verbal scale to be superior in predicting actual vaccination behavior. However, 
they also found that two additional scale types, which assessed beliefs about risk and feeling 
at risk, performed even better. Indeed, it has been argued that numeric scales make the 
mathematical concept of probability salient and thereby induce deliberate and rule-based 
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reasoning, whereas verbal probability scales allow for associative and intuitive thinking, 
which might be more akin to real-life decision situations (Windschitl & Wells, 1996). 
The predictive validity of verbal probability scales might render them the measure of 
choice in many situations. However, other research questions require measures that allow for 
an exact quantification of subjective probabilities. It has long been shown that concrete 
information, such as a narrative about behavioral consequences, has a stronger impact on 
decisions than abstract information such as a statistical base rate (Borgida & Nisbett, 1977; 
Brosius & Bathelt, 1994; Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2009). In recent years the 
persuasiveness of narrative communication has also become the focus of health-related 
research (Hinyard & Kreuter, 2007), albeit with different implications. While narrative 
information certainly has the potential to be an effective tool of health communication for 
promoting beneficial health-preventive behavior (de Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008), the effect can 
also work in the opposite direction. Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz, and Betsch (2011) have 
recently found that the relative frequency of narratives reporting adverse events after a 
vaccination significantly biased probability judgments even when reliable statistical 
information was also provided. Similarly, two studies concerning treatment decisions reported 
a significant effect of narrative information when the ratio of narratives arguing for and 
against treatment was incongruent with previous statistical information (Fagerlin, Wang, & 
Ubel, 2005; Ubel, Jepson, & Baron, 2001). In order to understand the underlying processes of 
such narrative biases a scale is required that solely measures subjective probability (as 
opposed to general risk). 
An obvious evaluation criterion for such scales is the concordance between objective 
and subjective probabilities and there have been different approaches to its implementation. 
Comparisons between perceived and actual real-life probabilities often find that judgments on 
numeric scales tend to overestimate objective risks, while comparative and verbal rating 
scales fare better (Eibner et al., 2006; Schapira, Davids, McAuliffe, & Nattinger, 2004; 
Woloshin, Schwartz, Black, & Welch, 1999). A general concern with this evaluation strategy, 
however, is that it “seems to assume that people are aware of the risks they face, and that their 
perception of risk is accurate” (van der Pligt, 1996, p. 36). A different approach was taken by 
Diefenbach et al. (1993) and Woloshin et al. (2000) who asked participants to rank a number 
of hazards in order of likelihood and then used the correlation of those ranks with scale 
derived ranks as an evaluation criterion. Diefenbach et al. once again demonstrated that a 
7-point verbal rating scale showed superior performance, while Woloshin et al. found that a 
verbally labeled visual analog scale performed best. 
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Overview 
In the present research, we compare the performance of two rating scales, a visual 
analog scale, and two numeric measures for the exact assessment of subjective probability 
estimates when objective probabilities have been provided. We employ two complementary 
goodness-of-fit criteria as main dependent variables. First, we examine measure sensitivity 
(the correlation between objective and subjective probabilities) to quantify the extent to which 
subjective probability judgments monotonically follow the provided objective probabilities. 
The second measure is the absolute accuracy of the scale (the root-mean-square deviations, 
RMSDs, of subjective from objective values; Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Hertwig, Pachur, & 
Kurzenhäuser, 2005). We test whether scale performance varies as a function of the 
probability and severity of the events to be judged as well as the presentation format of 
objective probabilities. 
Participants were provided with objective information regarding the likelihood of 
adverse events resulting from the hypothetical intake of different medications. Four different 
probabilities were first presented in a sequential format. In a second phase, the same 
probabilities were presented in a graphical format. Thus, each participant viewed a total of 
eight different adverse events and eight different medications. Events and medications were 
randomly assigned to the probabilities. 
For sequential encoding, participants were provided with four random sequences of 
100 statements each, corresponding to 100 hypothetical cases that one specific medication had 
been taken. Each statement either provided the information that there had been no findings 
following medication intake or that the specified adverse event had occurred. The relative 
frequency of the adverse event within a sequence provided the likelihood information. 
Following each sequence participants rated the probability of the adverse event on one of the 
five scale formats. 
For graphical encoding participants viewed four matrices of 100 elements colored in 
one of two ways, indicating either the adverse event or the absence thereof (Figure 1). The 
relative proportion of elements denoting the adverse event conveyed the relevant likelihood 
information. Following each matrix, participants again rated the probability of the respective 
adverse event on one of the scale formats. 
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Figure 1. Pictograph used in the graphical encoding condition indicating a probability of 42%.  
 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Goodness-of-Fit 
The scale formats we investigate differ with regard to at least two properties. First, the 
rating scales offer only a limited number of discrete answer categories (seven and 11), which 
means that they suffer from a low resolution compared to the typical value array for 
probability of 0–100. In contrast, the visual analog scale and numeric measures allow for 
continuous estimates of probability and therefore possess a natural advantage in terms of the 
maximal goodness-of-fit. Second, verbal scales might induce associative rather than rule-
based reasoning (Windschitl & Wells, 1996). That is, a verbal judgment of probability is not 
only a function of a perceived base-rate but also of associations activated by, for example, the 
focal event as well as the context and wording of the question (Windschitl, 2002). Both 
properties could result in different objective probabilities occupying the same subjective 
probability category, for example, the probabilities of 2% and 5% may both lie between the 
categories labelled 00 and 01 on the 11-point rating scale or they might both be judged as very 
small on the 7-point rating scale. In contrast, numeric measures are thought to evoke 
deliberate thinking informed by logic and evidence, thereby prompting notions of accuracy in 
a person’s judgment. Lastly, visual analog scales have been shown to lead to higher drop-out 
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rates and require more time to complete than rating scales (Couper, Tourangeau, Conrad, 
Frederick, & Singer, 2006), which might indicate difficulties in their handling. Hence, while 
the visual analog scale in the present research does allow for the differentiation between, for 
example, 2% and 5%, its design might prevent participants from providing such a precise 
response. For our hypotheses we group the two rating scales and the two numeric measures 
because they are highly similar in terms of resolution; we expect that this aspect will be the 
most important regarding goodness-of-fit. 
H1: Numeric scales show higher sensitivity than the visual analog scale and the rating 
scales. 
Our second hypothesis concerning accuracy applies only to measures that provide 
values from 0–100 and thus allow for the calculation of RMSDs, that is, the visual analog 
scale and the numeric formats. We discuss the question of assessing accuracy for rating scales 
in more detail in the results section. 
H2: Numeric scales show higher accuracy than the visual analog scale. 
Context Dependency: Range of Probabilities 
The influence of stimulus context on stimulus judgment is a well known phenomenon 
in between-subjects research (Birnbaum, 1999). While a measure of probability might be 
capable of tracking relative changes in perceptions of likelihood, the absolute accuracy of 
measurements might be subject to various context effects. The range-frequency theory 
(Parducci, 1965), for example, states that the stimulus context, that is, the range and 
distribution of different stimuli, informs stimulus perception. While the range of possible 
stimuli has natural anchors in the case of probabilities (0 and 100), the distribution of 
presented stimuli might still affect judgments (Birnbaum, 1974; Varey, Mellers, & Birnbaum, 
1990). To assess how this type of context dependency affects the different scale formats, we 
varied the distribution of stated probabilities between subjects. Specifically, we presented low 
and moderate probabilities in the form of two ranges (not to be confused with the general 
range of probabilities, i.e., 0–100), while the distribution of stimuli within each range 
remained constant (2–20% and 42–60%; see Methods). According to the frequency principle, 
an intermediate probability would receive a higher judgment when presented in the context of 
lower probabilities than when presented with higher probabilities. Since the probability ranges 
in the present research do not overlap, that is, we do not present the same probability in two 
different contexts, we consider the gap between ranges. While the number of categories on a 
scale should not mediate this type of frequency manipulation (Wedell & Parducci, 1988), we 
expect that the rating scales, due to the vagueness of their quantifiers, will be affected most 
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strongly by the experienced range of stimuli. For instance, in order to use an expression such 
as very small probability meaningfully, the scale must be anchored and calibrated (Schwarz & 
Wänke, 2002) and the range of presented stimuli could then determine whether an objective 
probability of 5% or of 45% is identified as very small. Further, although the visual analog 
scale does not provide quantifiers, it might be affected in a similar manner due to imprecision 
in its handling. Thus, if a division of the scale into 100 parts is too difficult, the division might 
rather be informed by the presented range of stimuli than by the general range of probability. 
To test for this type of context dependency, we compared judgments provided for the highest 
value in the low range (20%) with those provided for the lowest value in the moderate range 
(42%). 
H3: We expect that rating scales and the visual analog scale will be context-
dependent. This will be evident in similar or equal subjective probability ratings for events 
with 20% and 42% objective probability. We expect the numeric measures to differentiate 
between the different ranges of probabilities. 
Context Dependency: Severity of Outcomes 
Normatively the two risk components probability and severity should be perceived 
independently of each other. The subjective probability should only be a function of the 
objective likelihood, while the severity should only be a function of the outcome. However, 
verbal expressions of probability have been shown to be affected by the severity of the event 
to which they refer (Verplanken, 1997) and Harris, Corner, and Hahn (2009) recently found 
that extremely negative events are judged to be more likely than more neutral ones. Therefore, 
we varied the severity of adverse events between subjects to test whether the formats differ in 
their susceptibility to severity biases. Should the numeric scales induce more rule-based 
judgments and thereby increase pressure for accuracy (Pruitt & Hoge, 1965; Windschitl & 
Wells, 1996), then they might be rather resistant to the influence of severity. That is to say, a 
5% probability of cancer might be described on a verbal scale as moderate, while a 5% 
probability of catching a cold might be judged on the same scale to be very small. In contrast, 
on a numeric measure the probability in both contexts (cancer or cold) should be estimated to 
be 5%. 
H4: Higher severity will lead to higher probability estimates on the rating scales and 
the visual analog scale but not the numeric measures.  
Presentation Format 
Probability information may be encoded through the sequential sampling of outcome 
events or may be obtained in some aggregated form. The encoding of frequencies has been 
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found to be a largely automatic process that results in rather accurate relative judgments 
(Zacks & Hasher, 2002), although they necessarily still contain some error (Erev, Wallsten, & 
Budescu, 1994; Fiedler & Armbruster, 1994). This processing unreliability should result in 
probability judgments that are regressed to the mean. Indeed, a common finding in frequency 
and probability judgments is the overestimation of low-probability events and the 
underestimation of high-probability events (Zacks & Hasher, 2002; see also Hertwig et al., 
2005). The presentation of probability information in an aggregated format, on the other hand, 
offers perfect information in the sense that all occurrences of an event are encoded 
simultaneously. Pictographs have been found to be well understood in risk communication 
(Hawley et al., 2008). In order to assess how well the different scale formats handle the error 
in frequency encoding, we provided probabilities sequentially as well as graphically. The 
latter condition served as a benchmark to indicate the maximum sensitivity and accuracy that 
the scale formats can possibly attain. We posit the following research question: 
RQ1: How will the presentation format of probability information affect the different 
scales’ performance? 
Methods 
Experimental Design 
The study implemented a 5 (scale format: 7-point verbal rating scale vs. 11-point 
numeric rating scale vs. visual analog scale vs. frequency format vs. percent format)  2 (low 
probabilities vs. moderate probabilities)  2 (low severity vs. high severity) between-subjects 
design with one within-subjects factor (sequential vs. graphical encoding). 
Participants 
385 students of a German university took part in this lab-based study, either for course 
credit (in case of psychology majors) or the opportunity to take part in a raffle of 250 € (ca. 
US$340). 12 participants were excluded due to either making a tally chart during participation 
or providing nonsensical answers (e.g., “Adverse events will occur in 80 out of 20 cases”). 
Thus, the final sample consisted of 373 participants, 309 (82.8%) of which were female. 
Mean age was 21.61 years (SD = 1.24) and mean grade in the German general higher 
education entrance exam (Abitur) was 2.16 (SD = 0.52).1 All participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the 20 experimental conditions. 
 
                                                          
1 Grades on this exam vary between 1.0 and 4.0, with 1.0 being the best possible grade. 
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Measures and Materials 
Scale formats. Figure 2 presents the different scale formats that were administered 
between subjects. We included the verbally labeled 7-point rating scale as used by Weinstein 
et al. The verbal labels for each level were in ascending order: almost zero, very small, small, 
moderate, large, very large, and almost certain. 
We used an 11-point rating scale, with the verbal anchors no chance and absolutely 
certain in addition to consecutive integers from 00 to 10 anchoring each level, for two 
reasons. First, it approximates the numerical array of 0–100. Second, it has been shown to 
deliver rather accurate measurements when subjectively judged and actual survival rates were 
compared (Hurd & McGarry, 1995), although doubts regarding its ability to measure 
probability have also been voiced (Viscusi & Hakes, 2003). 
We selected a continuous visual analog scale with the verbal anchors no chance and 
absolutely certain (length: 11 cm). This could potentially serve as middle ground between 
verbal rating scales and numeric measures, since the scale offers a much higher resolution 
(i.e., 0–100, though no numerical feedback was given) yet remains a purely verbal measure. 
We assessed relative frequencies by asking participants to fill the gaps in the following 
statement “Adverse events will occur in ___ out of ___ cases.” Relative frequencies allow for 
an exact quantification of a probability and have been shown to improve understanding of and 
reasoning about probabilities (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). 
Finally, percentages were assessed with the statement “Adverse events will occur with 
a probability of ___%.” Percentages are closest to the concept of probability that a 
communicator usually has in mind. Furthermore, probabilities are commonly communicated 
in this format. 
Objective probabilities. Objective probabilities were 2%, 5%, 10%, and 20% in the 
low range condition and 42%, 45%, 50%, and 60% in the moderate range condition. 
Adverse Events and Medications. Adverse events had been pretested for severity 
and selected so as to maximize similarity in terms of severity within one condition. In the 
present study participants rated the severity of each adverse event they were presented with on 
a 7-point rating scale with the verbal anchors not severe and very severe. Severity ratings 
were sufficiently consistent within conditions (low severity Cronbach’s α = .74, high = .82) 
and differed significantly between conditions, low severity mean = 4.53, SD = 0.80, 
high = 5.51, SD = 0.81; F(1, 371) = 138.19, p < .001, η2 = .27. 
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Figure 2. Probability scale formats used in the present study. The original materials were in German  
 
The names of the medications were two-syllable non-words pretested as fictitious 
names for medications for associations with risk and effectiveness as well as positive versus 
negative associations. Names were selected so as to maximize moderate ratings on all three 
dimensions. 
Appendix A lists all adverse events and medication names. 
Presentation formats. Participants encoded the same probabilities in both encoding 
conditions. Likelihood information was always provided through the relative frequency of 
relevant outcomes out of a sample space of 100 outcomes. Thus, each sequence consisted of 
100 statements corresponding to the 100 elements in the pictograph. The order of presentation 
formats was fixed with the sequential condition always preceding graphical encoding. Our 
reasoning behind this was twofold: First, the graphical condition served as a control 
benchmark to assess the maximum goodness-of-fit that the scale formats can achieve. Second, 
we considered it plausible that the less precise information (sequential encoding) would not 
affect judgments of the highly precise information (graphical encoding). In contrast, 
7-Point Rating Scale
11-Point Rating Scale
Visual Analog Scale
Frequency Format
Percent Format
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presenting the graphical information first might have set anchors (identical probabilities in 
both conditions) and affected the effect of the presentation format on scale performance. 
The four sequences were presented in a randomized order on a computer screen. The 
name of the medication in question was constantly displayed in the upper half of the screen 
while the items of the sequence flashed in intervals of 1200 ms, remaining visible for 700 ms 
with an inter-stimulus interval of 500 ms. To ensure proper encoding and prevent simple 
counting of the relevant outcomes, participants were instructed to read out loud the name of 
the medication and the consequence of its ingestion for each case in the sequence, for 
example, “Argal, no findings; Argal, no findings; Argal, fatigue, etc.” 
In the graphical encoding phase, the four pictographs were presented in a randomized 
order without any constraints on presentation time. Participants clicked a button labeled 
continue underneath the pictograph to proceed to their probability judgment. 
Procedure 
Upon arriving at the lab, participants signed a consent form and were escorted to either 
a soundproof cubicle or a regular cubicle, in which case they were outfitted with soundproof 
earmuffs. Since the study was computer-based, all instructions were provided on the screen in 
a standardized manner. Participants were informed that they would view four sequences of 
cases, with each case representing the (non)occurence of adverse events after a medication 
was taken once. Following each sequence participants rated on one of the five formats the 
probability that adverse events would occur. The graphical encoding condition followed the 
same procedure. After completing both conditions, participants proceeded with the remaining 
measures2 and provided demographic information. 
Results 
Sensitivity 
A scale is highly sensitive if changes in the objective probability of an event are 
closely mirrored by changes in the subjective probability judgment. Thus, for each participant 
we calculated the correlation between the four subjective ratings and the respective objective  
                                                          
2 Additionally to rating the severity of the presented adverse events participants completed the Subjective Numeracy Scale (Fagerlin et al., 2007), which consists of eight 6-point rating scale items (e.g., “How good are you at working with percentages?”) that measure perceived mathematical abilities and subjective preference for numeric over verbal information. Since we found no substantial relation between numeracy and any of the dependent variables we omit numeracy from further analyses. 
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Figure 3. Sensitivity of scale formats for both ranges of probabilities when information was encoded sequentially (A) and graphically (B).  
 
probabilities.3 Higher correlations indicate higher scale sensitivity. Figures 3A and 3B present 
medians of scale sensitivity for both probability ranges and both encoding conditions.4 In our 
analysis we first address the sequential encoding condition, followed by the graphical 
encoding condition and, finally, a comparison of the two. 
We predicted that the numeric measures would be more sensitive than the visual 
analog scale, which in turn would be more sensitive than the rating scales (H1). In accordance 
with this, medians across context variables were: 7-point = .84, 11-point = .85, VAS = .88, 
frequency = .98, and percent = .96. A Kruskal-Wallis test confirmed that the scale medians 
differed significantly, H(4) = 34.59, p < .001. To further test Hypothesis 1, we compared the 
rating, visual analog, and numeric scales by calculating three respective Mann-Whitney tests. 
                                                          
3 The frequency format yielded two values for each probability judgment (i.e., x out of y). In order to obtain comparable data, probabilities were calculated by dividing the number of estimated positive cases, that is, cases that report the occurrence of an adverse event (x), by the total number of cases (y). 
4 The distributions of sensitivity were extremely skewed. In addition, we found many perfect correlations for the numeric formats, making it impossible to perform Fisher’s r-to-z-transformations. Therefore, we report medians and apply non-parametric tests for all further analyses in this section. 
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Partially supporting our predictions, we found that the numeric formats were more sensitive 
than the rating scales, U = 7102.00, z = −5.59, p < .001, r = .32, and the visual analog scale, 
U = 3589.50, z = −3.79, p < .001, r = .26. However, the visual analog and rating scales did 
not differ significantly.5 
Next, we considered the different probability ranges. Figure 3A indicates that the 
judgment of higher probabilities led to a drop in sensitivity for all scale formats (light vs. dark 
bars).6 We investigated this possibility further by comparing each scale’s sensitivity for low 
probabilities with its respective sensitivity for moderate probabilities. Mann-Whitney tests 
confirmed that the sensitivity of all formats except the 11-point rating scale was significantly 
lower for moderate probabilities, all ps ≤ .025, (effect sizes: r7-point = .48, rVAS = .27, 
rfrequency = .69, rpercent = .39). Further, the differences between the scale formats varied as a 
function of probability range. In the low probabilities condition, consistent with the analysis 
across ranges, the rating scales and the visual analog scale formed a distinct homogeneous 
group, while the numeric scales formed another (Bonferroni-corrected, single comparisons: 
all ps ≤ .005). In the moderate probabilities condition, however, only the 7-point rating scale 
and the percent format differed significantly, Mann-Whitney-U = 406.50, z = −3.40, p = .001, 
r = .39. 
Turning to the graphical encoding condition (Figure 3B), our analysis followed the 
same steps as for sequential encoding. Medians of sensitivity across context variables again 
followed the predicted pattern and differed significantly from each other: 7-point = .91, 
11-point = .93, VAS = .97, frequency = 1, and percent = 1; H(4) = 213.69, p < .001. Mann-
Whitney tests provided further support for Hypothesis 1: The numeric formats were more 
sensitive than the rating scales, U = 1545.50, z = −13.39, p < .001, r = .77, and the visual 
analog scale, U = 971.50, z = −10.76, p < .001, r = .73, which in turn demonstrated higher 
sensitivity than the rating scales, U = 3118.50, z = −5.05, p < .001, r = .34.7 
                                                          
5 Single comparisons between all scales revealed the same pattern of results. 
6 We also tested whether the severity of adverse events affected scale sensitivity and found only one significant effect: The sensitivity of the 11-point rating scale for sequentially encoded moderate probabilities was lower when adverse events were highly severe compared to less severe events, U= 107.50, z = −2.32, p = .02, r = .37 (low severity median = .90, high = .65). 
7 Single comparisons between all scales revealed the same pattern of results with the single exception that the sensitivities of the two rating scales also differed significantly, U = 1929.00, z = −3.48, p < .001, r = .28. 
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Taking the different probability ranges into account, Figure 3B does not indicate a 
general drop in sensitivity for moderate probabilities. Comparisons of each scale’s sensitivity 
between the low and moderate range delivered mixed results: The sensitivities of the 7-point 
rating scale, U = 470.50, z = −2.18, p = .029, r = .26, and the frequency format, U = 500.00, 
z = −2.22, p = .027, r = .26, were lower for moderate probabilities, while the sensitivity of the 
11-point rating scale was higher, U = 500.00, z = −2.17, p = .030, r = .25. The visual analog 
scale and the percent format did not differ significantly between ranges. Further, the 
differences between scale formats were not affected by the range of probabilities. 
Comparisons between numeric, visual analog, and rating scales matched those across 
probability ranges. That is, in both the low and the moderate probability conditions, 
sensitivity was highest in the numeric measures, intermediate in the visual analog scale, and 
lowest in the rating scales (all ps ≤ .001). 
In Research Question 1, we asked how encoding format would affect the performance 
of the scale formats. While the results so far already show differences between encoding 
conditions, a comparison of Figures 3A and 3B indicates that all formats were clearly more 
sensitive when objective probabilities had been presented graphically. Direct comparisons 
using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test confirmed that, for all formats, sensitivity was significantly 
higher in the graphical encoding condition, z7-point = −2.24, p = .025, r = .19; z11-point = −4.52, 
p < .001, r = .36; zVAS = −4.70, p < .001, r = .39; zfrequency = −5.60, p < .001, r = .47; 
zpercent = −6.31, p < .001, r = .51. 
In summary, Hypothesis 1 was mostly supported: The numeric measures were 
generally more sensitive than the visual analog scale and the two rating scales. However, 
sensitivity varied not only as a function of scale format but also of encoding condition. When 
participants had to sequentially sample probability information from many relevant outcomes, 
that is, 45 out of 100 (moderate probabilities), as compared to just a few, that is, 2 out of 100, 
the sensitivity of all formats decreased. This might be due to a greater sampling error. On the 
other hand, when objective probabilities are provided graphically and all relevant outcomes 
can be encoded simultaneously, encoding error should be reduced and differences in numbers 
of outcomes should become less important. The comparisons between sequential and 
graphical encoding, as well as between low and moderate probabilities within the graphical 
condition, supported this conclusion. It seems that differences inherent to scales may become 
less relevant once a certain encoding error is introduced. 
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Accuracy 
Accuracy was assessed by calculating the root-mean-square deviations (RMSDs) of 
the subjective probability estimates from the objective probabilities. Lower values indicate 
higher measurement accuracy. 
Calculating RMSDs for rating scales. The calculation of RMSDs requires that the 
values to be compared occupy identical value arrays, in this case 0–100 for all possible 
probabilities. The rating scales, however, deliver values from 1 to 7 and from 0 to 10 
respectively. Transforming these values necessarily entails an element of arbitrariness. For 
instance, one could multiply each value by a specific factor or one could assign each value an 
interval of corresponding values from the 0–100 array and use the intervals’ midpoints. 
However, this kind of transformation discounts that different individuals might make different 
use of the scales’ categories. Previous research has shown that the use of verbal quantifiers—
such as offered by the 7-point rating scale—for the expression of numerical probabilities 
differs substantially between individuals (Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Rapoport, Wallsten, & 
Cox, 1987; Wallsten & Budescu, 1995; Wallsten, Budescu, Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth, 
1986). Similarly, one individual might assign a probability of 10% to the category 01 on the 
11-point rating scale, while another might opt for 02 if 01 has already been used for smaller 
probabilities. In order to take such individual differences into account, we determined the 
individually ideal transformation function by regressing the objective probabilities onto the 
probability judgments. This resulted in four predicted subjective probability values for each 
participant (or eight taking both encoding conditions into account) that were determined by 
the individually best possible linear fit, which might best be characterized as the values that 
the participants could have meant when choosing a category under the assumption that they 
wanted to maximize accuracy. 
Accuracy of predicted values. The predicted values derived by the above described 
procedure were used to calculate RMSDs. To retain comparability, we applied the same 
procedure to all scales. Figures 4A and 4B present means of this accuracy index for both 
ranges of probabilities and both encoding conditions.  
It is important to note: These values are idealized, that is, they show the maximum 
accuracy that can be attained with the scales under these specific conditions and given a very 
beneficial transformation. However, due to the calculation procedure, a regression, they are 
also highly dependent on the scales’ sensitivity. Therefore, an analysis of differences between 
scales delivered results that closely mirrored those on sensitivity (see Appendix B for the 
detailed analysis) and, thus, do not add further insight to the question of different scale  
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Figure 4. Mean accuracy of scale formats as derived through predicted values for both ranges of probabilities when information was encoded sequentially (A) and graphically (B). Lower values indicate higher measurement accuracy. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
performances. These RMSDs, however, illustrate the fundamental disadvantage of using 
rating scales to elicit probability judgments. 
Accuracy of absolute values from the visual analog scale and the numeric 
measures. Unlike the rating scales, the visual analog scale and the numeric measures 
delivered values between 0 and 100. Therefore, we will discuss the absolute accuracy of these 
three scales. Figures 5A and 5B present means of accuracy for both ranges of probabilities 
and both encoding conditions.8 Conceptually, our analyses follow those for scale sensitivity, 
that is, we first consider accuracy in the sequential condition, then the graphical condition, 
and, finally, compare the two. 
We predicted that the numeric formats would be more accurate than the visual analog 
scale (H2). In the sequential encoding condition, means (SDs) across context variables 
followed the predicted pattern: VAS = 17.31 (12.46), frequency = 6.63 (8.24), and  
                                                          
8 In this and all following sections we apply parametric tests. All analyses were additionally carried out under exclusion of outliers. Outliers were defined as any value above and below two standard deviations within each cell. All of the effects regarding measurement accuracy remained significant after the exclusion of outliers, effect sizes generally increased. 
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Figure 5. Mean accuracy of scale formats for both ranges of probabilities when information was encoded sequentially (A) and graphically (B). Lower values indicate higher measurement accuracy. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
percent = 8.63 (8.70). An ANOVA with accuracy as the dependent variable and format, 
probability range, and severity as between-subjects factors confirmed a main effect of format, 
F(2, 207) = 25.71, p < .001, η
P
2  = .20. Bonferroni’s test supported Hypothesis 2: The numeric 
formats formed a homogenous subgroup and outperformed the visual analog scale in terms of 
accuracy, all ps < .001. Taking context variables into account, we found that accuracy 
decreased with increasing probability, F(1, 207)= 13.59, p < .001, η
P
2  = .06 (low probabilities 
mean = 8.49, SD = 12.28; moderate = 13.12, SD= 8.80), while severity had no effect. Finally, 
there was a significant interaction of format and range, F(2, 207) = 5.47, p = .005, η
P
2  = .05. 
Figure 5A suggests that only the numeric measures’ accuracy decreased when participants 
judged higher probabilities, whereas the visual analog scale was unaffected by the range. To 
further investigate this interaction, we calculated three separate independent t-tests, 
comparing accuracy between probability ranges for each scale separately. Supporting this 
notion, the numeric scales’ accuracy was significantly lower (indicated by higher values) for 
moderate probabilities in comparison to low probabilities, t(69)frequency = −5.29, p < .001, 
r = .54 (low probabilities mean = 2.30, SD = 5.09; moderate = 11.10, SD = 8.54); 
t(75)percent = −3.66, p < .001, r = .39 (low probabilities mean = 5.12, SD = 8.08; 
5
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moderate = 11.87, SD = 8.06). The visual analog scale’s accuracy did not differ between 
ranges, p = .691. 
Turning next to the graphical encoding condition (Figure 5B), accuracy means 
(standard deviations) across context variables also decreased from the visual analog scale to 
the numeric measures: VAS = 7.54 (10.56), frequency = 1.12 (3.74), and percent = 0.45 
(1.56). An ANOVA with accuracy as the dependent variable and format, probability range, 
and severity as between-subjects factors confirmed a significant effect of scale format, 
F(2, 207) = 25.74, p < .001, η
P
2  = .20. Again in line with expectations (H2), the numeric 
formats formed a homogenous subgroup (Bonferroni’s test, all ps < .001). The context 
variables, range and severity, had no effect on scale accuracy in the graphical condition. 
Finally, we compared the accuracy of the scale formats between encoding conditions 
(Figures 5A and 5B) using a mixed-design ANOVA with format as a between-subjects factor 
and encoding mode as a within-subjects factor. We found a significant effect of encoding 
condition, indicating greater accuracy of all formats when objective probabilities were 
encoded graphically in comparison to sequentially, F(1, 216) = 162.92, p < .001, η
P
2  = .43. We 
also observed a significant interaction between scale formats and encoding condition due to 
differences between encoding conditions varying in magnitude between scale formats, 
F(2, 216) = 4.01, p = .02, η
P
2  = .04. 
In summary, Hypothesis 2 was supported: The numeric formats were generally more 
accurate than the visual analog scale. Further, we found additional support for the notion that, 
beyond characteristics of the measures, differences in goodness-of-fit between scales also 
vary as a function of encoding error. This was indicated by the drop in accuracy for moderate 
probabilities in the sequential condition as compared to the graphical encoding condition. 
However, we only observed this effect for the numeric formats, whereas the visual analog 
scale showed no such decrease. 
Context Dependency 
We manipulated the context of the objective probabilities along two dimensions: the 
range of probabilities and the severity of the events to which the probabilities pertain. 
The range of probabilities. While the theoretical range of probabilities (0–100) is 
known beforehand and should therefore not affect likelihood judgments, we speculated that 
the distribution of actually presented probabilities would. To test this assumption, we varied 
the range of objective probabilities presented to the participants. Normatively, the difference 
between ranges should map onto a scale. That is, even though only probabilities of up to 20%  
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Figure 6. Mean subjective probability ratings on the 7-point rating scale (A) and on the percent format (B) in the sequential encoding condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
were experienced, a probability of, for example, 42% should still receive a significantly 
higher value on that same scale when used by a different individual. We expected that the 
numeric measures would succeed in this because of their precisely defined categories. The 
rating scales and the visual analog scale, however, were expected to succumb to this context 
effect due to the vagueness of quantifiers and imprecision in handling, respectively (H3). 
Beginning with the sequential encoding condition, Figures 6A and 6B exemplify 
differential mappings of probabilities on the 7-point verbal scale and the percent format, 
respectively. To assess the formats’ performance, we consider the absolute judgments of the 
highest low probability (20%) and the lowest moderate probability (42%) that were given 
between subjects.9 Mean ratings (standard deviations) of the respective 20%- and 42%-ratings 
were: 7-point = 4.05 (1.27) vs. 3.84 (1.15); 11-point = 3.87 (1.88) vs. 4.39 (1.91); 
VAS = 36.46 (22.41) vs. 44.09 (21.80); frequency = 0.19 (0.03) vs. 0.43 (0.13); 
percent = 22.81 (12.35) vs. 41.53 (13.88). In line with our prediction, these values suggest 
that neither the rating scales nor the visual analog scale differentiated between probability  
                                                          
9 Because means did not vary as a function of severity, we collapsed the data over both severity conditions. 
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Figure 7. Mean subjective probability ratings on the 7-point rating scale (A) and on the percent format (B) in the graphical encoding condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.  
 
ranges. This is most evident in the case of the 7-point verbal scale, which delivered an 
average rating for a probability of 42% that was actually lower than that for 20%. To test our 
hypothesis, we calculated independent t-tests for each of the value pairings and found that 
judgments made on the scales in question did not differ significantly, t(74)7-point = 0.76, 
p = .45; t(74)11-point = −1.19, p = .24; t(74)VAS = −1.45, p = .15.10 
In the graphical encoding condition, on the other hand, context dependency was 
markedly reduced. Figures 7A and 7B present means of the 7-point rating scale and the 
percent format. Means (standard deviations) of the respective 20%- and 42%-ratings were: 
7-point = 3.29 (0.77) vs. 4.18 (0.73); 11-point = 2.62 (1.16) vs. 4.10 (0.50); VAS = 23.78 
(14.86) vs. 46.88 (14.38); frequency = 0.20 (0.00) vs. 0.42 (0.03); percent = 20.00 (0.00) vs. 
42.01 (0.66). T-tests confirmed that all scales differentiated significantly between the two 
ranges of probabilities (all ps < .001). These results indicate once more the role of encoding 
error with regard to differences in scale performance. 
                                                          
10 The exclusion of outliers did not change the results of the t-tests in this section. 
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The severity of outcomes. We predicted that greater severity would lead to higher 
probability judgments on the rating scales and the visual analog scale (H4). To test this, we 
calculated mixed-design ANOVAs with the four respective probability judgments as a within-
subjects factor and severity as a between-subjects factor. Analyses were conducted separately 
for each scale format (due to different scale units) as well as for both probability ranges 
(because ranges were manipulated between subjects and inevitably affected probability 
ratings). Contrary to our prediction, probability judgments did not differ systematically as a 
function of the severity of observed outcomes in either of the encoding conditions.11 
Discussion 
We evaluated five different scale formats for measuring subjective probability 
estimates with regard to two goodness-of-fit criteria pertaining to the concordance between 
objective and subjective probabilities. We varied the range of probabilities and the severity of 
outcomes and provided objective probabilities in both a sequential and an aggregated 
graphical format. 
We observed that numeric scales for assessing subjective probability judgments 
generally fared better than rating scales or a visual analog scale in terms of sensitivity and 
showed higher accuracy than a visual analog scale. This superior performance is most likely 
due, in part, to the numeric scales’ higher resolution in terms of possible categories, which 
readily offer one category for each possible probability. The two rating scales, on the other 
hand, specify categories in such a manner that more than one of the presented probabilities 
fall within the range of one category. That is, probabilities of 2% and 5% may both be 
described as very small; even more pronounced in the case of the 11-point rating scale, 2%, 
5% and 10% fall between the categories 00 and 01. Finally, the somewhat mixed performance 
of the visual analog scale might be explained by difficulties in its use (Couper et al., 2006). 
While the scale does assign every position a score between 0 and 100, thereby theoretically 
allowing for a perfect goodness-of-fit, it offers no numeric feedback.  
                                                          
11 After the exclusion of outliers we found significantly higher probability estimates for sequentially encoded high severity adverse events in the low probabilities condition on the 11-point scale, F(1, 29) = 6.64, p = .015, η
P
2  = .19 In the graphical condition we found 
significantly higher probability estimates for low probability high severity events on the 7-point scale, F(1, 30) = 4.95, p = .034, η
P
2  = .14 as well as on the 11-point scale 
F(1, 33) = 6.41, p = .016, η
P
2  = .16. 
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However, goodness-of-fit was determined not only by the scales’ resolution but also 
varied as a function of the encoding of objective probabilities. We observed consistently 
higher sensitivity and accuracy when probability information was presented simultaneously. 
The sampling of relative event frequencies from a sequence of events inevitably contains a 
certain amount of noise (Erev et al., 1994; Fiedler, 2000; Fiedler & Armbruster, 1994). 
Further, translating single occurrences of an outcome into a judgment of frequency involves a 
mathematical transformation. Both aspects of sequential encoding might introduce error into 
estimates. The graphical presentation employed in the present research, on the other hand, 
allowed participants to simply count the relevant outcomes and, at the same time, provided a 
numeric reference scale that quantified all possible outcomes. This type of presentation format 
has been shown to decrease base-rate neglect (Obrecht et al., 2009) and improve probability 
weighting in risky choices in comparison to sequential presentation (Hilbig & Glöckner, 
2011). 
The importance of error in available probability information becomes more apparent 
when considering the effect of the two probability ranges presented. Sampling the probability 
of an event that is almost as equally frequent as its opposite (moderate probabilities condition) 
should be more error-prone than spotting a few highly salient events. Accordingly, we 
observed generally lower sensitivity following the sequential encoding of higher probabilities. 
In addition, the context dependency we observed, that is, the rating scales’ inability to 
differentiate between the two ranges of probabilities, disappeared in the graphical condition. 
Had this effect been caused only by inherent attributes of the scales, it would have appeared in 
both encoding conditions. Hence, it seems prudent to conclude that the precision of encoded 
information plays an important role in the goodness-of-fit of subjective probability measures. 
Against our expectations and previous research (Harris et al., 2009), none of the scales 
were in any way affected by the severity of outcomes. This lack of effect might be explained 
by the design of the study. The presentation of relative frequencies of outcomes may have 
induced a general sense of rule-based reasoning and focused participants’ attention on 
delivering accurate magnitude judgments. The scale-inherent performance differences in the 
present study are thus most likely caused by the resolution of measures rather than their verbal 
or numerical quality. Single comparisons of the two rating scales confirmed this notion, 
indicating no differences between the verbal 7-point and the numeric 11-point rating scale on 
any of the dependent variables. Hence, it seems likely that in the present context all scales 
were interpreted and used as measures of probability rather than measures of general risk or 
concern (cf. Borland, 1997). 
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An explanation for the notion that scale resolution becomes less relevant with less 
reliable available information might be that the differing judgments were based on different 
representations. Fuzzy-trace theory posits that individuals extract two independent kinds of 
representations from information: verbatim and gist. While the verbatim representations are 
for surface form and include, for example, exact numbers, gist representations capture the 
meaning of information (Reyna, 2012). In the present context, this distinction can be thought 
of as the difference between absolute probability judgments and the ordinal relations between 
probabilities (Reyna & Hamilton, 2001). Thus, in the graphical encoding condition, 
participants had verbatim knowledge of the presented probability readily available and could 
therefore base their judgment exclusively on this highly accurate representation. Differences 
in performance were thus due to the scales’ resolution either allowing for or preventing an 
exact expression of this representation. In contrast, following sequential encoding, verbatim 
representations of the presented probabilities were less available or even absent, while gist 
representations, for example, the general range (i.e., all small probabilities or all moderate 
probabilities) and rank order mostly remained (Zacks & Hasher, 2002). Consequently, 
judgments in this condition were rather gist-based. The data support this interpretation. First, 
all scales were very sensitive in all conditions, indicating that the rank order of the presented 
probabilities was available at the time of judgment. Second, in the graphical condition the 
numeric measures showed higher sensitivity because their high resolution allowed for 
quantifying the ordinal differences between scales. On the other hand, in the sequential 
condition, scales were not used for exact quantification (because that knowledge was not 
available) but merely to express the ordinal relation of the probabilities. Hence, the 
differences in scale resolutions were less important and the differences in sensitivity between 
scales markedly reduced. 
The distinction between verbatim and gist representations finds another more 
profound application in risk research. It is generally assumed that, in addition to a person’s 
belief about an objective probability of an outcome, there exists a more intuitive 
representation of uncertainty with regard to the occurrence of that outcome (Reyna, 2004). 
The latter concept has been shown to play a more important role in guiding decisions and 
behavior (Windschitl, 2002), which is in line with the earlier reported results from Weinstein 
et al. (2007). However, when research addresses biases in the perception of objective 
probabilities, measures are needed that tap into the beliefs about these probabilities. The high 
sensitivity and independence of severity that we found in the present research indicates that 
all scales were understood and used in such a manner. 
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On the other hand, the scale formats differed greatly in their performance with regard 
to mapping objective probabilities when the spacing of presented probabilities was skewed, 
that is, low and moderate ranges. This effect has important implications for research. When 
the encoding of probability information is error-prone, rating and visual analog scales are not 
suitable for between-subjects designs due to the dependence of scores on the distribution of 
stimuli. Even under conditions of perfect information, this effect, though somewhat reduced, 
is still observable. While all scales differentiated between low and moderate probabilities in 
the graphical condition, the gap between ranges—a difference of 22%—was not adequately 
mapped onto scales when compared to the within-subjects differences, for example, the 10%- 
and 20%-rating (Figures 7A and 7B). 
Thus, not every scale format we investigated can be equally recommended for use in 
research. All scales were high in sensitivity and should allow for a meaningful ordinal ranking 
of a limited number of different probabilities. For the rating scales, the number of categories 
is an obvious upper limit. However, if the differences between probabilities are very diverse 
(e.g., 5%, 10%, 30%, 80%), researchers must keep in mind that these differences will not be 
represented on the scales. The performance of the visual analog scale was inconsistent. 
Despite its high resolution, its sensitivity was on par with the rating scales. On the other hand, 
its accuracy was unaffected by encoding error. One speculative explanation for this could be 
that accuracy for low probabilities was decreased beyond the effect of encoding error 
(accuracy was very low in both conditions) because judgments had to be made at the extreme 
end of the scale, which may have increased difficulties in use. Finally, the numeric measures 
offered the most precise probability ratings and proved to be unaffected by the distribution of 
the stimuli. Previous research has shown that the use of natural frequencies, instead of 
percentages, can improve reasoning about probabilities and decrease a number of commonly 
found biases (Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). In the present context, however, the frequency format 
showed a much stronger drop in sensitivity for moderate probabilities in the sequential 
condition than the percentage format. The fact that participants have to provide two values 
instead of just one might make this measure simply more error-prone—out of the 12 
participants that had to be dropped from analyses, eight were dropped due to meaningless 
answers on the frequency measure. 
The encoding conditions that we implemented were rather artificial, which might 
impede the generalization of results. While a format such as the pictograph might be applied 
within the context of risk communication, it is unlikely that the sequential encoding of 
outcomes relevant to a question would ever happen in such a controlled and blocked fashion. 
 The Measurement of Subjective Probability 111 
Further, as one reviewer noted, participants may simply have counted the relevant outcomes 
in the sequential condition, thereby effectively canceling the difference between encoding 
conditions. While we cannot rule out this explanation, we believe that a counting strategy 
would simply have led to a quantitative reduction of the effect of encoding conditions by 
providing more reliable probability information. In addition, two participants had to be 
dropped from analyses due to keeping a written tally of relevant outcomes, indicating that it 
was most likely not possible to read out loud and simultaneously count the stimuli. 
In conclusion, the measurement formats we compared differ markedly in terms of 
sensitivity, accuracy, and dependency on stimulus distributions. These differences are caused 
only in part by characteristics inherent to the scales (i.e. resolution, verbal vs. numeric)—
factors that become less relevant with increasing encoding error. Therefore, when deciding 
which scale to use in research, the source of the probability information that informs the 
subjective probability judgments must be taken into account. In order to understand the 
processes that lead to typical biases in probability judgments, a scale is needed that measures 
probability alone. In the present research, even the verbally labeled 7-point rating scale 
delivered judgments that closely followed the presented objective probabilities. However, a 
meaningful quantification of probability judgments, that is, one that allows between-subjects 
comparisons, requires a numeric measure.  
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Appendix A: Adverse Events and Names of Medications Used in the Experiment 
 
Adverse Events   
Low Severity  High Severity  Medications 
Fever  Asthma  Argal 
Dizziness  Diabetes  Tirav 
Rash  Meningitis  Tookl 
Restlessness  Epilepsy  Endas 
Vomiting  Cerebral Edema  Vahto 
Headache  Blindness  Tigla 
Cough  Autism  Tsovir 
Muscle Aches  Neurodermatitis  Drigul 
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Appendix B: Analysis of Scales’ Accuracy Calculated with Predicted Subjective Probability 
Values 
All analyses were additionally carried out under exclusion of outliers. Outliers were defined 
as any value above and below two standard deviations within each cell. All of the effects 
remained significant after the exclusion of outliers, effect sizes generally increased. 
Means (SDs) across context variables in the sequential encoding condition: 
7-point = 3.69 (1.88), 11-point = 3.59 (1.90), VAS = 3.44 (1.99), frequency = 2.37 (2.31), and 
percent = 2.38 (1.84). An ANOVA with accuracy as the dependent variable and format, 
probability range, and severity as between-subjects factors found a main effect of format, 
F(4, 352) = 10.51, p < .001, η
P
2  = .11. Bonferroni’s test revealed that the numeric formats 
formed one of two homogenous subgroups and outperformed the remaining three measures in 
terms of accuracy, all ps ≤ .005. Further, accuracy decreased with increasing probability, 
F(1, 352) = 59.60, p < .001, η
P
2  = .15 (low probabilities mean = 2.40, SD = 1.92; 
moderate = 3.81, SD = 1.96), and increasing severity, although the latter effect was weak, 
F(1, 352) = 4.60, p = .033, η
P
2  = .01 (low severity mean = 2.92, SD = 1.91; high = 3.28, 
SD = 2.19). Finally, there was a significant interaction of format and range, F(4, 352) = 4.95, 
p = .001, η
P
2  = .05.  
Two separate ANOVAs, comparing accuracy between scale formats for each range of 
probabilities separately (and collapsing data across levels of severity because of that 
manipulation’s very small effect, η
P
2  = .01) found that, when probabilities were low, accuracy 
differed significantly between formats, F(4, 182) = 12.78, p < .001, η2 = .22, with the numeric 
measures and the remaining three scales forming two separate subgroups. However, the 
difference between the 7-point rating scale and the percent format was only marginally 
significant (Bonferroni’s test, p = .086). In contrast, the small, significant effect in the 
moderate probabilities condition, F(4, 180) = 3.62, p = .007, η2 = .07, is explained by a single 
significant difference between the 7-point rating scale and percent format (Bonferroni’s test, 
p = .002); all other comparisons were non-significant. 
Means (standard deviations) across context variables in the graphical encoding 
condition: 7-point = 3.05 (1.36), 11-point = 2.39 (1.25), VAS = 1.92 (1.48), frequency = 0.51 
(1.40), and percent = 0.33 (1.15). An ANOVA with accuracy as the dependent variable and 
format, probability range, and severity as between-subjects factors found a significant effect 
of scale format, F(4, 350) = 59.27, p < .001, η
P
2  = .40. The numeric formats formed one 
homogenous subgroup, the visual analog scale and the 11-point rating scale formed a separate 
120 The Measurement of Subjective Probability 
subgroup that differed from the 7-point rating scale (Bonferroni’s test, all ps ≤ .023). The 
context variables, range and severity, had no effect on scale accuracy in the graphical 
condition. 
Comparison of accuracy between encoding conditions, using a mixed-design ANOVA 
with format as a between-subjects factor and encoding mode as a within-subjects factor, 
found a significant effect of encoding condition, indicating greater accuracy of all formats 
when objective probabilities were encoded graphically in comparison to sequentially, 
F(1, 364) = 149.17, p < .001, η
P
2  = .29. A significant interaction between scale formats and 
encoding condition is due to differences between encoding conditions varying in magnitude 
between scale formats, F(4, 364) = 4.73, p = .001, η
P
2  = .05. 
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Abstract 
Recent evidence indicates that instruments for the assessment of subjective probability do not 
just differ due to scale-inherent characteristics, but also as a function of the error in the 
underlying representations. In three experiments subjects encoded the same two ranges of 
objective probabilities as sequences of option-outcome pairs and judged subjective probability 
either on a verbally labeled 7-point rating scale or in the form of percent estimates. The two 
ranges shared one common stimulus and were presented within-subjects. In Experiment 1 we 
observed that under highly error-prone conditions the high resolution of the percent format 
offers no advantage in terms of sensitivity. Additionally, imprecise representations, rather 
than the stimulus distribution, can result in apparent context effects on the rating scale. In 
Experiment 2 we found that an anchor in the stimuli can tether judgments on the rating scale 
to the scale’s midpoint but in turn result in inconsistent judgment functions on the percent 
format that are an expression of regression toward the mean. In Experiment 3 we discovered 
that imprecise representations change the way the rating scale is used while percent estimates 
remain consistent. We conclude that a verbal rating scale does not allow a meaningful 
quantification or meaningful comparisons between experimental conditions and should not be 
used in research on subjective probability. The percent format captures the underlying 
representations reliably and consistently but is very sensitive to noise and can lead to classic 
regression fallacies. 
 
Keywords: Subjective probability, scale sensitivity, context effects, anchor effects, 
regression toward the mean  
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Self-Report Measures of Subjective Probability: Error and Anchor Effects 
Subjective probability1 is a central variable for a large number of research questions. 
However, comparisons across studies are hindered because there is no standard of 
measurement. In fact, the question of how to assess perceptions of likelihood has been the 
focus of research in its own right for at least 50 years. Elicitation approaches range from 
inferring probabilities from behavior, such as bets (Beach & Phillips, 1967; Beach & Wise, 
1969) or choices between lotteries (Baillon, 2008; Edwards, 1962) to a great variety of self-
report instruments. The latter include complex methods, such as eliciting fractiles or even 
whole distributions (bins-and-balls method) for multinomial or continuous variables (e.g., 
Delavande & Rohwedder, 2008; Goldstein & Rothschild, 2014) and a plethora of different 
formats for direct estimation, especially in case of binomial distributions, that ask for some 
kind of magnitude judgment (Bilgin, 2012; Diefenbach, Weinstein, & O’Reilly, 1993; 
Galanter, 1962; Woloshin, Schwartz, Black, & Welch, 1999; Woloshin, Schwartz, Byram, 
Fischhoff, & Welch, 2000). 
Similarly, very different evaluative criteria have been employed to evaluate these 
instruments. Subjective probability scales have been studied in terms of usability, confidence 
in judgment, test-retest reliability, and with regard to behavior prediction (Diefenbach et al., 
1993; Weinstein et al., 2007). These criteria are certainly informative. However, many 
research questions address biases in probability judgments and to assess these biases reliably, 
that is, to differentiate biases in the representation of probability from measurement biases, it 
is necessary to the study scale formats in terms of correspondence between objective and 
subjective probabilities. 
Comparisons between probability judgments and real-life data, such as objective risk 
factors, have found numeric instruments to produce overestimations whereas verbal and 
comparative scales fare much better (Eibner, Barth, Helmes, & Bengel, 2006; Schapira, 
Davids, McAuliffe, & Nattinger, 2004; Woloshin et al., 1999). This approach to evaluate the 
performance of different scale formats, however, has one essential caveat. It assumes that the 
                                                          
1 The term subjective probability is sometimes used to denote one specific interpretation of the concept of probability, that is, the subjectivist interpretation. This view understands probability as a personal degree of belief and denies that the idea of a true or objective probability can even be meaningful (de Finetti, 1970). In this work, however, we adhere to the frequentist position and interpret the true probability of an event as its relative occurrence in a reference set. We use the term subjective probability to refer to an estimate of objective probability. 
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subjects have an accurate perception of these probabilities, which cannot be known a priori. 
So, if smokers underestimate their survival chances it is impossible to tell how much of this 
apparent bias is caused by a biased perception and how much is caused by the scale format 
itself (e.g., Viscusi & Hakes, 2003). One way to circumvent this is to provide all subjects with 
the same information and to thus create a normative truth to which judgments can be 
compared. 
Haase, Renkewitz, and Betsch (2013) employed such a paradigm to evaluate five self-
report instruments for subjective probability in terms of sensitivity and vulnerability to 
context effects. Subjects encoded four different probabilities from two ranges (low and 
moderate, between-subjects) first as sequences of single events and second in aggregate form 
as pictographs. Following each presentation, subjects judged the encoded probability on one 
of the five formats. Haase et al. found two numeric scales to be more sensitive than two rating 
scales and a visual analog measure. Judgments on the numeric scales were also more 
consistent across the two probability ranges whereas the other formats each produced two 
very different judgment functions for the two stimulus contexts, for example, on a 7-point 
rating scale an objective probability of 20% (the highest probability in the low range) received 
a higher rating than an objective probability of 42% (the lowest probability in the moderate 
range). 
However, the performance differences between scales differed themselves as a 
function of encoding error. When the available information became less precise the 
differences between scales in sensitivity decreased while differences in context dependency 
increased. The authors (Haase et al., 2013) interpreted these findings in terms of fuzzy-trace 
theory, which posits that when individuals encode information they create multiple 
representations along a continuum from verbatim and exact at one end to vague and gist-like 
at the other (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). For numerical information this gist continuum can be 
thought of as a hierarchy of imprecision comparable to different levels of measurement, that 
is, from ratio to nominal (Reyna, 2012). Crucially, gist representations are not built upon 
verbatim representations but are encoded simultaneously and independently. Furthermore, the 
utilization of any one or more than one representation is task-dependent and individuals have 
a preference to rely on the most gist-like representation possible for any given problem 
(Corbin, Reyna, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2015; Reyna, 2012). 
Within this theoretical framework Haase et al. (2013) argued that, when virtually 
error-free verbatim representations are available, a numeric scale with a high resolution 
allows for an exact quantification of differences between probabilities and as a consequence 
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much more sensitive judgments than the few and by definition equidistant categories of a 
rating scale. At the same time, precise information prompts subjects who use a rating scale to 
place close probabilities, for example, 5% and 10%, in the same category to retain a coherent 
mapping of the theoretically defined 0–100 probability range onto the available categories and 
to thus reduce sensitivity further. 
On the other hand, when representations are less precise due to error-prone encoding, 
subjects tend to rely more on gist representations, such as the general range and rank order of 
the presented probabilities. As a consequence, the advantage of a high-resolution scale is 
reduced and the differences in sensitivity between scale formats decrease. At the same time, 
in order to express ordinal relations, subjects using a rating scale tend to use more categories 
rather than preserve a judgment range consistent with the underlying probability range. For 
example, on the 7-point rating scale, due to its limited number of categories, this led to the 
apparent context effect of an objective probability of 20% receiving a higher judgment than 
one of 42%. A numeric format, on the other hand, offers enough (or virtually unlimited) 
categories and thus allows for a much more coherent mapping, even if judgments are mostly 
based on ordinal ranks. The authors concluded that researchers deciding on a scale format 
need to take the expected precision of the representations that inform subjective probability 
judgments into account as it affects how a scale will be used. In most applied contexts all 
tested formats will allow to assess perceived ordinal relations between probabilities but a 
meaningful quantification of probability judgments for between-subjects comparisons calls 
for a numeric instrument. 
This research follows up on these results. In three experiments we compared the best 
and the worst scale formats from that study—a percent estimate and a verbally labeled 7-point 
rating scale—to further explore the effects of error-prone encoding of probability information 
on scale sensitivity and the occurrence of context effects. The sensitivity of a scale quantifies 
the degree to which changes in the objective probabilities are mirrored by changes in 
subjective judgments. The occurrence of context effects served as a coarse indicator of 
accuracy. Typically, accuracy is assessed as deviations in judgments from an objective norm. 
This kind of calculation, however, requires the compared values to occupy identical value 
arrays, that is, 0–100 in this case. We address the question of transforming rating scale values 
to a 0–100 array in more detail in an additional analysis after reporting the experiments. 
However, to anticipate our conclusion, we believe that such a transformation is not 
appropriate and therefore refrain from assessing scale accuracy this way. On the other hand, 
probabilities are bounded at 0 and 100% (or 1) and have a natural anchor point at 50% (or 
 Error and Anchor Effects in Probability Judgments 127 
0.5). Irrespective of any inter-context incoherence, if a scale does not coherently map these 
anchors, it cannot be interpreted as quantifying subjective probabilities in any meaningful way 
beyond the ordinal scale. Therefore, we created a research paradigm that would allow for a 
direct test of this assumption. Before we explain our design in more detail we provide a 
review of relevant issues and findings. 
Scale Formats 
The scale formats we investigated differ in at least two aspects that are relevant for our 
evaluative criteria. First and most important is the format’s resolution: the 7-point rating scale 
offers the subject seven discrete categories to make a judgment while the percent format 
allows for quasi-continuous estimates (judgments were restricted to integers in the 0–100 
range). The question of the optimal number of response categories for rating scales has been 
discussed for a century and there appears to be a tentative consensus, that more than seven 
categories (plus or minus two) provide little gain in discriminative power (Cox, 1980; 
Diefenbach et al., 1993; McKelvie, 1978; Preston & Colman, 2000). However, a scale for 
probability judgments must not only be able to differentiate between probabilities but also 
relate judgments meaningfully to the underlying probability continuum. Depending on the 
precision of the representations this may present a conflict of interest to a larger or smaller 
degree. For instance, given perfect knowledge a subject might reasonably rate the objective 
probabilities of 5% and of 8% both as very small on the 7-point scale even though she is 
aware of the difference. 
On the other hand, it is as unrealistic to assume perfect knowledge in any applied 
context as it is to even ask for such a judgment when a known probability could simply be 
reproduced (unless one is interested in how one scale translates to the other). In fact, some 
researchers have argued that judgments of probability which do not involve any actual 
calculations are based on a coarse internal representation with a limited number of states or 
categories (Sun, Wang, Zhang, & Smith, 2008). In line with this, Diefenbach et al. (1993; 
Weinstein & Diefenbach, 1997) found that more than seven scale categories did neither 
improve the correlations between probability judgments and risk factors nor the agreement of 
ranks derived from probability judgments with the direct ranking of likelihoods. Furthermore, 
the 7-point rating scale was much preferred by subjects in terms of perceived accuracy and 
ease of use.  
Assuming coarse representations, there is then an obvious downside to the high 
resolution of the percent format: The requirement to provide a precise estimate can add 
additional noise to subjective probability judgments. Imagine two subjects judging the same 
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three probabilities. Both know the probabilities’ rank order and that they are below 50%. If 
these subjects make their judgments on the 7-point rating scale they will both in all likelihood 
assign the categories 1, 2, and 3. If, on the other hand, they provide their judgments as percent 
estimates, one of them might judge the probabilities as 10%, 20%, and 30%, the other as 8%, 
22%, and 36%. Thus, even though on the individual level both subjects’ judgments are 
equivalent in terms of sensitivity to the objective stimuli, on the aggregate level judgments 
may contain additional noise due to the scale’s high resolution. 
The issue is further complicated when considering the distribution of the objective 
probabilities. Equidistant or approximately equidistant stimuli will benefit the rating scale 
when representations are imprecise while a high-resolution scale format facilitates unevenly 
spaced judgments, and thus additional noise. On the other hand, a highly skewed stimulus 
distribution can be easily mapped with percent estimates but creates the above described 
conflict for users of the rating scale which increases with an increasing precision of 
representations. Thus, a scale’s resolution is relevant for its sensitivity to subjective 
probability representations as well as to its ability to meaningfully map the probability array. 
Further, it stands to reason that this relevancy changes not only as a function of the stimulus 
distribution but also of the accuracy of said representations. 
Second, our scale formats differ in that the 7-point rating scale provides verbal 
quantifiers as category labels whereas the percent estimate is purely numeric. Verbal 
quantifiers are easy to understand but inevitably somewhat vague. There exists a large body of 
research on the relation between numerical and verbal probability expressions (e.g., 
Bocklisch, Bocklisch, & Krems 2010; Budescu & Wallsten, 1985; Wallsten, Budescu, 
Rapoport, Zwick, & Forsyth, 1986) which we address at the end of the article. However, it 
has also been argued that numeric scales promote deliberate and rule-based thinking whereas 
verbal probability measures induce an associative and intuitive reasoning style. Thus elicited 
and sometimes called intuitive perceptions of certainty do not just comprise beliefs in 
objective probabilities but may also include notions of the value of a prospect, its meaning in 
a given situation, and affective reactions toward it (Windschitl, 2002; Windschitl & Wells, 
1996). For instance, a 10% chance of rain might be judged as small while a 10% likelihood of 
dying during a surgical procedure might reasonably be judged as large. Percent estimates of 
both probabilities, on the other hand, would be expected to only reflect the actual 10%. In line 
with this reasoning, verbal rating scales of subjective probability as compared to numerical 
estimates have been found to be better predictors of behavioral intentions and actual behavior 
that, of course, have more antecedents than just the likelihood of an outcome (Baghal, 2011; 
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Betsch, Haase, Renkewitz, & Schmid, 2015; Weinstein et al., 2007; Windschitl & Wells, 
1996). However, if a rating scale is used to express perceptions about aspects of an uncertain 
prospect other than its likelihood, then one can exclude this format a priori as a viable 
instrument to assess biases in subjective probability, unless all these aspects were to be 
controlled for. It appears, though, that the degree to which a rating scale goes beyond pure 
probability depends on the experimental setting (Betsch et al., 2015; Haase et al., 2013). We 
address this issue in Experiment 1. 
Context Effects 
The domain of an uncertain prospect, for example cancer vs. rain, is but one part of the 
context of the subjective probability judgment. Research into how the context can exert an 
unwanted (as in not being of interest to the person asking for the judgment) influence on a 
judgment has focused on many aspects, such as formal features of instruments and preceding 
questions (e.g., Belli, Conrad, & Wright, 2007; Schwarz & Sudman, 1992). When we address 
context effects in this article, however, we specifically refer to the influence of the context 
created by the stimulus distribution itself. Such effects have most extensively been studied 
within the framework of range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965). Originally developed for 
categorical judgments of multiple stimuli, the theory makes two basic assumptions. First, 
subjects match the range of available categories to the range of presented stimuli with the 
most extreme stimuli occupying the two respective end-categories and the remaining 
categories assigned to equal subranges of the stimuli (the range principle). Second, subjects 
tend to assign the same number of stimuli to each available category (the frequency principle). 
If stimuli are distributed uniformly the frequency principle has no effect. However, if for 
example the distribution is positively skewed, that is, smaller stimuli are presented with 
greater frequency, then some of these smaller stimuli will have to be placed in larger 
categories leading to a steeper judgment function. As a result, an intermediate stimulus will 
receive a higher judgment than when the stimulus distribution is negatively skewed. The final 
judgment presents a compromise between both principles. 
Range-frequency theory has been used to explain context effects on categorical ratings 
in a multitude of domains (e.g., size, happiness, attractiveness, strength of mental disorder, 
student evaluations) but also on magnitude estimations, salary allocations and other number 
estimates (Mellers & Birnbaum, 1982, 1983; Wedell & Parducci, 1988, 2000; Wedell, 
Parducci, & Lane, 1990). Additionally, it has been argued that a single stimulus can invoke its 
own context. For example, Birnbaum (1999) showed that in a between-subjects design the 
number 9 was judged to be subjectively larger than the number 221. 
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Since both principles of the theory describe a system of assigning categories to 
stimuli, a major focus of research and a point of contention (e.g., McKelvie, 2001; Wedell, 
1990) has been the importance of the scale format used for judgments in creating context 
effects. In general, a larger number of judgment categories reduces the context effects through 
both principles (Parducci, 1982; Parducci & Wedell, 1986; Wedell & Parducci, 2000; Wedell 
et al., 1990). We address the specific findings that are relevant for our design below. 
More importantly though is the question of whether range-frequency theory is 
applicable to probability judgments. Context effects through the frequency principle have 
been observed for judgment functions with up to four anchors (Birnbaum, 1974). However, 
besides providing anchors (i.e., 0, 50, and 100%), it has been argued that judgments of 
proportion and by extension probability represent a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
continuum (Stevens & Galanter, 1957) or an absolute scale and thus might not lend 
themselves to a relativistic interpretation. To our knowledge, only one study has addressed 
this issue. Varey, Mellers, and Birnbaum (1990) presented subjects with arrays of black and 
white dots and elicited percent estimates of the respective proportions. They found that 
skewed stimulus distributions changed the relation between judged and actual proportions and 
urged caution when interpreting between-subjects comparisons of subjective probability 
judgments. 
Systematic Effects of Random Error 
Interestingly, Varey et al. (1990) also noted that the judgments in their study were 
regressive (i.e., small proportions were overestimated, large ones underestimated) and pointed 
out that such a pattern could account for the typical finding of overconfidence in research on 
calibration if one were to plot subjective probabilities as a function of objective probabilities 
instead of the customary other way around. This idea was idea was implemented by Erev, 
Wallsten, and Budescu (1994) and independently developed by Pfeifer (1994) who argued 
that at least part of the often observed overconfidence could in fact be a failure to recognize 
and thus a misinterpretation of regression toward the mean. This approach sparked the 
development of numerous so-called stochastic or random-error models which share the 
assumption that various biases in probabilistic reasoning are due to effects of random 
variation or noise in the reasoning process but differ in the assumed error distributions (e.g., 
Budescu, Erev, & Wallsten, 1997; Juslin, Olsson, & Björkman, 1997; Wallsten & González-
Vallejo, 1994). More recently, broader frameworks have been suggested to reconcile these 
different models (Costello & Watts, 2014; Hilbert, 2012). 
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Regression toward the mean has flummoxed social scientists since it was first 
observed by Galton in 1885 and has been subject to what some researchers have called a 
mythologization (Maraun, Gabriel, & Martin, 2011). Therefore, it is important to note that 
regression toward the mean does not affect or explain anything. It is simply a property of a 
bivariate distribution if the two variables are not perfectly correlated (see Campbell & Kenny, 
1999 for an excellent introduction). The failure to recognize this, however, can lead to a 
misinterpretation of aggregate data in terms of psychologically meaningful concepts such as 
overconfidence. Such misinterpretations, or regression fallacies, have predominantly been 
observed in studies with a pre- and post-test (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Verkooijen, 
Stok, & Mollen, 2015) but also in research on the availability heuristic (Sedlmeier, Hertwig, 
& Gigerenzer, 1998), frequency judgments (Hertwig, Pachur, & Kurzenhäuser, 2005), and the 
description-experience gap in risky choice (Glöckner, Hilbig, Henninger, & Fiedler, 2016). 
Overview 
We conducted three experiments to further study how error in the sampling of event 
frequencies affects different scale formats for the assessment of event probabilities in terms of 
scale sensitivity and the occurrence of context effects. In each experiment we presented the 
same two ranges of probabilities as sequences of option-outcome pairs. These ranges shared 
one common stimulus and were presented within-subjects. Probability judgments were made 
either on the verbally labeled 7-point rating scale or as percent estimates. We assessed scale 
sensitivity—defined as the Pearson correlation between objective and subjective 
probabilities—at the individual as well as the aggregate score level. Additionally, we 
analyzed the relative variability of judgments in relation to encoding conditions and scale 
sensitivity. We tested for context effects by comparing judgments of the common stimulus 
from the two probability ranges. 
Experiment 1 served to establish the specific research paradigm and to test the scales’ 
performance under highly error-prone encoding conditions. In Experiment 2 we examined the 
special function of the 50% probability midpoint as an anchor in judgments. In Experiment 3 
we additionally varied the error in encoding to illustrate the interaction effect of anchor points 
and error on scale sensitivity and the occurrence of context effects. As the three experiments 
were very similar and followed nearly identical procedures, we describe the method and data 
analysis in detail for Experiment 1, while we confine those sections in the descriptions of 
Experiments 2 and 3 to changes and specific features as appropriate. 
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Experiment 1 
This experiment addressed three research questions. First, in Haase et al. (2013) only 
percent estimates were still significantly more sensitive than the 7-point rating scale when the 
encoding of event frequencies had been the most difficult. However, even under those 
conditions, scale sensitivity was still rather high. We were interested to see how the scales 
fare, when the sampling process is extremely error-prone. As delineated above, we expected 
the percent format to lose all advantage in terms of sensitivity and possibly even to suffer due 
to its high-resolution demands. 
Second, proponents of range-frequency theory have called the validity of between-
subjects research into question if differing judgment contexts are not taken into account 
(Birnbaum, 1999; Varey et al., 1990). Therefore, we presented the two judgment contexts 
within-subjects. We reasoned that if the previously observed context effects were at least in 
part a function of the encoding error and the scale format rather than of the distribution of 
stimuli (see also below), than they should also occur in a within-subjects design. We expected 
higher ratings for the common stimulus in the low-range context as compared to the high-
range context but percent estimates to be consistent across contexts. 
Third, Haase et al. (2013) found no effects of events’ severity on probability 
judgments and concluded that all scale formats had been used to express beliefs in objective 
probabilities rather than broader perceptions of certainty. We varied the judgment domain 
between-subjects and hoped to replicate this finding as this would allow us to interpret 
differences in scale performance to be due to characteristics of the scale formats rather than 
due to subjects expressing different concepts. 
Method 
The experiment implemented a 2 (scale format: 7-point rating scale vs. percent 
estimate) × 2 (domain: adverse drug reaction vs. crime) between-subjects design with one 
within-subjects factor (range of probabilities: low vs. high). 
Procedure. Upon arriving in the lab subjects signed a consent form and were escorted 
to a soundproof cubicle. They were instructed to turn off all communication devices and to 
not use any kind of aid while participating, for example, taking notes. All additional 
instructions were provided on the screen in a standardized manner. 
In the adverse drug reaction conditions subjects were asked to imagine that they 
wanted to take a medication and that five different drugs were available. The same adverse 
reaction was known to occur at different rates with each drug. They would see a sequence of 
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instances that these drugs had been taken. In each case either the adverse reaction had 
occurred or nothing had happened.  
Analogously, in the crime conditions subjects were asked to imagine that were on their 
way home late at night and that they could choose one of five different streets. They would 
then see a sequence of instances that people had chosen to walk in these streets at night. In 
each case either a specific crime had occurred or nothing had happened. 
Afterwards they were to judge the probability of the adverse reaction or the crime for 
each medication or street. Subjects were instructed to read out loud every name and every 
outcome as they appeared in order to ensure full encoding of all information and that they 
were not to try to simply count the presented events. They were also informed that an audio 
recording would be produced in order to check the compliance with the encoding instructions. 
After a practice trial with a shortened sequence of 10 items that did not appear later in the 
experiment, participants completed six trials—three low range and three high range 
sequences—in random order. Subsequently, they proceeded with additional measures, 
provided demographic information, and were debriefed. 
Subjects. A total of 104 students at a German university took part in this lab-based 
study, either for a payment of €3 (approximately US$3.75) or for course credit. Seventeen 
subjects had to be excluded because they did not read out loud the stimuli during encoding 
(n = 6) or because their reading could not be confirmed due to technical difficulties with the 
recording equipment (n = 11). Thus, the final sample included N = 87 subjects, 68 (78.2%) of 
whom were female, with ns for individual analyses ranging from 19 to 25. Mean age was 
22.41 years (SD = 2.31) and mean grade in the Abitur (German general higher education 
entrance exam) was 2.19 (SD = 0.55).2 Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four 
between-subjects conditions. 
Objective probabilities. The presented probabilities were 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 
50% in the low range and 50%, 60%, 70%, 80% and 90% in the high range. We chose this 
distribution for three reasons. First, equidistant spacing theoretically allows for perfect 
sensitivity on the rating scale. Second, presenting more stimuli than available categories 
creates the above described conflict for subjects using the rating-scale and might lead to 
apparent context effects, which can be easily tested for by comparing the common stimulus. 
Third, across contexts the stimuli cover nearly the whole continuum of probability which 
                                                          
2 Grades on this exam vary between 1.0 and 4.0 with 1.0 being the best possible grade. 
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allows for more general conclusions than the previous study by Haase et al. (2013) and has 
implications for predictions according to range-frequency theory. 
The range principle indicates that subjects match the subjective judgment range to the 
presented stimulus range. However, this matching is not absolute but the result of an 
inferential process and therefore malleable. It varies as a function of anchors, background, and 
familiarity with the stimulus domain (Parducci & Perrett, 1971; Sarris & Parducci, 1978; 
Wedell et al., 1990). It seems reasonable to assume that due to the three absolute anchors of 
the probability range the subjective range is fixed irrespective of context. Nonetheless, 
presenting the whole range within-subjects ensures this. 
Context effects would then be expected to be caused by a skewed stimulus distribution 
through the frequency principle. This skewing can be achieved by presenting the same stimuli 
with different frequencies or by varying the spacing of the stimuli within a fixed range as we 
do in these experiments. The number of available judgment categories only affects context 
effects in the former case (Parducci & Wedell, 1986). Thus, if our design manipulated the 
context between-subjects, range-frequency theory would predict higher judgments for the low 
range common stimulus on both scale formats. For a within-subjects design the prediction 
would be to find severely reduced (Haubensak, 1992) or no context effects. 
Stimulus material. Subjects encoded different probabilities as sets of option-outcome 
pairs with each outcome being the occurrence or non-occurrence of a focal event. The relative 
frequency of the focal event within one set conveyed the likelihood information. Sets 
consisted of 20 items each, which referred to 20 instances the respective option hat been 
chosen. For example, in order to present a 40% likelihood of experiencing dizziness after 
taking a dose of Peter Pharma, the name Peter coincided eight times with the word Dizziness 
and 12 times with the word Nothing. 
Options. For six trials we needed 30 different options. We used 15 male and 15 female 
German first names adopted from Betsch, Glauer, Renkewitz, Winkler, and Sedlmeier (2010) 
followed either by the word Pharma or the word Street, for example, Lisa Pharma. Appendix 
A lists the names. 
Outcome domain. The presented option-outcome pairs stood either for hypothetical 
medications and the likelihood of adverse reactions following their ingestion or for 
hypothetical streets and the likelihood of a crime occurring there. For a total of six trials we 
needed six different adverse reactions and six different crimes. For the former we chose six 
out of the eight low severity adverse drug reactions from Haase et al. (2013). For the latter we 
chose six crimes from Mannhaupt (1983). Appendix A lists all outcomes. 
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Figure 1. Presentation of stimuli in the encoding conditions without an anchor in Experiment 1 and 2. Original materials were in German.  
 
Creation of stimuli. For each subject six sequences of stimuli were created at the 
beginning of the experimental session. The six different outcomes were distributed randomly 
over the six sequences of stimuli. Likewise, the 30 names were distributed randomly over the 
altogether 30 options with the constraints that all five names within one sequence were of the 
same gender and that neither small nor large probabilities were exclusively associated with 
female or male names, for example, small probabilities: two sets with female names, one with 
male names; large probabilities: two sets with male names, one with female names; and vice 
versa. The variant of these range-gender pairings was randomly selected for each subject. 
Encoding of probabilities. Option-outcome pairs were presented as a fast sequence. 
This presentation format has been used in comparable research (Goldstein & Rothschild, 
2014; Haase et al., 2013) and communicates probabilities in an easily understandable way. A 
large body of research indicates that the encoding of frequencies is a mostly automatic and 
accurate process (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Zacks & Hasher, 2002). However, one goal of this 
experiment was to increase encoding error and thus add noise to the representations. 
Therefore, all five sets within one trial and hence five probabilities were presented within one 
sequence of items. The 100 items in one sequence were presented at random. The name of the 
option and the outcome were presented in two centered grey boxes over a light grey 
background. The boxes measured 20.7 mm high by 86.5 mm wide and were labeled Pharma 
or Street and Event in a medium grey. The font used for the labels as well as for the items was 
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36 point Calibri (Figure 1). The option-outcome pairs flashed in 1300 ms intervals with the 
stimulus remaining visible for 1000 ms and a 300 ms inter-stimulus interval. 
To ensure full encoding of all stimuli and to prevent simple counting of the focal 
event, subjects were instructed to read out loud the first name (omitting the word 
Pharma/Street) and the associated outcome upon appearance, for example, “Maria, Nothing; 
Laura, Nothing, Maria, Headache; Anna, Headache; Nina, Nothing; etc.” We produced 
audio recordings of each subject to check the compliance with this instruction. 
Subjective probability scale format. After encoding one sequence and thus five sets 
of option-outcome pairs, subjects judged the probability of the outcome occurring for each 
option in random order, for example, “What is the probability of experiencing the adverse 
event dizziness with Peter Pharma?” We manipulated the scale format used for subjective 
probability judgments between subjects. 
7-point rating scale. The 7-point rating scale offered verbal labels for each category. 
Those were in ascending order: almost zero, very small, small, moderate, large, very large, 
and almost certain. 
Percent estimate. In the percent estimate condition subjects were asked to fill in the 
statement “The event will occur with a probability of ___%.” 
Perceived severity of outcomes. Following the six trials of probability judgments 
subjects judged the severity of each presented outcome on a visual analog scale (scroll bar) 
with the verbal anchors not severe (score = 0) and very severe (= 100). The scale was 
anchored at the midpoint (= 50) and no numeric feedback was provided. The severity ratings 
served as a check for the domain manipulation and as control variable for the probability 
judgments. 
Subjective numeracy. Subjects also completed the Subjective Numeracy Scale that 
measures self-assessed ability to perform mathematical operations with proportions and 
preferences for numerical or verbal likelihood information (Fagerlin et al., 2007; German 
translation by Keller, Siegrist, & Visschers, 2009). It consists of eight six-point rating scale 
items, for example, “How good are you at working with percentages?” Mean subjective 
numeracy was 4.20 (SD = 0.77) and did not differ across conditions, Fs ≤ 1.98, ps ≥ .163. 
Since we found no relation between subjective numeracy and any of the dependent variables, 
we omit this variable from all further analyses. 
Data analysis. We wanted to ensure that all judgments were based on identical 
information and thus excluded all subjects who did not read out loud the stimuli during 
encoding or whose reading could not be confirmed due to technical problems. Next we 
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checked for outliers at the trial level. We excluded a trial if the subject’s five respective 
judgments were on average more than three median absolute deviations (MAD) above the 
respective median. The MAD is a robust measure of dispersion, not impacted itself by outliers 
and sample size and has been recommended for detecting outliers. The criterion of three 
MADs is considered conservative (Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard, & Licata, 2013). 
Subjects completed three trials under identical conditions and we aggregated at the 
individual level first and then performed parametric testing with these individual mean scores. 
We assessed scale sensitivity as the Pearson correlation between objective and subjective 
probabilities at the level of the individual as well as based on aggregate scores. Note that 
correlation coefficients based on means can differ drastically from those based on raw scores 
(Nickerson, 1995). Thus, to compute individual sensitivity we calculated the correlation for 
each trial and averaged these three coefficients to form the individual score. Correspondingly, 
to calculate the aggregate sensitivity we used all judgments, that is, three per subject, rather 
than the individual mean judgments. We applied Fisher’s r-to-z transformation3 to average 
correlations, to calculate means and confidence intervals, and to test for differences (Gorsuch 
& Lehmann, 2010). In the rare instances of a perfect correlation we recoded the sensitivity 
score to 0.9999. We report mean sensitivity scores transformed back to r.4 
We reasoned that the high resolution of the percent format might lead to greater 
variability and thus more noise in the judgments resulting in reduced sensitivity. We tested 
this assumption with the coefficient of variation (CV). The CV is the standard deviation 
normalized by the mean and thus represents a dimensionless measure of variability that allows 
for the comparison between different scale formats. CVs were also calculated using all 
judgments rather than individual means. 
Finally, we compared the two respective judgments of the common stimulus with 
dependent t-tests based on the individual means. 
Results 
There were no outliers in this experiment. Figure 2 presents mean subjective 
probability judgments as a function of presented probabilities for both scale formats, both  
                                                          
3 z = 0.5log
e
[
(1 + r)
(1 − r)
]. 
4 r = (e2z − 1)
(e2z + 1)
 . 
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Figure 2. Mean subjective probability judgments as a function of presented probabilities (A: n = 21, B: n = 25, C: n = 19, D: n = 22). Solid lines represent the best linear fit. Correlation coefficients indicate scale sensitivity at the aggregate score level. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs.5 ***p < .001.   
 
judgment domains, and both probability ranges. Visual inspection reveals strong regression 
toward the mean in all conditions (see also the analysis of scale sensitivity below). Note that 
for the rating scale the dashed identity line serves only to illustrate the relation between the 
category range and the full probability continuum. For slopes of 1, two even steeper identity 
lines, one for each judgment context, would be necessary. 
                                                          
5 To calculate within-subjects CIs we applied the method suggested by Cousineau (2005) with the corrections suggested by Morey (2008) and Baguley (2012). CIs are based on participant-mean centered scores and calibrated so that nonoverlapping CIs correspond to a confidence of the difference between the two related means that does not include zero. 
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Perceived severity of outcomes. Severity ratings were sufficiently consistent within 
domain conditions and thus averaged to form one severity score, adverse drug reaction 
Cronbach’s alpha = .78; crime = .84. We conducted a 2 (scale format: 7-point rating scale vs. 
percent estimate) × 2 (domain: adverse drug reaction vs. crime) ANOVA with perceived 
severity as dependent variable as a check of the domain manipulation. The outcomes in the 
crime condition were judged to be more severe, M = 75.40, SD = 14.52, than the adverse 
reactions, M = 62.83, SD = 18.15; F(1, 83) = 13.91, p < .001, η
P
2  = .14. However, we also 
found a small main effect of the scale format on the severity ratings indicating that subjects in 
the percent conditions perceived the outcomes to be slightly more severe, M = 73.50, 
SD = 16.30, than those who provided judgments on the rating scale, M = 66.16, SD = 17.74; 
F(1, 83) = 4.34, p = .040, η
P
2  = .05. The interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
One goal of this experiment was to establish that in our paradigm subjects used the 
two scale formats solely as measures of beliefs in objective probabilities, that is, 
independently of the respective outcomes. As the main effect of the scale format on perceived 
severity, though small, might suggest a relation, we calculated correlations between perceived 
severity and probability judgments. We found no discernible pattern and, out of altogether 40 
pairings (10 judgments per condition and four conditions), only three significant (one-sided) 
positive correlations between small range percent estimates and perceived severity of drug 
adverse reactions: r10% = .56, p = .006; r30% = .47, p = .021; r50% = .45, p = .027. 
Subjective probability as a function of the content domain. If the subjects used the 
two scale formats only to express beliefs in objective probabilities, then their judgments 
should not vary as a function of the judgment domain. In order to test this assumption, we 
conducted two mixed design ANOVAs—one for each scale format—with the domain as 
between-subjects factor and the ten objective probabilities as within-subjects factor. In both 
cases Mauchly’s test indicated a violation of the assumption of sphericity, percent: 
χ²(44) = 145.60, p < .001; 7-point: χ²(44) = 74.04, p = .003. Therefore, we report Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected tests, percent: ε = .40; 7-point: ε = .74. 
For the percent estimates we found a significant effect of the different probabilities 
indicating, of course, only that higher presented probabilities were judged to be higher, 
F(3.62, 141.25) = 38.43, p < .001, η
P
2  = .50. Crucially, there was neither a main effect of the 
domain on the subjective probability judgments nor an interaction, Fs < 1. 
For the 7-point rating scale we found the same effect of presented probabilities on 
subjective probability judgments, F(6.65, 292.50) = 37.00, p < .001, η
P
2  = .46. However, we 
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also found a small, though not significant, main effect of the domain, F(1, 44) = 2.29, 
p = .137, η
P
2  = .05, and a small significant interaction effect, F(6.65, 292.50) = 2.49, p = .019, 
η
P
2  = .05. In order to understand these mixed results we calculated independent t-tests for each 
level of objective probability.6 Two probabilities in the low range were judged to be 
significantly higher and one probability in the high range was judged to be significantly lower 
when they referred to crimes as compared to drug adverse reactions, t(44)30% = 2.64, p = .011, 
r = .37; t(44)40% = 2.27, p = .028, r = .32; t(44)60% = −2.70, p = .010, r = .38. Thus, there was 
generally no systematic effect of the judgment domain on subjective probability ratings. 
Sensitivity. The sensitivity of a scale quantifies the extent to which subjective 
probability ratings monotonically follow the objective probabilities. For the analysis at the 
individual score level we recoded perfect sensitivity in one out of 505 (0.20%) cases. 
Figure 3 presents mean sensitivity. All scores (range = .42–.58) were markedly lower 
than in the study by Haase et al. (2013) reflecting the higher error in encoding conditions. A 
mixed-design ANOVA with sensitivity as dependent variable indicated no main effects of  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Sensitivity at the individual score level of both scale formats for both ranges of probabilities and in both judgment domains. Error bars = 95% CIs. CIs were calculated by 
transforming Fisher’s z-values back to r and are therefore asymmetrical. 
                                                          
6 As we are essentially testing for the null hypothesis we refrain from a Bonferroni correction of significance levels. 
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content domain, scale format, or probability range, all Fs ≤ 1.09, all ps ≥ .301. The apparent 
interaction between range and content domain indicating an effect of the probability range in 
the adverse drug reaction condition but not the crime condition was not significant, 
F(1, 82) = 2.97, p = .089, η
P
2  = .04, nor were the other interaction terms, Fs < 1. 
At the aggregate level, scale sensitivity was lower than at the individual level 
(range = .24–.39, Figure 2). To test for differences between conditions we employed a test of 
heterogeneity described by Fleiss (1993), using SPSS syntax provided by Weaver and 
Wuensch (2013). When the null hypothesis is true, that is, when all correlations are 
equivalent, the test statistic Q has an approximate chi-square distribution with df = k – 1 
where k denotes the number of independent correlations.7 Although correlation coefficients 
were generally higher for the 7-point rating scale, the differences in aggregate sensitivity as a 
function of the scale format or of the domain were not significant in either probability range, 
low: Q = 5.08, df = 3, p = .166; high: Q = 3.16, df = 3, p = .367. 
For the within-subjects comparisons between probability ranges we employed a t-test 
developed by Williams (1959) for two dependent correlations with one common variable, that 
is, r12 vs. r13.8 The test statistic follows approximately a t-distribution with df = n – 3.9 
Aggregate sensitivity did not differ between probability ranges in any of the between-subjects 
conditions, all ts ≤ |1.34|, all ps ≥ .180. 
                                                          
7 Q = ∑ Wi(zi − z)2ki=1  where k denotes the number of independent correlations, zi is the 
Fisher’s r-to-z transformed value of the ith correlation, Wi is the reciprocal of its variance, that 
is, ni − 3, and z is a weighted average of the k correlations: z = ∑ Wizi
∑ Wi
 . 
8 Strictly speaking, our test has the structure r12 vs. r34 because we are comparing the correlation between low presented probabilities and low range probability judgments with that between high presented probabilities and high range judgments. However, as the two presented ranges, that is, 10%–50% in 10% increments and 50%–90% in 10% increments, are equivalent in this context we can use the t-test by Williams rather than a less parsimonious test such as the ZPF test statistic by Steiger (1980) for two dependent nonoverlapping correlations. 
9 t(n − 3) = (r12 − r13)√ (n − 1)(1 + r23)
2(
n − 1
n − 3
)|R| + 
(r12 + r13)
2
4
(1 − r23)3
 
 where |R|=1 − r122  − r132  − r232  + 2r12r13r23. 
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Figure 4. Coefficients of variation as variability profiles over all probability judgments for all between-subjects conditions.  
 
Error in judgments. We expected percent estimates to show a higher variation 
relative to the judgments on the 7-point rating scale. To compare the relative variation 
between scale formats we calculated the coefficient of variation (CV) for every judgment in 
every condition.10 Figure 4 presents CVs for each condition in the form of variability profiles, 
that is, an array of CVs from the same sample is depicted as a line over a meaningful order of 
measurements, in this case ascending presented probabilities. 
To our knowledge there exists neither a multivariate test to compare variability 
profiles with each other (taking the dependence of CVs into account) nor to test multiple CVs 
against each other in one procedure. As a proxy we calculated the mean CV for each between-
subjects condition across all judgments and compared these by conducting single comparisons 
using the t-test for independent CVs11 by Sokal and Braumann (1980). Mean CVs for 
                                                          
10 We applied the following correction to the calculation of the CV as suggested by Sokal and 
Braumann (1980): (1 + 1
4n
)
s
x̅
. This correction only makes an appreciable difference when 
samples are very small and affected our data only in the third decimal. We applied it nonetheless because the tests we calculated to compare CVs were designed and evaluated for thusly corrected CVs. 
11 t = CV1 − CV2
√sCV1
2 + sCV2
2
 with df = n1 + n2 – 2 where sCV = √CV 22n ( nn − 1  + 2CV 2) (1 + 14n)
2. 
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judgments on the 7-point rating scale were: adverse drug reaction = 0.315; crime = 0.311; and 
for percent estimates: adverse drug reaction = 0.502; crime = 0.543. Judgments did not differ 
in variation between content domains on either scale format, ts < |1|. Comparisons between 
scale formats within and across domains, and assuming a Bonferroni corrected significance 
criterion of .008, on the other hand, revealed in line with our hypothesis a significantly higher 
variation in percent estimates as compared to judgments on the rating scale, ts ≥ |2.83|. 
ps ≤ .004, rs between .25 and .29. 
Common stimulus. Subjects encoded an objective probability of 50% in both 
probability ranges. Judgments of this common stimulus allow for a direct test of context 
effects. We expected the common stimulus to receive higher judgments on the rating scale in 
the low-range context than in the high-range context but percent estimates to be consistent 
across contexts. As the points and CIs in Figure 2 overlap, Figure 5 presents only the 
judgments of the common stimulus separate for both contexts. 
Percent estimates were consistent across ranges, ts < 1, ps ≥ .378. For the 7-point 
rating scale we found the expected relation between scores only in the crime domain, 
t(24) = 2.65, p = .014, r = .48. Ratings of adverse reactions showed the expected trend but did 
not differ significantly, t < 1, p = .494. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Subjective probability judgments of 50% probabilities in their respective range context for each between-subjects condition. The dotted line represents the scale’s respective midpoint. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs. 
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Discussion 
We observed no systematic relation between subjective probability judgments and the 
content domain or the perceived severity of outcomes. Thus, we conclude that subjects used 
both scale formats to express beliefs in objective probabilities (i.e., to estimate rather than to 
evaluate) and that differences between formats are caused directly by overt characteristics of 
the scales rather than by the elicitation of different concepts. 
In line with our expectations, scale sensitivity was generally reduced and did not differ 
between formats at the individual or the aggregate score level. For the latter we observed 
generally lower scores for the percent format but differences were not significant. Given our 
relatively small sample size, however, the test for differences (an extension of the common 
z-test) was likely underpowered (Kenny, 1987). The high error in the sampling of event 
frequencies had a stronger effect on percent estimates than on category ratings as indicated by 
significantly higher relative variation in the former as compared to the latter. However, 
beyond these scale-specific factors, sensitivity was generally reduced by an inability to clearly 
differentiate five levels of probability with either format (e.g., overlapping CIs in Figure 2). 
Percent estimates were consistent across judgment contexts, that is, irrespective of the 
stimulus distribution, objective probabilities were mapped in the same way onto the judgment 
categories (i.e., integers). Results regarding the rating scale, however, were mixed. While 
subjects in the adverse drug reactions condition produced two similar judgment functions, 
subjects in the crime condition clearly used the rating scale incoherently and judged the 
common stimulus differently across contexts. It is unlikely that this discrepancy is a 
systematic effect of the content domain as judgments were otherwise not systematically 
affected by it. Moreover, if subjects did not try to express five distinct probabilities, users of 
the rating scale were not faced with the above described conflict between probability mapping 
and stimulus discrimination anyway. 
We believe that this discrepancy is the result of the generally large error in 
representations and reveals a certain amount of arbitrariness in the positioning of judgments 
along the category range. Keep in mind that subjects encoded all five probabilities and thus a 
representation of the context, that is, the general range of stimuli, before providing their 
judgments. Additionally, note that judgments on the rating scale seem to be loosely anchored 
around the scale midpoint whereas the linear judgment functions of the percent estimates 
cross the identity line at around 30%. The latter might be explained by the mental 
representation of integers, which we return to in the general discussion. The former, however, 
might indicate that subjects did not place their judgments in relation to the scale’s endpoints, 
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that is, to a coherent mapping of the probability continuum on to the category range, but 
rather in relation to the scale’s midpoint (Marsh & Parducci, 1978; Marsh, 1983). However, 
unreliable representations of context, that is, of the range of presented probabilities in relation 
to 50%, together with the inherent vagueness of the rating scale’s categories allowed for some 
fluctuation around the midpoint resulting in apparent context effects in one condition but not 
in the other. Thus, in Experiment 2 we investigated whether an anchor in the sample of events 
can fasten category ratings to the midpoint. 
Experiment 2 
The probability continuum has two clearly defined bounds at 0 and 100%. Assuming 
sampling error, subjective probability estimates might deviate from objective probabilities in 
the positive as well as the negative direction. However, the more extreme an objective 
probability is, the less symmetric this deviation will be. For instance, the estimate of an 
objective probability of 10% can only deviate by 10% into the negative but by 90% into the 
positive. Thus, even if we assume that the sampling error is symmetric (as most error-models 
do) these bounds will lead to asymmetric error near the endpoints of the probability 
continuum and increase regression toward the mean. Likewise, if we introduce an anchor 
indicating that all probabilities in a given trial are below or above a certain reference point, we 
would expect to constrain the possible range of estimates and to observe judgments that are 
regressed in relation to this bound (Hollands & Dyre, 2000). 
In Experiment 1 we observed that judgments on the rating scale appeared to be 
anchored roughly around the midpoint. We assumed that subjects used the midpoint as a 
reference to position their five respective judgments within one context and that due to 
imprecise representations of said context these five judgments fluctuated around this reference 
point. Thus, in this experiment we introduced an anchor into the encoding of the likelihood 
information indicating whether the presented probabilities were equal to and above or equal to 
and below 50%. We expected percent estimates to be regressed within context, that is, with 
relation to this new bound resulting in a step-like pattern of judgments across contexts with 
the 50% in the low range to be estimated as lower than the same probability in the high range. 
If judgments on the rating scale are anchored at the midpoint, however, then the common 
stimulus of 50% should receive the same rating across contexts. In addition to probability 
judgments we collected judgments of the absolute frequency of the target events. These 
judgments served as a standard of comparison for judgments of the common stimulus. We 
expected to find the same pattern of within-context regression as for the percent estimates 
irrespective of the used scale format. Besides this manipulation we aimed to make the 
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paradigm as similar to Experiment 1 as possible and our expectations regarding scale 
sensitivity were unchanged. 
Method 
The experiment implemented a 2 (scale format: 7-point rating scale vs. percent 
estimate) × 2 (encoding mode: anchor vs. no anchor) between-subjects design with one 
within-subjects factor (low range of probabilities vs. high range). 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 with the exception that after 
encoding the likelihood information subjects first judged the absolute frequency of all target 
events in random order and immediately afterwards their respective probabilities. Also, we 
collected different additional measures as explained below.  
Subjects. A total of 116 students at a German university took part in this lab-based 
study, either for a payment of €3 (approximately US$3.75) or for course credit. Eleven 
subjects had to be excluded because they did not read out loud the stimuli during encoding 
(n = 7) or because their reading could not be confirmed due to technical difficulties with the 
recording equipment (n = 4). Thus, the final sample included N = 105 subjects, 82 (78.1%) of 
whom were female, with ns for individual analyses ranging from 25 to 28. Mean age was 
22.55 years (SD = 3.15) and mean grade in the Abitur exam was 2.09 (SD = 0.47). Subjects 
were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions. 
Encoding of probabilities. The event frequencies in Experiment 1 were presented in 
what could be called a purely sequential manner, that is, each option-outcome pair appeared 
for 1000 ms and disappeared afterwards. In order to provide an anchor, we introduced a 
minimum of aggregate information while otherwise keeping the presentation identical. Thus, 
the no anchor condition was identical to Experiment 1 while in the anchor condition the items 
of a sequence were listed row-wise on the screen and remained visible until the end of the 
sequence. Each item was presented in a frame with two labeled boxes as in the sequential 
encoding condition. The frame measured 11.3 mm by 59 mm and each box 5.3 mm by 37.7 
mm (Figure 6). The items were presented at the same speed as in the no anchor condition with 
a new frame appearing every 1300 ms. Thus, the encoding process was virtually identical in 
both conditions with the exception that the anchored presentation allowed for extracting one 
additional piece of information, namely whether the target event (e.g., Headache) appeared in 
the majority or minority of cases. 
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Figure 6. Presentation of stimuli in the encoding conditions with an anchor (and high error) in Experiment 2 and 3. Original materials were in German.  
 
Frequency judgments. Subjects judged the absolute frequency of the adverse 
reaction for each medication in random order, for example, “How often did the adverse event 
dizziness occur with Peter Pharma?” Participants filled in the statement “The adverse event 
occurred ___ times.” 
Verbal-numeric scale mapping. After the six trials subjects were asked to assign 
numeric percent values to the verbal labels of the 7-point rating scale. The labels were 
presented in random order and participants could either assign a point value or an interval of 
values along the percent array of 0–100, for example, “The term ‘very small’ corresponds to a 
probability of ___% to ___%.” For point values subjects only filled in the left blank. We 
address the results of this task after reporting the experiments. 
Numeracy. In Experiment 1 we observed no relation between subjective numeracy 
and any of the dependent variables. As subjective and objective numeracy appear to be related 
but not identical (Peters & Bjalkebring, 2014), in this experiment subjects completed a 
combination of the 3-item numeracy scale by Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, and Welch (1997) 
and the Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012). 
The altogether seven items are comprised of actual mathematical quizzes, for example, 
“Imagine we are throwing a five-sided die 50 times. On average, out of these 50 throws how 
many times would this five-sided die show an odd number (1, 3 or 5)?” The sum score of all 
correct answers (possible range: 0–7) constitutes the numeracy score. 
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Mean numeracy was 3.40 (SD = 1.27) and did not differ across conditions, Fs < 1. 
Again, we found no relation between numeracy and any of the dependent variables and thus 
omit this variable from all further analyses. 
Results 
There were no outliers in the probability judgments. Figure 7 presents mean subjective 
probability judgments. Visual inspection reveals generally similar judgment functions to those 
in Experiment 1. Judgments on the rating scale were consistent across contexts and anchored 
at the scale’s midpoint whereas percent estimates only followed the same function when no 
anchor was provided. In the anchor condition estimates were regressed within context 
resulting in two different judgment functions. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean subjective probability judgments as a function of presented probabilities (A: n = 28, B: n = 25, C: n = 27, D: n = 25). Solid lines represent the best linear fit. Correlation coefficients indicate scale sensitivity at the aggregate score level. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs. **p < .005. ***p < .001.  
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Figure 8. Sensitivity at the individual score level of both scale formats for both ranges of probabilities and both encoding conditions. Error bars = 95% CIs.  
 
Sensitivity. We recoded perfect sensitivity in one out of 600 (0.17%) correlations. 
Figure 8 presents mean sensitivity. The scores (range = .34–.54) were comparable to 
Experiment 1. A mixed-design ANOVA indicated no effects of scale format, encoding mode, 
or probability range, all Fs ≤ 1.90, all ps ≥ .172. 
Likewise at the aggregate score level, sensitivity did not differ as a function of 
encoding mode or scale format for either range of probabilities, low: Q = 3.68, df = 3, 
p = .299; high: Q = 2.85, df = 3, p = .415, but note that aggregate sensitivity was again 
consistently lower for percent estimates when compared to the rating scale. Comparisons 
between ranges revealed that percent estimates in the no anchor condition were slightly less 
sensitive to high as compared to low probabilities, t(402) = 2.37, p = .018, r = .12. In all other 
conditions sensitivity did not vary as a function of the probability range, all ts ≤ 1.25, all 
ps ≥ .212. 
Error in judgments. The pattern of variation was consistent with Experiment 1 
(Figure 9). Mean CVs for judgments on the rating scale were: no anchor = .298; anchor = 
.316; and for percent estimates: no anchor = .584; anchor = .560. CVs did not differ within 
scale format, that is, between the conditions with and without an anchor, both ts < 1, but all 
four differences between scale formats (within and across anchor conditions) were significant 
at a Bonferroni corrected criterion of .008, all ts ≥ |3.74|, all ps < .001, all rs ≥ .29. 
150 Error and Anchor Effects in Probability Judgments 
 
Figure 9. Coefficients of variation as variability profiles over all probability judgments for all between-subjects conditions.  
 
Common stimulus. Probability judgments of the common stimulus are shown in the 
upper half of Figure 10. In line with our expectations, an anchor led to percent estimates that 
were significantly smaller in the low probability range than in the high range, t(24) = −3.30, 
p = .003, r = .54 while estimates were consistent across contexts when no anchor had been 
provided, t < |1|. Judgments on the 7-point rating scale, on the other hand did not differ across 
contexts irrespective of an anchor, ts < |1|. Additionally, none of the ratings differed 
significantly from the scale’s midpoint value of 4, ts < 1.99, ps ≥ .058. 
Frequency judgments. We excluded 22 out of the total of 630 trials (3.49%) as 
outliers and analyzed frequency judgments analogously to the probability judgments. 
Appendix B presents scatter plots and the detailed analyses regarding the sensitivity of and 
relative error in frequency judgments. To sum up the findings, subjects in the anchor 
condition who used the percent format for probability judgments judged frequencies to be 
slightly higher than subjects using the rating scale. Individual sensitivity (range = .31–.49) 
was slightly, though not significantly, lower for higher frequencies and did not differ as a 
function of the scale format or encoding mode. Aggregate score sensitivity (range = .16–.25) 
was similar to percent estimates and lower than for judgments on the rating scale but also did 
not differ between conditions or the stimulus ranges. More noteworthy, though, CVs 
(range = 0.545–0.636) were very close to those of the percent estimates and did not differ 
irrespective of condition. 
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Figure 10. Judgments of the common stimulus. White bars = low range, grey bars = high range. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs. A: Presented probability = 50%. The dotted line 
represents the scale’s respective midpoint. B: Presented frequency = 10 (dotted line).   
 
The lower half of Figure 10 presents frequency judgments of the common stimulus. 
When an anchor had been provided, frequency estimates of the common stimulus were 
significantly lower in the low frequency range than in the high range, irrespective of the 
format used for probability estimates, 7-Point: t(24) = −3.18, p = .004, r = .54; percent: 
t(24) = −4.41, p < .001, r = .67. Without an anchor, frequency estimates were consistent 
across ranges when subjects provided percent estimates, t < |1|, but showed the same within-
context regression when subjects had used the rating scale, t(27) = −2.90, p = .007, r = .49. 
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Discussion 
The results regarding probability judgments were in line with our expectations. Scale 
sensitivity at the individual and the aggregate score level did not differ between scale formats. 
CVs showed that, again, the error in representations had a stronger effect on the percent 
format than on the rating scale. Crucially, none of these variables differed between encoding 
conditions, which indicates that the presentation modes were equivalent in terms of error.  
 Introducing an anchor, by retaining a minimum of aggregate information in the event 
sample, had the expected effects on both formats. Percent estimates were regressed relative to 
this bound which led to two different judgment functions across contexts and significantly 
different estimates of the common stimulus. Judgments on the rating scale, on the other hand, 
were anchored to the scale’s midpoint resulting in consistent ratings of the common stimulus 
across contexts. As the probability judgments are based on representations of frequency, a 
comparison of the former with estimates of the latter will help to interpret these findings. 
In the anchor condition frequency judgments were regressed within-context 
irrespective of the format used for probability judgments. The resulting two different 
judgment functions (Figure C1) as well as the differences between estimates of the common 
stimulus (Figure 10) resembled closely the pattern of corresponding percent estimates. 
Judgments on the rating scale, on the other hand, did not follow frequency estimates. 
For the condition without an anchor we had expected consistent judgment functions 
for frequency estimates as well as for probability judgments (possibly with some of the 
previously observed fluctuations on the rating scale). In the percent condition we found the 
predicted distributions and a close match between frequency and percent estimates. Subjects 
who used the rating scale, however, produced frequency estimates that were also strongly 
regressed within-context. While this pattern, again, was not reflected in the corresponding 
probability ratings, it is nonetheless surprising and hard to explain. 
Despite this discrepancy, we believe that these results indicate that a rating scale may 
deliver results that appear to be normatively consistent but fail to map the actual imprecision 
in the representations that underlie subjective probability judgments. The error-related 
dependent variables lend further support to this interpretation. The aggregate sensitivity 
scores as well as the CVs of all frequency estimates were very similar to those found for the 
percent estimates but differed markedly from those of the rating scale. Thus, in Experiment 3 
we manipulated the error in encoding to investigate this further. 
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Experiment 3 
In the previous two experiments subjects sampled event frequencies under extremely 
error-prone conditions and were generally not able to differentiate the five respective 
probabilities presented within one context. As a consequence, we were not able to observe the 
conflict between stimulus discrimination and probability mapping on the rating scale as 
described in the introduction. Instead we found that subjects anchored their ratings to the 
scale’s midpoint, which led to judgment distributions that were inconsistent with 
corresponding frequency estimates. This led us to conclude that the rating scale does not 
reflect the error in the underlying representations which, in contrast, was clearly captured by 
the percent format. 
Thus, in this experiment we manipulated the error in encoding while retaining the 
anchor in the stimulus material. We expected that more precise representations would increase 
the sensitivity of both scale formats and possibly render the percent format more sensitive. 
Depending on the actual amount of reduction in error we expected percent estimates to still be 
regressed within-context but to a lesser degree resulting in judgments of the common stimulus 
to be closer to each other. Regarding the rating scale, we were interested to find out whether 
less error would result in two distinct judgment functions based on discriminating the stimuli 
within-context or whether judgments would still be anchored to the midpoint. 
Method 
The experiment implemented a 2 (scale format: 7-point rating scale vs. percent 
estimate) × 2 (encoding mode: high error vs. low error) between-subjects design with one 
within-subjects factor (low range of probabilities vs. high range). 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to Experiment 2 with the exception that we 
employed a different numeracy measure.  
Subjects. A total of 105 students at a German university took part in this lab-based 
study, either for a payment of €3 (approximately US$3.75) or for course credit. Thirteen 
subjects had to be excluded: Nine did not read out loud the stimuli during encoding, for three 
subjects the reading could not be confirmed due to technical difficulties with the recording 
equipment, and one subject counted. Thus, the final sample included N = 92 subjects, 71 
(77.2%) of whom were female, with ns for individual analyses ranging from 21 to 25. Mean 
age was 21.64 years (SD = 2.75) and mean grade in the Abitur exam was 2.18 (SD = 0.55). 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the four between-subjects conditions. 
154 Error and Anchor Effects in Probability Judgments 
 
Figure 11. Presentation of one probability in the low-error encoding condition (with an anchor). Original materials were in German.  
 
Encoding of probabilities. The high-error encoding condition was identical to the 
anchor condition in Experiment 2. For the low-error condition we wanted to facilitate the 
discrimination between probabilities while retaining the anchor. Thus, we presented the five 
probabilities within one trial separately and in ascending order while we kept the list-wise 
presentation format (Figure 11). Subjects still encoded all five probabilities before making 
their judgments. 
Numeracy. Since we observed no systematic effects of numeracy in Experiments 1 
and 2, in this experiment we employed for economic reasons the single-item version of the 
Berlin Numeracy Test recommended for educated samples (Cokely et al., 2012). The single-
item numeracy test classified 35.9% of the sample (n = 33) as highly numerate. Numeracy did 
not differ between conditions, χ2(3) = 6.21, p = .102.  
We only found one significant effect of numeracy. Highly numerate subjects using the 
rating scale were more sensitive to high probabilities in the low-error condition, t(22) = −2.53, 
p = .019, r = .47. Thus, again we omit numeracy from all further analyses. 
Results 
We excluded 9 out of the total of 552 trials (1.63%) as outliers. Figure 12 presents 
mean subjective probability judgments. Visual inspection reveals much steeper judgment 
functions in the low-error condition on both scale formats. Irrespective of error, percent 
estimates showed the expected within-context regression. Judgments on the rating scale,  
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Figure 12. Mean subjective probability judgments as a function of presented probabilities (A: n = 22, B: n = 24, C: n = 21, D: n = 25). Solid lines represent the best linear fit. Correlation coefficients indicate scale sensitivity at the aggregate score level. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs. *p < .05. **p < .005. ***p < .001.   
 
again, appeared to be anchored around the scale’s midpoint, though the relation of the two 
respective common stimulus judgments was reversed as a function of encoding error. 
Sensitivity. We recoded perfect sensitivity in five out of 526 (0.95%) correlations. 
Figure 13 presents mean sensitivity. The scores in the high-error condition (range = .31–.54) 
were comparable to Experiment 2, though percent estimates were a little less sensitive. The 
scores in the low-error condition (range = .71–.88) were, as expected, much higher. 
Accordingly, a mixed-design ANOVA found a large effect of the encoding condition on 
individual sensitivity, F(1, 86) = 41.63, p < .001, η
P
2  = .33. Additionally, subjects were a little 
less sensitive to high probabilities, F(1, 86) = 4.35, p = .040, η
P
2  = .05. This effect was more 
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pronounced in the low-error condition, interaction: F(1, 86) = 2.90, p = .092, η
P
2  = .03. There 
was no main effect of the scale format on individual sensitivity, F < 1. However, a significant 
interaction indicated that in the high-error condition percent estimates were less sensitive than 
judgments on the rating scale while the opposite was the case in the low-error condition, 
F(1, 86) = 3.97, p = .049, η
P
2  = .04. 
We observed the same pattern of results at the aggregate score level. The omnibus 
Q-test found significant differences between aggregate sensitivities for both ranges, low: 
Q = 50.39, df = 3, p < .001; high: Q = 61.47, df = 3, p < .001. Single comparisons using 
Fisher’s z-test revealed that aggregate sensitivity was significantly higher in the low-error 
condition within as well as across scale formats, low range: zs ≥ |3.57|, ps < .001; high: 
zs ≥ |3.90|, ps < .001. Additionally, like on the individual level, when the error was high, 
percent estimates were less sensitive than judgments on the rating scale, low range: z = 1.92, 
p = .055; high: z = 2.20, p = .028. However, assuming a Bonferroni corrected significance 
criterion of .008, neither effect would be qualified as significant. It is further noteworthy that 
in the low-error condition, aggregate sensitivity was virtually identical for both scale formats, 
zs < 1. Aggregate sensitivity did not differ between ranges of probabilities, ts ≤ |1.03|, 
ps ≥ .307. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Sensitivity at the individual score level of both scale formats for both ranges of probabilities and both encoding conditions. Error bars = 95% CIs.  
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Figure 14. Coefficients of variation as variability profiles over all probability judgments for all between-subjects conditions. *The disconnected profile sections are based on data from Haase et al. (2013). The semi-transparent connection between the two 50% judgments indicates that the estimates of higher probabilities formed one context. Subjects in that study judged 50% only once.  
 
Error in judgments. Mean CVs for judgments on the rating scale were: high-
error = 0.322, low = 0.271; and for percent estimates: high-error = 0.589, low = 0.332 
(Figure 14). 
Remarkably, the manipulation of encoding error only affected percent estimates 
significantly, t(136) = 3.42, p = .001. r = .28 while the variation of judgments on the rating 
scale did not differ between encoding conditions, t(136) = 1.29, p = .199, r = .11. High-error 
percent estimates also showed more variation than the rating scale, ts ≥ |3.53, ps ≤ .001, 
rs ≥ .30 while low error estimates did not differ from it, ts ≤ |1.57|, ps ≥ .119 
Common stimulus. The upper half of Figure 15 presents probability judgments of the 
common stimulus. In both encoding conditions percent estimates of the common stimulus 
were significantly lower in the low probability range than in the high range, high-error: 
t(20) = −3.61, p = .002, r = .63; low: t(24) = −4.56, p < .001, r = .68. Judgments on the rating 
scale, again, did not differ significantly between probability ranges. However, it is noteworthy 
that the trend in the score difference was reversed between encoding conditions, high-error: 
t(21) = −1.34, p = .195. r = .28; low: t(23) = 1.44, p = .16. r = .29. 
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Figure 15. Judgments of the common stimulus. White bars = low range, grey bars = high range. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs. A: Presented probability = 50%. The dotted line 
represents the scale’s respective midpoint. B: Presented frequency = 10 (dotted line).  
 
Frequency judgments. We excluded 16 out of the total of 552 trials (2.90%) as 
outliers. Appendix C presents scatter plots and the detailed analyses regarding the sensitivity 
of and relative error in frequency estimates. In the high-error condition (like in the identical 
anchor condition in Experiment 2), subjects who used the percent format estimated 
frequencies to be higher than those using the rating scale while in the low-error conditions, 
frequency estimates did not differ as a function of the probability judgment format. 
Individual sensitivity was significantly higher when encoding error was low 
(range = .83–.91) as compared to when it was high (range = .33–.56). It was generally lower 
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for higher frequencies but did not differ as a function of the scale format. At the aggregate 
level we found mostly the same pattern of results, though sensitivity was generally lower 
(high-error range = .12–.38, low-error range = .34–.67). CVs were higher when the error was 
high and did not differ between scale formats (7-point, high-error = 0.483, low = 0.383; 
percent, high-error = 0.548, low = 0.332). 
The lower half of Figure 15 presents frequency estimates of the common stimulus. In 
all four conditions, estimates were significantly lower in the low range as compared to the 
high range. This effect was only slightly larger in the high-error encoding condition, 7-point: 
t(21) = −3.91, p = .001, r = .65; percent: t(20) = −4.15, p < .001, r = .68, as compared to low-
error encoding, 7-point: t(23) = −2.37, p = .027, r = .44; percent: t(24) = −2.89, p = .008, 
r = .51. 
Discussion 
The reduction of random error in the event sampling process led to the expected 
increase of scale sensitivity at the individual as well as the aggregate score level in both 
formats. There were additional noteworthy trends in the data. Like in the previous 
experiments, when the encoding error was extremely high, percent estimates tended to be less 
sensitive than judgments on the rating scale (especially at the aggregate level). When the error 
was significantly lower, on the other hand, this trend tended to be reversed. Furthermore, with 
less error, there were some indications of a range effect which is in line with the findings in 
Haase et al. (2013). High range probability judgments as well as frequency estimates tended 
to be less sensitive as it is harder to track many instances of the focal event than just few. For 
this effect to be visible, however, we believe that a certain level of precision in representations 
is necessary. In all other conditions it was drowned out by the generally high level of error. 
With regard to capturing the error in the frequency representations which underlie 
probability judgments, the CVs proved to be very telling. While a reduction of error 
significantly reduced the variability in percent estimates, it had no effect on the CVs of 
judgments on the rating scale. For comparison we included CVs from the study by Haase et al. 
(2013) in Figure 14. These are based on a control condition, in which subjects simply read 
probabilities of an icon array and transferred these into judgments on different scale formats. 
For the percent format, variation and CVs dropped essentially to zero (not shown in the 
figure). Judgments on the rating scale, however, varied almost to the same degree as in the 
present study. Thus, it appears that the variation in rating scale judgments does not, or only to 
a small degree, stem from error in representations but rather from the scale-inherent 
imprecision. 
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This disconnect was again evident in the judgments of the common stimulus. Percent 
estimates were regressed within-context and differed accordingly for the common stimulus in 
both encoding conditions. The difference in actual scores was smaller in the low-error 
condition, though the effect sizes were, due to the higher measurement precision, very similar. 
Crucially, this pattern matched the corresponding frequency estimates very closely. In 
contrast, judgments on the rating scale were again anchored around the scale’s midpoint. 
When the error was high and the five probabilities could not be clearly discriminated, the 
placement of all judgments was presumably only guided by the anchor and thus the difference 
between the common stimulus judgments, though not significant, followed the same trend as 
percent and frequency estimates. However, when discrimination was easier and judgment 
functions accordingly steeper, this trend was reversed and did not match the corresponding 
within-context regressed frequency estimates (which, due to their higher resolution, allow for 
discrimination without violating the anchor; Figure C1). 
We must note one caveat in our interpretation. The frequency estimates served as a 
standard of comparison for the probability judgments and, thus, should have been identical 
irrespective of the scale format. However, in the high-error condition, subjects who used the 
percent format provided higher frequency estimates than subjects who used the rating scale. 
These differences were consistent across stimuli, that is, the judgment functions remained 
parallel (Figure C1) and thus do not impede our conclusions which are based on the relation 
between estimates rather than their absolute value. Nonetheless, they might indicate 
unexpected carry-over effects between probability and frequency estimates that should be 
avoided in future research. 
Additional Analysis: Recoding the 7-Point Rating Scale 
The accuracy of scale formats is typically assessed as deviations in judgments from an 
objective norm, which, of course, requires the compared values to occupy identical value 
arrays. However, transforming scale values to match a predefined range is problematic 
because any transformation of this kind is somewhat arbitrary as any number of different 
transformation functions is conceivable. For instance, in the present context one could simply 
divide the value array of 0–100 into seven equal segments and assign the segments’ midpoints 
to the categories on the rating scale. One could just as well fix the endpoints first at 0 and 100 
and then divide the remaining array in equal segments (e.g., Parducci & Wedell, 1986), which 
would result in drastically different values. Additionally, both these approaches assume that 
subjects interpret category labels to represent equally large sections of the probability 
continuum and to be spread equidistantly along it. Both assumptions have been refuted 
 Error and Anchor Effects in Probability Judgments 161 
(Bocklisch et al., 2010) and, furthermore, research indicates that there are vast interindividual 
differences in the translation of verbal qualifiers into numeric probability expressions (e.g., 
Budescu & Wallsten, 1985). 
In light of these findings, some researchers have suggested to collect individual 
transformation functions in order to translate vague quantifier judgments into numeric 
estimates (Al Baghal, 2014; Bradburn & Miles, 1979). Thus, in Experiments 2 and 3 we 
asked subjects to assign numeric percent values to the verbal labels of the 7-point rating scale 
to find out whether it is at least theoretically viable. Subjects could either provide point 
estimates or an interval of values. In the latter case we used the interval’s midpoint to assign a 
numeric value to the respective category. Figure 16 presents recoded as well as the original 
scale judgments. Note that the right y-axis is scaled to represent the 7-point rating scale. 
For the analysis we pooled the data from both experiments, though separate analyses 
revealed identical results. For the most part, subjects provided intervals (88%). These differed 
significantly in width, F(6, 570) = 22.96, p < .001, η
P
2  = .20. On average, the percent intervals 
assigned to the central categories 3, 4, 5, and 6 were 1.5 times as wide as those assigned to 
categories 2 and 7, and almost 3 times as wide as the interval assigned to the smallest 
category 1. This explains why the recoded judgments in Figure 16 (solid black lines) diverge 
more from the original rating scale judgments (grey lines) in the lower half of all graphs as 
well as at the upper extreme in the low-error panel on the right. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Recoded and original judgments in Experiments 2 and 3 (Rating scale, A: n = 28, B: n = 47, C: n = 24; Percent estimates, A: n = 27, B: n = 46, C: n = 25).  
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A mixed-design ANOVA found that the transformation functions did not differ 
between encoding modes, F < 1. Keep in mind that subjects assigned percent values to rating 
scale categories in a theoretical or idealized sense. This can be understood as the counterpart 
to using the rating scale for actual judgments with perfect knowledge (as explained in the 
introduction). However, all experiments indicated that when representations are perturbed by 
random error, subjects do not use the categories to coherently map the probability continuum 
but follow other principles such as expressing the relation of stimuli to an anchor or for 
ordinal stimulus discrimination. Therefore, when these category ratings are transformed with 
a function that relies on an error-free matching, the resultant percent values will be similarly 
distorted. Accordingly, we found in three separate ANOVAs that the recoded ratings were 
significantly higher than actual percent estimates in all encoding conditions, Fs ≥ 5.96, 
ps ≤ .018, η
P
2s ≥ .10, though in the low-error condition (Figure 16 C) this difference was not 
significant for high range probabilities, F(6.62, 311.16) = 3.17, p = .004, η
P
2  = .06 (Mauchly’s 
test: χ²(44) = 69.33, p = .009; Greenhouse-Geisser ε = .74). Even though percent estimates 
may have been artificially depressed to some degree (discussed below), if one follows the 
logic behind the transformation approach, Figure 16 C, for example, would indicate that 
subjects really judged the common stimulus in the low range to be higher than in the high 
range while actual percent estimates and, more importantly frequency estimates, suggest the 
opposite. 
To sum up, setting aside that it seems at least impractical if not unreasonable to 
employ a verbal rating scale in any applied setting and to additionally ask subjects for a 
translation of that scale, our findings indicate that whenever the judged representations 
contain some error, this approach will likely lead to false conclusions. Only under conditions 
of perfect knowledge can such a transformation lead to reasonable estimates. But under such 
conditions, a low-resolution rating scale will, of course, also entail a loss of sensitivity. Thus, 
we conclude that rating scales cannot be used to measure absolute perceptions of subjective 
probability. 
General Discussion 
In three experiments subjects encoded the same two ranges of objective probabilities 
as sequences of option-outcome pairs and judged subjective probability either on a verbally 
labeled 7-point rating scale or in the form of percent estimates. The two ranges shared one 
common stimulus and were presented within-subjects. We varied the error in encoding as well 
as the presentation format and found that both rather subtle manipulations changed the 
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judgments on both scales markedly and can lead to false conclusions in either case. The main 
reason for this lies in the different ways these scale formats react to random error in the 
representations on which judgments are based. 
In Experiment 1 we established that in this paradigm both scale formats were used to 
express the same construct and observed that under highly error-prone conditions the high 
resolution of the percent format offered no advantage in terms of sensitivity and might even 
lead to a decrease at the aggregate level. Additionally, imprecise representations, rather than 
the stimulus distribution, can result in apparent context effects on the rating scale but are 
unlikely in percent estimates. In Experiment 2 we found that an anchor in the stimuli can 
tether judgments on the rating scale to the scale’s midpoint but in turn result in inconsistent 
judgment functions on the percent format. These could be interpreted as context effects, 
though they are, again, not caused by the stimulus distribution but an expression of regression 
toward the mean. We concluded further that the rating scale may deliver results that appear to 
be normatively consistent but fail to capture the actual imprecision in the representations 
which underlie subjective probability judgments. In Experiment 3 we followed up on this and 
discovered that most of the variation in rating scale judgments stems from the scale-inherent 
imprecision rather than unreliable representations. The results further indicated, though, that 
imprecise information changes the way the rating scale is used while percent estimates remain 
consistent. 
Before we discuss the two scale formats in more detail we should note that the results, 
especially of Experiments 1 and 2, present strong evidence for the hypothesis that event 
frequencies are encoded automatically (Hasher & Zacks, 1984; Zacks & Hasher, 2002). The 
sampling process in those experiments was extremely difficult and resulted in highly 
imprecise estimates. Nonetheless, these estimates captured the relative relations of event 
frequencies and probabilities. Still, this raises the question about the applicability of our 
results, that is, in which research settings can we expect to collect probability or frequency 
judgments that are perturbed by this much noise? Unfortunately, the literature does not 
provide a clear answer as sensitivity is rarely reported or it is based on scores that reduce 
some of the error in the estimates. For instance, Attneave (1953) reports a correlation of .79 
between the frequency of letters in the English language and median direct estimates. 
Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman, and Combs (1978) report in their study of judged 
frequency of lethal events correlations between .82 and .91 that are based on geometric 
means. In the same study, analyses of individual sensitivity (.28–.92) were based on log 
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transformed responses. Notwithstanding this lack of clarity, the main purpose of the high 
error in the present experiments was to elucidate how it affects scale usage. 
The Verbally Labeled 7-Point Rating Scale 
Theoretically, the probability continuum can be mapped on a rating scale with a 
limited number of categories when both arrays share the same endpoints, that is, when the 
extreme categories indicate endpoints (e.g., almost certain) rather than just a relativistic 
increase (e.g., very very likely). Such a mapping necessarily implies that similar probabilities 
share a category. However, Haase et al. (2013) showed that when representations of the 
probabilities are imprecise, subjects using a vague rating scale tend to abandon a consistent 
mapping in favor of ordinal stimulus discrimination. The authors concluded that a rating scale 
therefore does not allow a meaningful quantification of probability judgments and thus no 
between-subjects comparisons. 
In the present study we expanded this notion to within-subjects designs and even more 
error-prone conditions. We observed that when representations are too imprecise to allow for 
ordinal discrimination judgments on the rating scale will be anchored around the scale’s 
midpoint. This finding is consistent with the theoretical framework of fuzzy-trace theory 
(Reyna, 2012) in that it represents a shift from an ordinal to a nominal scale. The probability 
continuum has a clearly defined and meaningful midpoint at 50%. Probabilities above indicate 
that an event will rather happen, those below that it will rather not happen. When 
representations only allow a dichotomous discrimination, anchoring the judgments at the 
midpoint is reasonable and, in a sense, even represents a consistent scale use across context. 
However, as we have shown, it can also lead to the false conclusion that a common stimulus 
from two different judgment contexts was perceived to be equal in magnitude while direct 
estimates of the underlying frequency representations clearly indicated a difference. 
In the third experiment we have shown that different levels of gist representation can 
even have a competing influence on judgments on a rating scale. The nominal discrimination 
pushed the common stimulus toward its respective context while the ordinal discrimination 
pushed in the opposite direction. It would be interesting to see how a removal of the anchor 
from the stimuli would affect judgments in a low-error condition. More importantly, though, 
the manipulation of encoding error revealed that the variation in rating scale judgments does 
not reflect the imprecision in representations. We would therefore argue that, even when used 
for estimation, probability judgments on a rating scale are not actually magnitude estimates 
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but merely a form of categorization.12 More importantly, the rules which guide this 
categorization change as a function of the precision in the underlying representations. 
A likely reason for this is that the vague qualifiers of a verbal scale do not pressure 
subjects into concerns about normative accuracy (Windschitl & Wells, 1996). There is 
evidence that subjects’ preferences for communicating probabilities in a verbal or numerical 
format differs with the precision of the representations that are to be conveyed, which 
supports this reasoning. With increasingly precise knowledge preferences shift from verbal to 
numerical (Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, & Kemp, 1993; Wallsten & Budescu, 1995; Witteman, 
Renooij, & Koele, 2007). As a way to counteract the arbitrariness of the verbal scale, it has 
been suggested to combine verbal and numerical labels which would fasten segments of the 
probability continuum to the categories (Witteman & Renooij, 2003). While we would be 
curious to see how such a scale fares in our research paradigm we do not really expect any 
benefit. On the contrary, we would expect a drop in sensitivity because, on the one hand, the 
numerical labels suppress the scale-free ordinal discrimination while, on the other hand, the 
scale, of course, still only has a very low resolution. 
What remains then is the question of whether a verbal rating scale can ever be used 
reasonably in research on subjective probability. The only application that we can think of is 
the assessment of ordinal relations of a limited number of different probabilities with the 
number of categories as an upper limit. Why this should be favored over simply asking for a 
direct ranking, however, is beyond us. 
Percent Estimates 
In most judgment and decision research, the percent format has a bad reputation as 
being too hard for subjects to handle. This is mainly due to a number of studies that have 
shown that biases in Bayesian reasoning disappear when likelihood information is presented 
in the form of natural frequencies (not relative frequencies) instead of probabilities (e.g., 
Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995). However, inference is not the same as estimation. For 
instance, numeracy, which essentially measures the ability to solve simple inference 
problems, had no effect on percent estimates in any of our experiments.13 We found percent 
                                                          
12 Note that this interpretation is different from the notion that verbal ratings express intuitive perceptions of certainty as discussed in the introduction. 
13 For this purpose, we additionally assessed the accuracy of percent estimates as absolute error and as root mean square deviations and also found no relation with numeracy. These analyses are not included in the paper because, as delineated above, they cannot be calculated for the rating scale and thus do not allow a comparison between scale formats. 
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estimates to provide the most reliable measurements of subjective probability and would 
recommend them as the format of choice whenever judgments need to be compared to a 
normative standard or across conditions. They are highly sensitive and relate consistently to 
the underlying representations. This, however, does not mean that they cannot lead to false 
conclusions. 
The defining features of the percent scale are its high resolution and the exactness of 
its categories (i.e., integers). These properties are also the reason why this format is often 
liked the least by subjects (Diefenbach et al., 1993; Eibner et al., 2006). It asks for precise 
estimates even when representations are not precise. One undesired consequence of this is an 
overreliance on readily available anchors such as multiples of ten or five when providing 
percent estimates (Ariely et al., 2000; Manski & Molinari, 2010; Wallsten, Budescu, & 
Zwick, 1993). Nonetheless the analyses of the CVs in this study and the study by Haase et al. 
(2013) clearly indicates that percent estimates are very sensitive to error and we would argue 
that this is a strength of the format because the imprecision is a part of the representation. It 
also means that researchers need to be aware of it. 
In the introduction we wrote that the percent scale might introduce more noise due to 
its high resolution. In light of our findings and in line with previous research (Pleskac, 
Dougherty, Rivadeneira, & Wallsten, 2009) we want to clarify this statement. The percent 
format does not introduce but capture noise. For instance, the sensitivity of the percent scale 
was generally lower than that of the rating scale at the aggregate but not at the individual 
score level because the percent estimates accurately reflected interindividual differences. 
Thus, additionally analyzing individual scores may help to avoid false conclusions in many 
research contexts. 
Being cognizant of the error in percent estimates is, of course, much more important in 
the analyses of mean judgments lest one fall prey to a classic regression fallacy. In 
Experiments 2 and 3 we observed lower estimates for the 50% probability in the low range as 
compared to the high range when the stimuli provided an anchor. These differences are an 
expression of the within-context regression toward the mean. This does not imply, however, 
that subjects did not truly differ in their estimates—of course they did! It only implies that 
these differences mean nothing beyond the fact that the representations underlying the 
estimates were perturbed by random error. It is prudent to keep this in mind when comparing 
experimental conditions that are supposed to represent another manipulated factor. While the 
midpoint of the probability continuum is certainly a very salient anchor in many contexts, the 
same logic applies to the whole range, as well as to any other single or number of arbitrary 
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anchors in the stimuli or on the measuring instrument itself (Hollands & Dyre, 2000). The 
important point is that the percent format remains consistent in how it translates error and 
anchors into estimates. 
There is one caveat to this statement. We observed that in all high-error conditions the 
judgment functions of the percent estimates did not cross the identity line at the midpoint 
(50% without an anchor, 25% and 75% respectively with an anchor) which would be expected 
as judgments should be regressed symmetrically. Instead, the “turning points” between over- 
and underestimation lay at around 30% (no anchor) and 20% and 40% respectively (anchor). 
One explanation for this could be that the representations of the high range stimuli were 
noisier because it is harder to track many instances of a focal event than just few. In that case, 
however, the judgments should differ in sensitivity between the ranges which was generally 
not the case. More importantly, the corresponding frequency estimates should show a similar 
pattern, but they crossed the identity lines roughly around the respective midpoints. A more 
likely explanation for this discrepancy could lie in the mental representation of numbers 
themselves. Keep in mind that subjects estimated both probabilities and frequencies as 
integers. However, the former covered a range from 0–100 (presumably not starting below 
10) while the latter only went up to estimates of around 20. Some research indicates that 
numbers are represented by magnitudes that have scalar variability, that is, a constant 
coefficient of variation (e.g., Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999). This property implies an 
increase in noise for estimates of larger magnitudes. Thus, even though subjects based their 
judgments on identical representations, expressing these judgments with larger numbers 
might have additionally increased the error (see Cohen, Ferrell, & Johnson, 2002 for 
comparable findings). 
Note, however, that both judgment functions in the low-error condition did not show 
this pattern but were regressed almost symmetrically. Additionally, their noise did not 
increase with magnitude. We found high positive correlations between mean percent 
estimates and their corresponding standard deviations in all high-error conditions, rs ≥ .79, 
ps ≤ .007, but not in the low-error condition, r = .15, p = .685, indicating that those judgments 
did not have scalar variability. It seems that with increasing noise in the underlying 
representations the percent scale becomes more alike to analog magnitude estimates and less 
alike to a high-resolution category scale (see Parducci & Wedell, 1986 for comparable 
findings and a similar interpretation). 
Nonetheless, the property of scalar variability implies flat variability profiles. 
However, the CV profiles for all percent estimates, including high-error conditions, show a 
168 Error and Anchor Effects in Probability Judgments 
marked downward trend (Figures 4, 9, & 14). The CVs for the frequency estimates, on the 
other hand, do not show any trend and remain reasonably level (Figures B3 & C3). Previous 
research indicates differences in scalar variability between unbounded (e.g., frequency) and 
bounded (e.g., probability) estimation tasks (Ebersbach, Luwel, Frick, Onghena, & 
Verschaffel, 2008; Ebersbach, Luwel, & Verschaffel, 2013). Here, this comparison is of 
course not entirely appropriate because of the highly different numerosities. It does, however, 
serve to illustrate that percent estimates were not simply mathematical transformations of 
previously provided frequency estimates but distinct judgments. 
Context Effects in Probability Estimates 
Each variation in any of the three experiments could be interpreted as a manipulation 
of the judgment context. However, as we explained in the introduction, we were interested in 
the kind of context effects that are created by the stimulus distributions and that have been 
studied predominantly within the framework of range-frequency theory (Parducci, 1965). 
From this point of view, we should have expected the same results in each experiment as the 
stimulus distributions were identical. We must note, though, that the applicability of range-
frequency theory to our paradigm is certainly questionable. First, it has typically been applied 
to judgments made on explicitly relativistic scales with no clearly defined lower and upper 
bounds. The study by Varey et al. (1999), of course, is the most relevant exception. 
Furthermore, to our knowledge, it has not been applied to this form of stimuli. Conceptually, 
in each trial we presented five stimuli (i.e., probabilities) simultaneously (i.e., before any 
judgment). However, each stimulus was itself composed of 20 sequentially encoded separate 
stimuli (i.e., option-outcome pairs). A later and more elaborated version of the theory assumes 
that due to working memory constraints the effective judgment context is limited to the 12 
previously presented stimuli (Parducci & Wedell, 1986). It is unclear, whether this limitation 
would be relevant here. Most importantly, range-frequency theory describes context effects in 
between-subjects designs while we varied the distributions within-subjects. Nonetheless we 
discuss our results in relation to this theory because they support an alternative account for 
context effects. 
Haase et al. (2013) observed different judgment functions for different stimulus 
distributions in a between-subjects design. Even though there were marked differences 
between different scale formats, their findings could be in line with range-frequency theory 
which takes the number of categories on a scale into account (Parducci, 1982). However, 
these context effects also varied with the difficulty of encoding the stimuli, that is, with the 
precision of the underlying representations. Therefore, the authors suggested that fuzzy-trace 
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theory (Reyna, 2012) might provide a better explanation. Our present findings support this 
conclusion. Furthermore, the within-subjects design provides a stronger test as it precludes the 
range-frequency account. We have observed that a change in the way a scale is used can give 
the appearance of context effects (Experiment 1) or, through the same mechanism, the 
appearance of normatively consistent probability judgments (Experiments 2 and 3). Crucially, 
as we observed for the latter two instances, these judgments contradicted direct assessments 
of the underlying frequency. Thus, these apparent context effects and their apparent absence 
were not located at the level of representation but were created by the specific scale format. In 
comparison, percent estimates have been consistent across different judgment contexts in 
between- (Haase et al., 2013) as well as in within-subjects designs (Experiment 1). The 
provision of an anchor in Experiments 2 and 3 led to context effects. However, the differences 
between judgments of a common stimulus were reversed to what range-frequency theory 
would predict and could be fully explained by taking the random error in the representations 
into account. It would be interesting to test whether the context effect that Varey et al. (1999) 
found were not, in fact, an expression of noisy judgments. 
Limitations 
The main limitation to our results and interpretations stems from the rather small 
sample sizes in all three experiments. Because it was crucial that all subjects based their 
judgments on identical information we were very conservative in excluding those for whom a 
proper encoding could not be confirmed. This resulted in a certain lack of power to detect 
significant differences, especially with regard to analyses based on the z-test. 
Additionally, we observed unexpected differences in the frequency estimates that were 
most likely carry-over effect from the different probability scale formats. However, as 
explained above, we do not believe that these impede our conclusions. 
Conclusion 
We investigated the performance of two scale formats for subjective probability when 
objective probabilities were provided. We found that a verbally labeled 7-point rating scale 
did not assess actual estimates of subjective probability but was rather used for categorization 
of stimuli. Moreover, the rules that guided this categorization depended upon the precision of 
the available information. This can lead to the appearance of context effects or of normatively 
correct judgments that are, however, not representative of the underlying representations. 
Thus, as this scale does not allow meaningful comparisons between experimental conditions 
even in within-subjects designs, we conclude that it should not be used in research on 
subjective probability. 
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Instead we recommend assessing probability judgments as percent estimates. The 
percent format is highly sensitive and captures the underlying representations reliably and for 
the most part consistently. It is however also sensitive to random error in said representation. 
Not being aware of this can lead to classic regression fallacies especially when the stimuli 
present salient anchors. 
In light of the many different ways that we have found in which different scale formats 
for subjective probability can lead to false conclusions we would like to close with a 
quotation from Stanley Smith Stevens’ and Eugene H. Galanter’s seminal paper on ratio and 
category scales (1957, p. 405). In their discussion of judgments of proportion, the authors 
laconically remark: 
There are numerous pitfalls in this business.  
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Appendix A: Stimulus Material 
 
Option names  Outcomes 
Female  Male  Adverse drug reactions  Crimes (Experiment 1 only) 
Anna  Andreas  Ausschlag [rash]  Diebstahl [theft] 
Ella  Christoph  Erbrechen [vomiting]  Mord [murder] 
Karin  Fabian  Fieber [fever]  Raub [robbery] 
Katja  Felix  Kopfschmerz [headache]  Schlägerei [brawl] 
Klara  Florian  Schwindel [dizziness]  Totschlag [manslaughter] 
Laura  Julian  Unruhe [restlessness]  Überfall [mugging] 
Lea  Marcel     
Lena  Martin     
Lisa  Matthias     
Lydia  Moritz     
Maria  Peter     
Nadin  Philipp     
Nina  Robert     
Sonja  Stefan     
Sophie  Thomas     
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Appendix B: Frequency Judgments in Experiment 2 
 
 
Figure B1. Mean frequency judgments as a function of presented frequencies (A: n = 28, B: n = 25, C: n = 27, D: n = 25). Solid lines represent the best linear fit. Correlation coefficients indicate sensitivity at the aggregate score level. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs. *p < .05. **p < .005. ***p < .001.  
 
Differences as a function of probability scale formats 
Figure B1 indicates that frequency judgments differed systematically as a function of 
the formats used probability judgments. Therefore, we calculated two separate mixed design 
ANOVAs – one for each encoding condition – with the scale format as between-subjects 
factor and the ten objective frequencies as within-subjects factor. In both cases Mauchly’s test 
indicated a violation of the assumption of sphericity, sequential encoding: χ²(44) = 203.65, 
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p < .001; list--wise: χ²(44) = 186.26, p < .001. We report Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests, 
sequential: ε = .52, list-wise: ε = .49. 
In the condition without an anchor we found a significant effect of the different 
frequencies indicating, of course, only that higher objective frequencies were judged to be 
higher, F(4.66, 247.10) = 36.18, p < .001, η
P
2  = .41. There was neither a main effect of the 
scale format on frequency judgments nor an interaction, Fs ≤ 1.58, ps ≥ .170, η
P
2s ≤ .03. 
In the anchor condition we observed the same effect of objective frequencies on 
frequency judgments, F(4.40, 211.19) = 47.75, p < .001, η
P
2  = .50. However, we also found 
that subjects who used the percent format in their probability judgments, judged frequencies 
to be higher than those subjects using the rating scale, F(1, 48) = 4.58, p = .037, η
P
2  = .09. The 
interaction was not significant, F < 1. 
Sensitivity 
A mixed-design ANOVA found individual sensitivity to be somewhat lower for 
higher frequencies (Figure B2), though this effect was not qualified as significant, 
F(1, 99) = 3.55, p = .062, η
P
2  = .04. Individual sensitivity did not differ as a function of 
encoding mode or scale format, Fs < 1. 
 
 
 
Figure B2. Sensitivity of frequency judgments at the individual score level of both scale formats for both ranges of probabilities and both encoding conditions. Error bars = 95% CIs. 
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At the aggregate score level, sensitivity did not differ as a function of encoding mode 
or scale format for either range of frequencies, low: Q = 1.18, df = 3, p = .759, high: Q = 0.34, 
df = 3, p = .953, or between frequency ranges, ts ≤ 1.69, ps ≥ .093, rs ≤ .09. 
Error in judgment 
Mean CVs were: 7-Point, no anchor = .552, anchor = .590; percent, no anchor = .636, 
anchor = .545. CVs did not differ between conditions, ts ≤ |1.03|, ps ≥ .304, rs ≤ .08. 
 
 
 
Figure B3. Coefficients of variation as variability profiles over all frequency judgments for all 
between-subjects conditions. 
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Appendix C: Frequency Judgments in Experiment 3 
 
 
Figure C1. Mean frequency judgments as a function of presented frequencies (A: n = 22, B: n = 24, C: n = 21, D: n = 25). Solid lines represent the best linear fit. Correlation coefficients indicate sensitivity at the aggregate score level. Error bars = 95% within-subjects CIs. *p < .05. **p < .005. ***p < .001.  
 
Differences as a function of probability scale formats 
Figures 15 and C1 indicate that frequency judgments in the high-error condition 
differed systematically as a function of probability scale formats. We calculated mixed design 
ANOVAs for each encoding condition with the scale format as between-subjects factor and 
the ten objective frequencies as within-subjects factor. In both cases Mauchly’s test indicated 
a violation of the assumption of sphericity, high-error: χ²(44) = 183.48, p < .001; low: 
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χ²(44) = 129.32, p < .001. We report Greenhouse-Geisser corrected tests, high-error: ε = .49; 
low: ε = .53. 
Besides the effect of objective frequencies, F(4.39, 179.86) = 58.97, p < .001, 
η
P
2  = .59, when error was high subjects in the percent group estimated frequencies to be 
significantly higher than those using the rating scale, F(1, 41) = 10.60, p = .002, η
P
2  = .21. 
In the low-error condition we observed the same effect of objective frequencies on 
frequency judgments, F(4.77, 244.15) = 258.39, p < .001, η
P
2  = .85 as well as a small but 
negligible interaction effect, F(4.77, 244.15) = 2.86, p = .017, η
P
2  = .06. However, frequency 
estimates did not vary as a function of the scale format used for probability judgments, F < 1. 
Sensitivity 
We recoded perfect sensitivity in 18 out of 527 (3.42%) correlations. A mixed-design 
ANOVA found that subjects were more sensitive to frequencies in the low-error condition as 
compared to the high-error condition, F(1, 87) = 55.76, p < .001, η
P
2  = .39. Additionally, 
subjects were less sensitive to high range frequencies than to low range frequencies, 
F(1, 87) = 11.34, p = .001, η
P
2  = .12. There was no difference between scale formats, nor were 
there any significant interactions, all F < 1. 
 
 
 
Figure C2. Sensitivity of frequency judgments at the individual score level of both scale 
formats for both ranges of probabilities and both encoding conditions. Error bars = 95% CIs. 
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At the aggregate level, the omnibus Q-test also confirmed significant differences 
between sensitivities for both frequency ranges, low: Q = 69.93, df = 3, p < .001; high: 
Q = 47.67, df = 3, p < .001. Single comparisons using Fisher’s z-test revealed that aggregate 
sensitivity was significantly higher in the low-error condition within as well as across 
probability scale conditions, low range: zs ≥ |2.87|, ps < .004; high: zs ≥ |3.53|, ps < .001. 
Additionally, for low range frequencies, aggregate sensitivity differed as a function of 
the scale format. In the high-error encoding, frequency estimates by subjects who used the 
rating scale were more sensitive than those by subjects using the percent format, z = 2.50, 
p = .012. In the high-error condition, this trend was reversed, z = −2.49, p = .013. However, 
assuming a Bonferroni corrected significance criterion of .008, neither effect would be 
qualified as significant. In the high range, aggregate sensitivity did not differ between scale 
formats within encoding conditions, zs ≤ |1.63|, ps ≥ .104. 
Generally, frequency estimates were more sensitive to lower frequencies then to 
higher ones, ts ≥ 2.48, ps ≤ .014, rs ≥ .13, except for list-wise-percent condition, t = 1.01, 
p = .315, r = .06. 
Error in judgment 
Mean CVs were: 7-point rating scale, high-error = 0.483, low = 0.383; percent format, 
high-error = 0.548, low = 0.332. Within encoding conditions, CVs did not differ between 
scale formats, ts ≤ |1.04|, ps ≥ .302. Generally, frequency estimates showed less variation in 
the low-error condition, though differences were not as clear-cut as for probability judgments. 
Assuming a Bonferroni corrected significance criterion of .008, frequency estimates’ variation 
only differed significantly in the percent condition, t(136) = 3.12, p = .002, r = .26, but not for 
subjects who had used the rating scale, t(136) = 1.59, p = .115, r = .14. Across scale formats 
comparisons: ts ≥ |2.28|, ps ≤ .024, rs ≥ .19. 
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Figure C3. Coefficients of variation as variability profiles over all frequency judgments for all 
between-subjects conditions. 
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Summary of the Research Findings 
The experiment in the first article (Haase, Betsch, & Renkewitz, 2015) revealed a 
stable effect of single-case narrative exemplars on the perceived risk and the subjective 
probability of vaccine adverse events even though a statistic had also been provided. 
Furthermore, the narratives also biased perceptions of severity. Manipulating the credibility of 
the statistical information had no effect. However, exemplars from a low-credibility source 
led to generally reduced estimates on all dependent variables but had no moderating effect on 
the occurrence of the bias. 
The two experiments in Article 2 (Betsch, Haase, Renkewitz, & Schmid, 2015) found 
that the occurrence of the bias is task- and context dependent: Exemplars had the strongest 
effect on a broad risk measure while two scales for subjective probability mostly reflected 
variations in the statistical information. These ratios, however, varied as a function of the 
order in which the constructs were judged. Furthermore, different cognitive processes seem to 
underlie these judgments: Exemplars increased rather than decreased risk perceptions while 
the effect on probability estimates was symmetric. Additionally, numeracy had inconsistent 
moderating effects. Overall, these findings underscore the important conceptual distinction 
between risk perceptions and subjective probability. Crucially though, the effect of exemplars 
was driven by representations of likelihood. 
The experiment in the third article (Haase, Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2013) showed that 
the performance of different measurement formats for subjective probability differs not only 
due to scale-inherent characteristics, such as their resolution or whether they are verbal or 
numeric in nature. The differences themselves differed as a function of the noise in the 
underlying representations. Greater error reduced differences in scale sensitivity but changed 
the way a low-resolution scale was used which may account in part for commonly observed 
context effects in between-subjects designs. 
Finally, the three experiments in Article 4 (Haase & Betsch, 2016) revealed that high 
error can create apparent context effects even in a within-subjects design, though the 
responsible mechanism differs between scale formats. For a low-resolution verbal scale, the 
error changes the way the scale is used from a focus on mapping probabilities’ positions on 
the probability continuum to differentiating them, effectively reducing the level of 
measurement to ordinal or even nominal. For a high-resolution numerical scale, high error 
may lead to classic regression fallacies which could also be interpreted as context effects. 
However, the percent format remains relatively consistent in how it captures the error in 
representations. 
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Discussion and Implications 
The findings in Article 1 are in line with previous studies using the same research 
paradigm. Context variables—such as the emotionality of narratives (Betsch, Ulshöfer, 
Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2011), the credibility of their source (Haase et al., 2015), or the 
perceived personal susceptibility to experiencing the focal event (Haase, Schmid, & Betsch, 
2016)—can have a main effect on risk and sometimes on probability judgments but do not 
moderate the bias created by single-case exemplars. Only numeracy, that is, the ability to 
perform operations with numbers and proportions has inconsistently affected its occurrence. 
Sometimes highly numerate subjects have been less susceptible to the influence of a small 
sample of exemplars. (Betsch et al., 2015; Haase et al., 2015; Haase et al., 2016 but see 
Betsch, Renkewitz, & Haase, 2013). 
All these findings are in line with the notion that the encoding of frequency 
information is a fundamental, largely automatic and ultimately inevitable property of 
perception (Zacks & Hasher, 2002). People are highly sensitive to event frequencies and use 
them for probabilistic judgments. However, the translation of a frequency representation into 
a judgment of probability or risk involves other processes as the effects of numeracy in the 
presented inference tasks indicate. But also in pure estimation tasks, probability judgments are 
not simply mathematical transformations of encoded absolute frequencies as indicated, for 
example, by the differences between the error distributions of frequency and probability 
judgments that were based on the same stimuli in Article 4. 
Articles 2–4 address how perceptions of probability that are based on relative 
frequencies are mapped onto different measurement formats under various conditions. There 
is one important difference to keep in mind though. In Article 2, the probabilistic information 
was manipulated in an applied context and subjects were faced with an inference task. The 
experiments in Articles 3 and 4, on the other hand, employed an almost psychophysical 
design in that the stimuli were not embedded in an elaborate scenario and the task was 
focused on estimation only. Consequently, the manipulations of the focal event’s severity and 
domain had no effect. This distinction is crucial as the respective findings relate to different 
aspects of the scale formats’ validity. I will first discuss the results reported in Articles 3 and 
4 because the conclusions are rather clear-cut. I will then close with a discussion of Article 2 
because its theoretical implications are broader and somewhat ambiguous. 
The results from the studies in Articles 3 and 4 indicate that all subjects used their 
respective scale format to express the same construct, that is, their perception of the objective 
probability which they had encoded as a relative frequency. Thus, in the sense that the 
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construct of interest is frequentist probability, all formats can be considered valid given the 
right circumstances (i.e., the research paradigm). However, the formats also provided clearly 
defined bounds at the bottom and top end of the scale indicating to the subjects that the 
construct is not just probability but absolute probability, in contrast to relative probability. 
Mapping the probability continuum on to a rating scale with a limited number of categories 
means, of course, that similar probabilities need to be placed in the same category. When 
subjects have precise knowledge, this is what they do (Article 3, graphical encoding). 
However, with increasing error in the representations the focus shifts from precise mapping to 
differentiation (Articles 3 & 4), which is in line with a preference for gist-based reasoning as 
posited by fuzzy-trace theory (Reyna, 2012). From the subjects’ point of view it may seem 
reasonable to at least successfully convey certain knowledge (i.e., ordinal relations) than to 
potentially fail at conveying vague impressions (absolute probabilities). For the researcher 
who uses a low-resolution scale, however, this means that the construct she measures changes 
as a function of noise. While this may be interpreted as measurement error, it is not an issue 
of scale reliability—the effects are systematic and repeatable. It rather demonstrates that 
verbal probability measures have unstable validity. 
Thus, whenever a research question asks for a comparison of probability estimates, a 
low-resolution verbal rating scale is not a valid instrument. This does not only apply to 
situations where judgments are to be compared to objective probabilities but to any 
comparison of estimates between different contexts (e.g., experimental conditions), between- 
as well as within-subjects. Situations like this require a high-resolution numeric instrument. 
By prompting concerns about accuracy (Windschitl & Wells, 1996) numbers keep the answer 
scale fixed to the probability continuum, that is, the construct remains absolute probability. 
More importantly, they allow and force subjects to make use of the high resolution in the first 
place. Recall, for example, the visual analog scale in Article 3. It provided the same resolution 
as the two numeric instruments but no numeric feedback. Consequently, estimates were very 
similar to the rating scales in terms of sensitivity and context dependency. This is in line with 
previous research reporting that in an applied context (i.e., imperfect knowledge) people 
typically do not use more than seven categories for judgments and a higher resolution does 
not improve scale sensitivity (Diefenbach, Weinstein, & O’Reilly, 1993; McKelvie, 1978; 
Weinstein & Diefenbach, 1997). The strength of the numeric format, however, does not lie in 
its superiority to capture monotonic change but to capture random error by asking for precise 
estimates even when representations are vague. The error is part of the representation that one 
is trying to assess and being sensitive to it makes numerical probability estimates relate 
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consistently to the theoretical probability continuum allowing for comparisons between 
judgment contexts. Again, a finding which might be construed to indicate a lack of reliability 
reveals in fact, I would argue, a property of the scale format which speaks to its validity. 
From the reasoning thus far one could draw the conclusion that subjective probability 
should simply always be assessed numerically, preferably in the form of percent estimates. 
Unfortunately, matters get a lot less clear once we leave the confines of psychophysical 
research and turn to the applied context. When there is good reason to believe that subjects 
can sample event frequencies in such a context, the previous argument, of course, still applies. 
However, we can easily identify a priori circumstances where asking for a percent estimate is 
counterproductive or does not even make sense. For instance, when people have no 
information at all (e.g., asking a Franconian farmer about the chances of rain in Tokyo?)1 or 
when the event is fundamentally unique (e.g., “How likely is it that Margarete loves me?”)2  
Of course, we still need to communicate about situations like this. After all, humanity 
had to deal with uncertain prospects long before Blaise Pascal developed probability theory 
(Zimmer, 1983). But, when we do, we are not referring to objective probabilities but rather to 
the strength of our beliefs, that is, subjectivist probability. Verbal expressions seem intuitive 
and natural for this purpose and pose no problem in clear-cut cases like the two examples 
where comparisons to any objective criterion are dismissed from the outset. However, when 
there is a normative standard that is defined by an objectivist interpretation of probability—as 
is the case in the experiments in Articles 1 and 2—the downside of verbal expressions 
becomes quickly apparent: Very often we cannot be certain about what construct we are 
referring to, or, more specifically, whether at all or to what extend a belief in an objective 
probability enters into a verbal probability judgment. For instance, in Article 2 we only 
observed an effect of the single-case exemplars (i.e., a purely probabilistic manipulation) on 
the verbal rating scale when we either controlled for perceptions of severity or when subjects 
had judged the broader risk construct first. Both findings indicate that in an applied context 
verbal probability judgments might best be understood from a subjectivist perspective. 
                                                          
1 This example assumes that the average Franconian farmer has not spent an extended period in Tokyo to collect data on the frequency of rain. 
2 One could, of course, argue that there are many instances of girls like Margarete and boys like me. Then the question becomes an issue of finding the right reference classes to which we belong. Similarly, one could take Margarete not as a whole but rather analyze specific behavioral patterns and character traits that have previously coincided with loving me (which is the basic working principle of online dating websites). 
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Incidentally, this is the reason why it was crucial that in Articles 3 and 4 the verbal judgments 
were not affected by the focal events’ severity and domain. Thus, we could be certain that 
subjects tried to express their perceptions of objective probability and we could interpret that 
the scale format is also inconsistent regarding the structure of the construct (i.e., absolute vs. 
relative judgments) and not just its content (objectivist vs. subjectivist interpretation). Note 
that the subjectivist view theoretically does not include other aspects of an uncertain prospect 
in its interpretation of probability. However, how to disentangle subjectivist probabilities 
from values has been the central challenge for this position with some arguing that it is neither 
possible nor necessary (Nau, 2002).  
The argument about the uncertainty over what construct we are actually assessing with 
verbal probability expressions applies by extension to risk judgments. The key difference is 
that most theoretical perspectives are explicit about including other constructs than objective 
probability in their definitions of risk. Nonetheless, the effect of the relative frequency of 
exemplars on risk judgments changes when subjects first provide probability estimates or 
when we control for severity. Given their flexibility and sensitivity to context manipulations, 
it is then not surprising that verbal likelihood formats and risk judgments have consistently 
been shown to be superior in the prediction of behavioral intentions and actual behavior than 
numeric probability estimates (Article 2; Baghal, 2011; Weinstein et al., 2007; Windschitl & 
Wells, 1996). Behavior, of course, has more antecedent than just the belief in the objective 
probability of behavioral outcomes. 
However, when we assess biases we need to apply a normative standard and in most 
research on biased probabilistic reasoning this standard is rooted in a frequentist interpretation 
of probability including the bias of single-case exemplars which hinges on the law of large 
numbers. In Article 2 we observed a large effect on a broad risk measure (both experiments) 
and only a small (Experiment 1) or even no effect (Experiment 2) on a percent estimate. In 
Articles 3 and 4 we found the percent format to be highly sensitive to frequentist probability. 
Taken together, we could then conclude that single-case exemplars increase risk perceptions 
through other constituents of the construct. For example, repeatedly reading about vaccine 
adverse events might make them seem more severe and thus make vaccinations seem more 
risky. If this were the case, one might still argue that the reasoning is biased if one assumed 
that perceptions of severity should not be changed by a few repeated encounters with an 
event. However, this bias does not violate probability theory. Given this reasoning, I close 
with pointing out what I believe to be the most striking finding of this dissertation. Subjects 
extracted a representation of likelihood (i.e., relative frequency) from a small sample of 
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single-case exemplars (Article 2, Experiment 2). This representation had no effect on an 
instrument shown to be sensitive to relative frequencies (i.e., percent estimates) but a large 
effect on the inherently multi-dimensional risk measure. Thus, the relationship between 
representations of subjective probability and perceptions of risk is not yet fully understood. 
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